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Abstract
Social Order and Contest in Meanings and Power:
Black Boycotts against Korean Shopkeepers 
in Poor Black New York City Neighborhoods
by
JEONGDUK YI 
Advisor: Professor Gerald Sider
This dissertation aims to provide an analysis of the 
process of social reproduction revealed through the conflict 
between Korean sopkeepers and poor Black inner city 
residents in New York City. The major concepts, discussed 
in the introduction, include culture, power, domination, 
resistance, and conceptual orders.
The pervasive racism and capitalism in America provides 
the context where the two minority groups have been 
constituted and! where opposing meanings are contested as the 
conflict between Korean shopkeepers and poor Blacks 
develops. State agents, Whites, and news media also join in 
the process of the conflict. They contest with various 
combinations of coercion, persuasion, protest, and 
argumentations for the maintenance or change of the existing 
social relationships.
With further theoretical discussion on the conflict, 
the multidimensionality of social orders, the relationship 
between conceptual orders and social reproduction, and the 
interconnection among meanings, power, and economic 
relationships are discussed in the conclusion.
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PART ONE
INTRODUCTION
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2CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The anthropologists have shown us that cultural 
forms - as "determinate orderings" of things, 
behavior, and ideas - do play a demonstrable role 
in the management of human interaction. What will 
be required of us in the future is not to deny 
that role, but to understand more precisely how 
cultural forms work to mediate social 
relationships among particular populations. (Wolf 
1982:19)
The core of culture is the form and manner in 
which people perceive, define, articulate, and 
express their mutual relations. (Sider 1986:120)
The word is the ideological phenomenon par 
excellence. (Volosinov 1986:13)
...the maintenance of categories upholds power, 
and power maintains the order of the world. (Wolf 
1990:593)
Aims of the Research 
This dissertation aims to illustrate processes of 
social reproduction as revealed through the conflict between 
two social groups in New York City. I use the concept of 
social reproduction as the reproduction or maintenance of 
social order despite challenges to it. Specifically, this 
dissertation will discuss how two groups in different 
economic positions came into opposition, how they 
conceptualize the conflict between them, and how they 
contest meanings and power in the context of wider society. 
The escalation of the conflict between Korean shopkeepers
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
and the poor Black inner city residents during 1988-1990 in 
New York City provides a good opportunity to examine how 
people challenge existing social relationships and how state 
agents such as politicians, public officials, law enforcers, 
and involved groups deploy their cultural and political 
efforts to change, compromise, and maintain existing social 
relationships.
However, because they contest in historically product 1 
social conditions, it is important to understand how 
structural limitation of the playing fields for both poor 
Blacks and Korean shopkeepers have been constructed through 
history. In order to understand these historical and 
structural backgrounds of the conflict between two groups, I 
will also examine how a poor Black neighborhood was 
constructed in Harlem, how the Blacks in Harlem historically 
experienced the conflict with alien shopkeepers, why Koreans 
immigrated and settled in urban neighborhoods, and how they 
opened and expanded their business in poor Black 
neighborhoods. Because these processes have been closely 
related to American racism and capitalism, I will also 
consider the context of American racism and capitalism in 
discussing poor Black residents and Korean shopkeepers.
By discussing the historically constructed social 
conditions for social groups and the process of their 
conflict and its connection to wider social context, this 
dissertation aims to contribute to the theoretical
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
discussion of the process of the reproduction of social 
orders and to the discussion of American social dynamics, 
especially to the interconnection between racism and 
capitalism.
In order to achieve these aims, I will focus on two 
things in this introduction. In sections of the first half 
of this introduction, I will discuss general conceptual 
tools which are necessary for the theoretical 
conceptualizations of the process of social reproduction.
In sections of the second half, I will specifically focus on 
the more concrete frameworks which are directly related to 
the understanding of the conflict between Korean shopkeepers 
and poor Blacks. Therefore, sections in the first half 
address the relationships between culture and power, between 
domination and resistance, and between social order and 
conceptual order. Sections in the second half shall 
consider the economic positions of Korean shopkeepers and 
poor Black residents, their racial conceptions befpre the 
conflict between the two groups, my motivations in selecting 
this topic and a field area for this dissertation, and the 
collection of my data.
Culture and Power
Most anthropologists think about culture. What is 
culture? Culture which had meant in its early uses "the 
tending of... crops or animals" became a metaphor for the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
cultivation of the mind (Williams 1976:76-82). In 
eighteenth-century Germany, Herder provided an 
anthropological turn for the conceptualization of culture. 
Herder used 'cultures' in the plural: the particular 
characteristics of different groups, nations, and periods. 
Thus, a culture was used for a culture of a specific nation 
or period. Tylor (1871) and Boas (1920; see also 1940) used 
cultures in this context, and the concept of culture as a 
particular way of life of a specific group has been well 
established in anthropology.
However, traditional conceptualizations of culture in 
anthropology are very limited in explaining cultural 
dynamics, because their conceptualizations of culture give 
insufficient attention to problems of power and social 
conflict (Wolf 1982:afterword). Even those who paid 
attention to power and social conflict in understanding 
culture limited their analytical understanding to 
equilibrium systems (e.g. Leach 1954; Gluckman 1955) or to 
individual interactions (Turner 1957; Barth 1959; Cohen 
1974).
The equilibrium model does not explain historical 
change. The interactional understanding of power is very 
limited because this model ignores organizational and 
structural dimensions of power. According to Wolf(1990), 
four different modes of power can be ascertained: individual 
endowment in the play of power; imposition of one's will on
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6others in interpersonal relationships; controls within the
setting (organizational power); and the ability to structure
the settings themselves (structural power). If we primarily
focus on individual interaction in understanding power,
neither structural power which shapes the social field of
action nor organizational power which sets up relationships
among people through allocation and control of resources and
rewards come into our view (Wolf 1990).
The various dimensions of power cannot be ignored when
we understand culture, because, as Wolf (1990:593) suggests,
Power is implicated in meaning through its role in 
upholding one version of significance as true, 
fruitful, or beautiful, against other possibilities 
that may threaten truth, fruitfulness, or beauty. All 
cultures, however conceived, carve out significance and 
try to stabilize it against possible alternatives.
In another dimension, a problem for the traditional
conceptualizations of culture is that the integration,
boundedness, uniqueness, and to a lesser degree,
independence from other social dimensions of each culture
were assumed a priori. This conception of culture, in fact,
came into existence when European nations contended for
dominance or for separate identities and independence and
"[t]he notion of separate and integral cultures responded to
this political project” (Wolf 1982:387). The vestiges of
this conceptualization of culture in the specific European
political environment were carried over to anthropology. In
order to overcome this problem and to reflect the social
reality of "historically changing, imperfectly bounded,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7multiple and branching social alignments," Wolf (1982:387) 
suggests us to replace "the concept of a fixed, unitary, and 
bounded culture" with "a sense of the fluidity and 
permeability of cultural sets."
The concepts of cultural sets or cultural forms provide 
conceptual tools free from the a priori assumptions of the 
concept of culture in anthropology. If we continue to use 
culture as an integrated totality, this concept of culture 
inherently limits the possibility to examine the diverse, 
contradictory, permeable, and inconsistent elements in 
culture because the paradigm of the traditional conception 
of culture will render those elements trivial and 
meaningless.
In order to avoid the limitation of traditional 
concepts of culture in anthropology, my dissertation will 
focus not on culture per se, but certain cultural sets, 
especially meanings, which can make us possible to approach 
the fluidity of cultural dynamics. These meanings are not 
to be considered as the precise and fixed meanings. They 
may be generated, assembled, ensembled, changed, modified, 
distorted, and discarded in the process of concrete social 
interactions (Wolf 1982:385-391). As Moreman (1988:97) 
mentions, "meaning is situated, not abstract; enacted, not 
embodied; negotiated, not decoded; consequential, not prior, 
to use; and not exclusively referential." This 
understanding of cultural sets is important for analyzing
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the process of social reproduction, because this approach 
makes the dynamics process of cultural sets, in connection 
to the dynamics or other social dimensions, come into our 
view.
Domination and Resistance
The turn toward power in understanding culture, or vice 
versa, which influences recent anthropologists came from 
Marxist traditions(e.g. Gramsci 1971; Thompson 1963;
Williams 1977), especially for political-economic 
anthropologists, and from poststructuralism (e.g. Foucault 
1978; 1979; 1980), especially for feminist and post­
modernist anthropologists. Among them, Gramsci provides the 
most systemic —  but scattered and often inconsistent —  
conceptual tools to approach the complex interlocking 
relationships between state and civil society, and between 
power and culture.
Gramsci distinguishes "rule" Idominio) from "hegemony." 
Rule is a direct political form while hegemony is "a more 
complex interlocking of political, social and cultural 
forces" (Williams 1977:108). Thus, the concept of hegemony 
relates culture to power. For Williams, hegemony is never 
total nor exclusive and forms of alternative or oppositional 
politics and culture exist in any society.1 These
1 Foucault also states a similar view. "Where there is a 
power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, 
this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
oppositional features are also indicative "of what the 
hegemonic process2 has in practice had to work to control" 
(Williams 1977:113). This conceptualization of hegemony 
emphasizes the various processes producing consent from the 
dominated. In this sense, the hegemonic process is a good 
conceptual tool to analyze the process of making consent 
even in a society where the achieved moral leadership does 
not exist.
However, the concept of hegemony can overemphasize the 
possibility of consent3 because the concept directs our 
concerns toward the possibility of achieving consent through
relation to power" (Foucault 1978:95-96).
2 While Foucault would put power here instead of "hegemonic 
process," Bourdieu would put domination. It seems to me 
that Foucaultian conception of power already incorporates 
the hegemonic process in it. Thus, Foucault can discuss the 
hegemonic process without the concept of hegemony. However, 
because Foucault, in his conceptualization of power, ignores 
the role of the material conditions in constituting social 
relations, knowledge, and subjectivity, his conceptual 
framework is not adequate for understanding social 
reproduction. (For a concise explanation of the Foucaultian 
concept of power, see Digeser 1992.) In contrast, Bourdieu 
tries to connect culture, politics, and class. In his 
conceptualization of domination, Bourdieu (1977:183-197) 
argues that cultural forms are inherent elements of the 
reproduction of domination.
3 At the time of Gramsci, 97% of the population in Italy 
was Catholic and even Gramsci's mother considered Gramsci as 
a poor atheist(Germino 1990). The tremendous impact of 
Catholicism in Italian social dynamics might have been the 
major subject which Gramsci wanted to wrestle through the 
concept of hegemony. Thus, in understanding the concept of 
hegemony, the peculiarity of the Italian society should be 
considered. His division between the East and the West does 
not solve the problem, because the variations among the East 
or the West also require further explanation.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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various cultural mechanisms while the concept directs us 
possibly to belittle various faces of direct political (or 
dominating) mechanisms including explicit and implicit, as 
well as direct and indirect, use of force, coercion, 
pressure, constraint, and influence. As Abercrombie, Hill 
and Turner(1980) and Scott(1985; 1990) show, even though the 
process of manufacturing consent may exist in a society, the 
real consent may not be successfully produced. Moreover, 
the dominant classes do not necessarily need consent in 
ruling or directing a society.
I would argue that while the hegemony of the dominant 
may exist in certain sections of a society, it may not exist 
as strongly, or at all, in other sections. Even though 
hegemony is not necessarily achieved over certain social 
sections, the research on the hegemonic process will reveal 
how relations between particular groups are mediated through 
interlocking social, cultural, and political relationships. 
However, the attention to both the hegemonic process and 
direct political process should be balanced in order to 
avoid the possibility of misdirecting our concerns toward 
one aspect of social dynamics, and while ignoring the other.
Resistance provides a good window to examine the 
mechanism of power, which includes the hegemonic process and 
the direct political process. The dynamics of power become 
clearer during the acts of containing and defusing 
resistance through interlocking cultural and political
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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mechanisms. Resistance not only reveals the complex faces 
of power, but also alters the faces of power, because the 
dominant groups must deploy the new or adapted faces of 
power in order to contain or accommodate new phases of 
resistance. Thus studies on resistance can analyze the 
continuous shift of the faces of both power (Abu-Lughod 
1990j41), and the resistance manifested both in culture and 
politics and through their interconnections.
The conceptual framework of domination/resistance, 
discussed above, directed this researcher to pay close 
attention to the various political and hegemonic processes 
not only in civil society but also in relation to state 
agents during the conflict between poor Blacks and Korean 
shopkeepers. Previous discussion of the conflict between 
poor Blacks and Korean shopkeepers ignored this complex 
political process by focusing on the different communication 
styles of the two groups (Stewart 1989), by presenting 
Blacks and Koreans as similar minorities (Chang 1990), or by 
focusing on the economic dimension of Korean shopkeepers 
(Light and Bonacich 1988).
Conceptual Orders and Social Contests
The web of meanings is a fundamental aspect of human 
life (Geertz 1973). The web of meanings provides people 
with "conceptions of the world" (Gramsci 1971), "a sense of 
the reality" (Williams 1977), or a "symbolic universe"
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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(Berger 1966) which guides people in how to live and how to 
interpret the world. As Peter Berger (1966) suggests, the 
phenomenon of actual reality is too complex to experience 
meaningfully without some guiding and filtering frameworks. 
Thus, classificatory systems and/or symbolic categories 
guide us to organize the myriad reality into a relatively 
orderly and meaningful reality.
However, these guiding and filtering frameworks should 
be considered as tools to grasp and organize reality rather 
than as a framework to arbitrarily structure the 
representation of reality. That is, frameworks are used in 
a continuous interaction with the reality and can be 
transformed, discarded, and replaced with other ones. 
However, in the process of grasping and organizing reality, 
the frameworks influence not only our cognition of reality 
but also our moral order of reality.
Douglas (1966) shows that classificatory systems are 
not only classifying myriad things and organizing them into 
an orderly reality but also putting them into a moral 
framework. Thus, the classification system is an organizing 
tool for reality and also for morality at the same time. 
According to her, what does not fit into existing rules or 
classificatory systems is described by a society as dirty, 
polluted, or dangerous. By eliminating or punishing the 
boundary transgression, the reality and rightness of 
original rules or classificatory systems are restored and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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confirmed. While Douglas limits her focus to the boundary 
crisis, Bourdieu goes further and considers some 
classificatory systems themselves as a reproductive 
mechanism of class relations.
According to Bourdieu (1977a; 1977b; 1984; 1991), 
access to different kinds of cultural capital such as 
language, attitudes, education, consumption, and lifestyle 
is determined by one's class position, and differentiations 
in cultural capital reproduce these social inequalities.
That is, cultural capital or symbolic differentiation 
justifies hierarchical exclusionary practices, and mutes the 
critique against existing social hierarchy. Classificatory 
systems of myriad symbolic acts, words, and objects are also 
the result of the active manipulation of symbols by the 
upper class. By emphasizing the distinction of the upper 
class and by the devaluing of the culture of other groups, 
the differential meanings of various lifestyles justify a 
social hierarchy (Bourdieu 1984).
But Bourdieu does not clearly explain how existing 
classificatory orders are internalized or rejected. He also 
ignores implicit and explicit resistance or disagreement 
over the classification among different classes (Joppke 
1986). In order to explain the social struggle over signs, 
Volosinov (1986) proposes the concept of multiaccentuality 
where "differently oriented social interests" intersect.
"By and large, it is thanks to this intersecting of accents
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
14
that a sign maintains its vitality and dynamism and the 
capacity for further development. A sign that has been 
withdrawn from pressures of the social struggle... 
inevitably loses force..."(Volosinov 1986:23). In other 
words, because accents in meanings of signs are challenged, 
contested, and disciplined, accents in meanings are in a 
state of constant tension. However, "differently oriented 
social interests" produce tension not only in accents of 
meanings but also in claims and assertions. This tension 
may be negotiated through compromise or heightened through 
antagonistic confrontations among differently oriented 
social groups.
This logic can also be applied to classificatory 
orders. Classificatory orders are under "pressures of the 
social struggle." Because "the creation of conceptual order 
is also, constitutively, the suppression of aspects of 
reality" (Valeri 1985:xi, quoted in Wolf 1990:593), power 
holders should assault or suppress rival categorical claims 
in order to maintain their conceptual order. That is, 
classificatory orders that justify an existing social 
hierarchy can be maintained only when rival conceptual 
orders or claims can be oppressed. Thus, signs and 
classificatory systems have to be seen as the sites where 
disciplinary acts for domination, and resistance toward 
dominant accents clash.
This conceptual framework for the relationship between
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classificatory systems and domination/resistance has very 
important implications for the understanding of the conflict 
between poor Black residents and Korean shopkeepers because 
I found, through my preliminary research, that the 
hierarchial conceptualizations of racial order and 
individual virtues are the most important sites of struggles 
for the both groups. Loewen's The Mississippi Chinese(19711 
clearly showed that the conceptualization of racial 
hierarchy was very important for the dynamics and change of 
the economic and social relationships among Blacks, Chinese, 
and Whites in the Mississippi Delta area. However, in 
studies about the conflict between Black residents and 
Korean shopkeepers (Chang 1990? I. Kim 1981; Light and 
Bonacich 1988; Stewart 1989), the role of the hierarchical 
conceptualizations of racial order and individual virtues 
was totally ignored.
The conceptual orders of racial hierarchy and 
individual virtues in certain groups develop within 
historical and social contexts. The historical and social 
contexts of the hierarchical conceptions of racial order 
between Blacks and Whites will be discussed in chapters 2,
6, and 7; I will briefly explain here the concepts of racial 
order Korean immigrants brought with them from Korea to 
America. This is important for understanding the context of 
their present conception of racial order which is one of the 
major sites of struggle between poor Blacks and Korean
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shopkeepers. The present concepts of racial order of Korean 
shopkeepers in relation to Blacks will be discussed in 
chapter 6. However, in order to contextualize the political 
and cultural dimensions of the conflict between Korean 
shopkeepers and poor Blacks in American society, I will 
discuss their material conditions in America first. Their 
political and cultural conditions will be discussed in the 
subsequent chapters.
The Material Conditions of the Existence of Shopkeepers
The following abstract presentation of the social 
relationships of shopkeepers in this section is an effort to 
provide a conceptual framework with which I can approach 
more concrete socio-cultural relationships and dynamics in a 
definite social and historical moment. Since culture 
mediates social relationships, especially, the relationships 
of production and appropriation, the understanding of the 
relationships of production and appropriation is an 
important first step for analyzing the implications of 
various cultural sets or forms. Thus, this section should 
be understood not as a result of data analysis but as a 
conceptual construction to help the analysis of the data.
The human species has, "in the course of evolution, 
acquired the ability to transform nature to human use" (Wolf 
1982:74). In the process of production and consumption, 
human beings organize themselves. In capitalist societies,
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most products and even human labor are commodified and put 
into circulation. Commodities are distributed through 
wholesalers and retailers which include capitalist 
distributors such as Wal-Mart or Price Club and small 
retailers such as "mom and pop" stores. This distribution 
is for individual consumption through which individual 
households and individuals reproduce themselves.4 Because 
individual and collective consumption reproduces labor 
power, this process is a critical moment of capitalist 
reproduction.
Exchanges of commodities for individual consumption are 
at the core of the economic relationship of shopkeepers. In 
capitalist societies, these exchanges are a part of the 
circulation of commodities in the process of realization of 
surplus value or profit. Their main social relationships 
can be diagrammed as below.
Importers— Wholesalers— Industrial Capitalists
Bankers
\
Other Shopkeepers-Shop!
Workers
Landlords
/
ceepers 
\
-State Agents
Shoplifters, Robbers, etc.
Consumers
4 Collective consumption such as health care, education, 
transportation, and housing, often organized and produced by 
state systems, are also necessary for the reproduction of 
labor power. For the detailed discussion of individual and 
collective consumptions and their implication in social 
reproduction, see Dickinson and Russell (1986).
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This diagram is an abstract model for the social 
relationships of shopkeepers. However, this diagram 
implies the stratification of the relationships. Those with 
capital are on top. Shopkeepers are in the middle. They 
have small capital and also work by themselves. 0$ the 
bottom, workers, consumers, and shoplifters are located 
closely. The common character through them is that they all 
have labor to sell. The diagram also implies that consumers 
are usually workers and, shoplifters are usually consumers. 
However, in concrete reality, the social relationships of 
shopkeepers can vary.
In the U.S., the distribution system of commodities is 
dominated by capitalists who own department stores, discount 
stores, supermarket chains, and franchise stores. Many 
small store owners focus on the area where capitalists have 
problems in expanding their distribution systems. The areas 
include labor-intensive small business (labor control 
problem), businesses with small markets or demands 
(unprofitable for capitalists), and inner city areas (too 
high a crime rate for capitalists risk). Many Korean 
shopkeepers risk the high crime rate and move into inner 
city areas because of their limited choices and relatively 
strong resources for small business as a form of "dirty 
work" and "cheap labor" (Light and Bonacich 1988).
The major everyday interaction of shopkeepers is the 
interaction with consumers. Through the exchange of money
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and commodities with consumers, shopkeepers earn their own 
profit and pay to wholesalers and landlords. When 
shopkeepers cannot sell enough for their profit, they simply 
close their stores. Because of their small amount of 
capital, the survival rate of small businessmen is low. 
Nearly half of all new small business ventures fail within 
five years. In order to avoid failure and to increase 
profit, small businesses rely on various strategies to 
secure their profits. They may work long hours themselves, 
use cheap labor, and exploit consumers.
The urban poor have problems in their reproduction 
because of their lack of income. During the 1970s and 
1980s, the flight of American capital to foreign countries, 
the internal relocation of capital from the Northeastern 
area to the South, and the loss of competitiveness of many 
American industries pushed more people into low-wage service 
industries in Northeastern cities than before (Rodwin and 
Sazanami 1989). In the case of New York City, the number of 
manufacturing jobs dropped 35% during the 1970s alone 
(Sassen-Koob 1985:302). The reduction of welfare during the 
Reagan and Bush administration further deteriorate^ the life 
of the urban poor (New York Times. Jan. 27, 1991). The 
problems in everyday reproduction of the lives of the poor 
increased tension in their family relationships and other 
social relationships. During the same period, new 
immigrants to metropolitan areas provided cheap laborers and
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kept many urban poor out of employment. Some other 
immigrants such as Korean immigrants rapidly expanded their 
small businesses in the inner-city areas during the same 
period. The transaction between poor Blacks and Korean 
shopkeepers is not only the place for an economic 
relationship between the two groups but also the place of 
the mediation of racial relationship.
History of Racial Conceptions 
Korea has been a country with one ethnic group for over 
a millennium.5 Even though the majority of Koreans' did not 
have direct experiences with other ethnic or racial groups 
before the turn of the century, they were aware of the other 
nations surrounding the Korean peninsula. They 
conceptualized those nations in a hierarchical order. The 
Chinese - from whom Koreans adopted various social and 
cultural elements - occupied the top of this racial 
hierarchy. Because Koreans believed themselves to be more 
civilized than any other nations except the Chinese, they 
considered Manchurians, Japanese, and other East Asian 
nations inferior to Koreans. Similarly, Koreans dismissed 
Whites as vancrvi [Western barbarians] until the late 19th
5 Because Korea has been an one-nation state for almost two 
thousand years, they have not developed the concepts such as 
'ethnicity.' Because of this situation, there is also no 
clear definition of race or ethnicity in Korean language.
Inchong [race] often connotes not only race but also nation.
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century.
But from the mid and late 19th century, Koreans were 
shocked by the military power of the supposedly inferior 
vanovi [Western barbarians] and waenom [Japs]. This 
disturbed the Korean conception of racial hierarchy.
Because of Japan's brutal domination and occupation of 
Korean until 1945, Koreans developed and still maintain a 
great hostility toward the Japanese. The prestige of the 
Chinese in the Korean conception of racial order also 
declined because of the miserable humiliation of China by 
the Western power during the 19th century.
From the turn of the century, Whites clearly occupied a 
better position in the Korean conception of racial hierarchy 
because of their military power and civilization, which was 
eventually considered superior to the Chinese and Korean 
civilizations. Koreans also realized that Whites6 
controlled the world with superior economic and political 
power. Because Koreans who were educated in America have 
dominated South Korea since 1945, and because the Korean 
media and education system describe White civilization as 
superior, Koreans still consider Whites to be the most 
prestigious race.
The image of Blacks eventually came to occupy the
6 Whites include peoples in America and Europe. It does 
not come into view clearly to Koreans that many Blacks are 
also living in America and Europe. Because of the close 
relationship between America and Korea for the last 50 
years, Whites are usually represented by American Whites.
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bottom in Korean racial conception. Television networks in 
Korea broadcast American programs almost every week, and 
American movies dominate the Korean movie market.
Certainly, Korean people notice from these programs that the 
dominant characters are mostly White, and that most Blacks 
are often depicted as a lower class or as violent criminals.
They also know from television news programs and 
newspapers that the most powerful people in America and in 
the world are typically Whites, while famines and "tribal" 
wars are frequent in Africa. Thus, they perceive Whites as 
coming from "civilized" countries superior to Korea, and 
view Blacks as coming from "tribal" or "primitive" African 
countries inferior to Korea. These images easily translate 
into a racial hierarchy.
The image of Blacks for Koreans remains vague but 
negative. Koreans do not cognitively separate the images of 
Blacks in America and in Africa.7 The images of Whites in
7 Many Korean immigrants expressed that they did not know, 
when they came to America, that there are so many Blacks in 
America. Because they were accustomed only to the White 
image of America, the large size of Black population in 
America was a surprise for many Korean immigrants. However, 
because the increasing conflict between Korean shopkeepers 
and Black Americans are frequently reported in Korea, 
Koreans in Korea may now clearly aware of the presence of 
Blacks in America but may have more negative images of 
Blacks. (Korean newspapers in Korea depicted Black 
boycotters as "reverse racists" against new Korean 
immigrants.)
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Europe, in America, and in Australia are also mixed.8 
Koreans are not accustomed to the cohabitation of several 
races or ethnic groups in the same country. Accordingly, 
Korean immigrants come to America with only a very vague 
notion of what a multi-ethnic country is. However, they 
bring from Korea conceptions of a racial hierarchy where 
Whites are "superior" and "developed" while Blacks are 
"inferior" and "primitive."
Before large number of Koreans entered poor Black 
neighborhoods, Blacks had similarly vague ideas about 
Koreans. First of all, the differences between Koreans, 
Chinese, and Japanese were and still are not clear to many 
of them; many Blacks simply consider all of them as Asians. 
The position of Asians in American racial conceptions yet is 
not clearly defined in American racial conceptions yet.
A considerable number of Black adults were directly 
exposed to Korea when they fought there during the Korean 
Civil War, 1950-1953. Poverty prevails the image of Korea 
because of the image of Korea during the Korean Civil War 
and on the T.V. program, "MASH." Even though many Blacks 
thought Korea of a poor country, they might not have had a 
clear negative image of Koreans. When Korean immigrants 
first appeared in Harlem in the late 1970s, some Blacks
8 Because of the White image of America (Whiteness also 
means wealth for many Koreans), the existence of many poor 
White Americans is also a surprise for many Korean 
immigrants.
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considered Koreans to be a third world people just like 
Blacks. However, others believed Koreans to be inferior in 
racial status because Korea was a very poor and undeveloped 
country.
During the subsequent conflict, both poor Blacks and 
Korean shopkeepers concertized and reformulated their 
conceptions of racial order based on their historical 
beliefs and new experiences about each other in a White 
dominated American society.
Research Concerns and Methods
My research was a process of continual dialogue with 
myself about the social location of urban shopkeepers.
Before I came to the United States to attend a doctoral 
program at CUNY in 1985, I had some interest in the 
ambiguous social position of urban petty producers. However, 
my main concern was the transformation of the labor process 
and organization and its implications for politics and 
culture.
When I worked in Korean stores as a part-timer in 1985 
and 1986, I also gathered information about Korean 
shopkeepers. At the time, my question focused on how the 
Korean shopkeepers managed work processes in their stores, 
disciplined workers, and manipulated meanings in the 
relationship with their workers. When I took a course, _ 
"Anthropology and Marxism," with Professor Sider in the fall
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of 1986, I wrote a paper for the class blending the 
theoretical constructs about the urban petty bourgeoisie, 
and my experiences. At the time, I tried to construct a 
mechanical class model of the urban petty bourgeoisie.
Through Professor Sider's comments and my reflection, I 
realized that I constructed an ideal model instead of 
analyzing real experiences and relationships. I also 
realized that I was not dealing with the urban petty 
bourgeoisie in general but Korean shopkeepers specifically.
I also received comments from other professors for other 
papers reflecting my changing ideas. My desire to 
understand the petty bourgeoisie as a class eventually made 
me choose the example of Korean shopkeepers as my 
dissertation topic.
I chose their relationships to poor Black consumers as 
my main research topic in order to understand how two 
minority groups, not as passersby but as actors, participate 
in the process of social reproduction. I also expected that 
this process would clarify how specific class positions and 
ethnicity can intersect, particularly how class and ethnic 
conflicts are both organized, expressed, and mediated in the 
wider social context.
In order to achieve a more balanced understanding about 
the social relationships of shopkeepers, I also decided to 
collect some information about the relationship between 
Korean shopkeepers and White wholesalers. For this purpose,
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I will add a short afterword explaining the relationship 
between them.
I chose Harlem as my main field research area. Harlem 
serves as a historical base for the conflict between Black 
residents and Korean shopkeepers. In addition, there was 
further historical documentation on earlier conflicts 
between Jewish shopkeepers and Black residents. Data on 
previous conflicts would help to interpret present 
conflicts. Furthermore, Harlem has become, for Blacks and 
others, the symbol of the Black inner city. The conflict 
between the two groups was not limited to local areas. 
Through the involvement of city-wide organizations, news 
media, and various levels of city and state agents, the 
conflict became a city-wide issue. Thus, I also researched 
the conflicts in other areas, city-wide organizations, news 
media, and various state agents. I also collected data from 
other areas and from city-wide discourse (e.g. newspapers).
My data collection methods were necessarily informal. 
Before I started my research, I worked in several Korean 
stores in New York City. For my pilot research, I worked in 
a clothing store in Harlem for six weeks in late 1988. As 
an employee, I could observe and actually participate in 
everyday transactions as a "Korean" salesclerk. Because I 
was a Korean, the Korean employer was relatively open with 
me. However, Black customers and I felt a certain distance 
between us. My Korean background helped me to obtain
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information from Korean shopkeepers but was also a barrier 
to opening dialogue with Black residents.
I usee only one formal questionnaire form in my 
research. With this, I collected data from twenty-eight 
Korean shopkeepers in the field area regarding their 
business establishments and relationships with White 
wholesalers and Black residents. Other information about 
the conflict between Korean shopkeepers and poor Black 
residents came mainly from three sources; my informal 
interviews, conversations with related people, and 
newspapers. Some other data was collected from radio and 
television news programs. Information from newspapers was 
critical to my understanding of Korean and Black 
organizations, their points of view, and the actions of 
various politicians. Without the information from 
newspapers, my description of the relationship between the 
Blacks and the Korean shopkeepers would have been very 
limited. As a Korean, I encountered difficulty in gathering 
the full co-operation of the Black population. Thus the 
information from newspapers was very critical to my 
understanding of Black experiences, views, and 
organizations.
However, I conducted informal interviews, with Black 
residents on the streets of Harlem and participated in their 
meetings. I observed Black boycotts and interviewed Black 
boycotters. My Black research assistant, Sabiyha Prince,
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also conducted an interview with the organizer of the Black 
boycott against Korean shopkeepers in Harlem. I also 
conducted informal interviews with Korean shopkeepers in 
Harlem and in other areas. Initially, I had problems 
interviewing them, because they were reluctant to speak 
about their business practices and racial problems. Both 
are very sensitive issues for Korean shopkeepers. However, 
some of the Korean shopkeepers soon began pouring out 
information due to the fact that I was Korean. I also 
participated in the events and observed the meetings of 
several city-wide Korean organizations on a regular basis 
during the field research.
My formal fieldwork started June 1989 and finished in 
May 1990. However, I visited and worked in the field area 
before my formal fieldwork began, and I also visited the 
area after my formal fieldwork ended. Materials on the 
conflict between Jewish shopkeepers and Black residents in 
Harlem was collected from historical documents and texts.
Structure of This Dissertation
This dissertation is divided into four parts. The 
first part discusses the conceptual frameworks that guide my 
presentation and analysis of data. The second part deals 
with relevant historical issues on how Blacks and Koreans 
came to Harlem. This part also deals with questions 
regarding the construction of social conditions through
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which they confront each other.
Specifically, chapter two in part two will show how the 
Blacks in New York City have been segregated and 
concentrated in Harlem, why Blacks could not develop their 
small businesses, and how the conflict between Black 
residents and Jewish shopkeepers developed. Chapter three 
will explain why certain Koreans came to America, and how 
they concentrated in the small business sector of inner- 
cities. Chapter three will also explain American 
immigration policy and its implication for American racial 
order. Chapter four focuses on how Koreans became 
shopkeepers, and how the social and family relationships of 
Koreans were geared toward making money. The information in 
this part will help us understand the social and historical 
contexts of the conflict between Korean shopkeepers and 
Black residents. This understanding will also help us 
clarify the context of deployed meanings and power contests 
during the conflict between the Black residents and Korean 
shopkeepers.
The third part deals with questions about the present 
conflicts between the two groups. What happened, why and 
how do Blacks and Koreans feel in everyday interactions, how 
do Blacks boycott Korean shopkeepers, how do they present 
their stories and organize their power, how do the White 
majority and 'White' media understand and present the 
conflict between the two minority groups, how do state
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agents intervene in the conflicts, how do state power and 
capitalist relationships constitute the playing field of two 
groups, and how do Koreans try to avoid or diffuse problems 
with Black residents? Chapters five and six in part three 
will answer these questions.
Part four is a section for the discussion of the 
implications of the data presented in the parts two and 
three. In part four, I will discuss the theoretical 
implications of the data in the light of the conceptual 
framework presented in the first section. In this part, the 
social order, domination, resistance, and the 
interconnection among meanings, power, and economic 
relationships will be discussed with more concrete data 
presented in the parts two and three.
I add an afterword in order to explain the conflicting 
relationships between Korean shopkeepers and White 
wholesalers. This is a brief sketch to show the social 
relationships of Korean shopkeepers with the "higher" group, 
in terms of racial status and class position. Because this 
dissertation is imbalanced in the representation of Korean 
shopkeepers by focusing on only one side of Korean 
shopkeepers' social relationships, I want to provide a brief 
sketch of the other side. In the future, this section will 
be further developed to explain the "contradictory" social 
position of Korean shopkeepers.
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PART TWO
THE HISTORICAL CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL CONDITIONS FOR 
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN POOR BLACKS AND KOREAN SHOPKEEPERS
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"WE MEAN BUSINESS": BLACK HARLEM AND ALIEN SHOPKEEPERS
rolks r I ccnic up North
Cause they told me de North was fine.
I come up North
Cause they told me de North was fine.
Been up here six months-
I'm about to lose my mind.
e • • •
(from "Evenin' Air Blues" of Langston 
Hughes, 1942:38)
From Native Land to Jewish-Dominated Harlem 
On September 3rd, 1609, Henry Hudson with his ship 
dispatched by the East India Company of Holland and seeking 
a western route to 'golden' China, approached an 'unknown' 
river, later called the Hudson River, in North America. 
Natives viewed them with astonishment, and finally conluded 
that "it's nothing less than the wigwam of the great 
Manitto, or Supreme Being himself, who has evidently come to 
pay them a visit"(Riker 1904:110). Hudson's discovery of 
the area stimulated annual dispatches of vessels to 'New 
Netherland' for further discovery and the fur trade. For 
this purpose, the Dutch established trading posts. The 
Dutch eventually brought and built their settlement at the 
tip of Manhattan in 1623 (Riker 1904:109-118).
The Dutch bought Manhattan island for the sum of 24 
dollars of beads and trinkets from the natives in 1626, and
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started to call the upper part of the island "Haarlem," 
after a city name of the Dutch.1 The first Dutch settlers 
in Haarlem, Johannes de la Montagne and his family, began 
living there in 1636. He obtained a grant of the land where 
he settled from Governor Kieft of New Amsterdam. The 
Manhattans and Wickquaskeeks, the native tribes of the 
region, were not satisfied with this development. They 
attacked the Dutch settlements and ruined the farms. 
Gradually, the natives were driven out by the Dutch and the 
Haarlem land was given to the European settlers (Pierce 
1903).
After the British gained control of New Amsterdam in 
1664, they changed the city name to New York City. 
Eventually, one va' was deleted from Haarlem. Harlem 
remained a rural settlement distant from downtown Manhattan 
until the Civil War.
The economic expansion of the United States after the 
Civil War attracted massive immigrants from Europe and many 
of them settled in lower Manhattan. When upper- and middle 
class Whites such as Germans, Irish, German-Jews, and 
Italians migrated to Harlem to avoid congested downtown 
Manhattan,2 Harlem was transformed into the first suburban
1 Haarlem is located on the westside of Amersterdam in the 
Netherlands.
2 The population of Manhattan was 124,000 in 1820 and
516,000 in 1850. The number already passed 1,200,000 in 
1880 (Scheiner 1965:222). Nearly one million people 
overcrowded lower Manhattan. While the poor immigrants
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
34
residential area of New York City. New railroad lines 
connected Harlem to downtown Manhattan. In the early 1880s, 
the residential construction boom rapidly transformed the 
landscape of East Harlem (Gurock 1979:15).
When the overhead trolley line was extended to Central 
Harlem in 1895, that area experienced a construction boom 
and accommodated new settlers from the downtown. New subway 
lines were constructed during the late 1890s. Lower and 
middle class Russian-Jews and Italians also migrated to 
Harlem. Until 1910, about 100,000 Russian-Jews migrated to 
Harlem and this made Jews the largest ethnic group in 
Harlem.3 The construction boom of new houses and 
apartments rekindled from 1903, and most vacant places in 
Harlem were built over by 1906. Many Jewish shopkeepers and 
businessmen also heavily invested in the construction and 
renovation during the period (Gurock 1979:32-49).
Black Business before the Emergency of Black Harlem 
Many Blacks in New York City worked as domestics and 
common laborers before the Civil War. The jobs which were
overcrowded the area south of 14th Street, the middle and 
rich classes lived in the area between 14th and 42nd streets 
(Gurock 1979:5). In order to avoid the congestion and new 
immigrants, many escaped from downtown Manhattan to Harlem. 
One man recalled, "It was our way of avoiding contact with 
such uncouth citizens as might be found downtown..."
(Osofsky 1971:26).
3 Between 1901-1910, 976,000 Jews immigrated to the United 
States mostly from Russia and 696,000 of them to New York 
City (Joseph 1914:195).
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considered distasteful for Whites were left for Blacks.
When a great number of Irish immigrated to New York City 
during the mid-19th century, there was a serious competition 
for the menial jobs occupied by Blacks. The Irish, and 
later other immigrants from Europe gradually replaced Blacks 
in many menial jobs (Scheiner 1965:45-48). Thus, for 
example,
By 1850 there were more Irish servants than the entire 
Negro population of the city, whereas twenty years 
earlier Negro labor constituted a majority of the 
servant class. (Scheiner 1965:46)
According to the Colored Mission in 1879, Negroes were 
"entirely excluded from the more lucrative branches of 
employment".... One year later, the Mission reported 
that "many of the various industries open to the 
foreigner" were closed "to the native colored man." 
(quoted in Scheiner 1965:53)4
In these conditions, Blacks were often hired as strike­
breakers and as cheap laborers to reduce the wages of White 
workers.
A small number of Blacks specialized in certain 
businesses until the mid-19th century. Businesses in the 
catering, barbering, and whitewashing fields were known as 
"Negro Business" before the Civil War and were patronized 
largely by Whites. After the massive influx of millions of 
European immigrants after the mid-19th century, European
4 However, in terms of absolute number of workers, there was 
a steady increase in Black workers within New York City. 
This was the result of the steady increase of the Black 
population in New York City after the 1890s. While Handlin 
(1959) stated that there was considerable progress between 
1870-1900 for Blacks in New York City, Bloch (1960) 
concluded that European immigrants replaced Blacks.
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immigrants displaced the Black small businessmen from "Negro 
Business."5 (Ottley and Weatherby 1967:229)
This process was very tumultuous and the tension 
between European immigrants and Blacks was very high through 
the 19th century. Many race riots were directed towards 
Blacks not only in New York City but also in many other 
northern cities. In July 1834, the anti-abolitionist riot 
continued for eight days, and many Blacks and their churches 
were attacked in lower Manhattan. Because of the strike­
breaking role of some Black workers, European immigrant 
workers often attacked Black strike-breakers (Bernstein 
1990:5).6
The Draft Riots were the worst race riot. In the 
middle of the Civil War, the Conscript Act of 1863 caused a 
wide-spread resentment from working-class immigrants who 
were the victim of the new law. The resentment was 
expressed in bloody attacks not only upon the wartime
5 Until the 1850s, barber shops, the catering business, the 
white washing trade, coachmen, and the boot-black business 
were primary business areas for Blacks. Many hotel dining 
rooms and restaurants hired Blacks. According to a news 
article, "[Black employment] has been receding ever since" 
the 1850s. (Harper/s Weekly. Dec. 22, 1900)
6 Because of the pervasive racism, it would be difficult for 
Blacks to attack European immigrants or Whites. If they 
did, they would be severely punished. Racism might also 
encourage the European (or White) immigrants to attack 
Blacks without the consequence of severe punishment from the 
White government.
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authority and some established Republicans7 but also on 
Blacks and their property. The rioters thought that the 
main reason for the Act and the war was Blacks. Many Blacks 
were slain and thousands of them fled town. Amid the 
confrontations, 105 or more people were killed (Berstein 
1990:5). This riot and other riots caused a great loss of 
Black businesses in New York City and the loss of much White 
patronage to Black businesses. Eventually, the Blacks and 
their business were driven into strict segregation (Ottley 
and Weatherby 1967:229).
The first World War halted immigration from Europe.
The expansion of the war economy and the shortage of labor 
made it easy for Blacks to obtain employment. As a result 
of the immigration halt and war expansion, the number of New 
York City Blacks in the manufacturing, mechanical, trade, 
and transportation fields more than doubled in the decade 
1910-1920. The number of Black women in manufacturing and 
mechanical pursuits increased almost fourfold in the decade 
(Scheiner 1965:52). This period saw a massive influx of 
Blacks which dramatically transformed the color of Harlem.
The expansion of Black employment and the massive
7 At the time Republican Abraham Lincoln was the President. 
Local Republican leaders supported Lincoln's war efforts, 
while Democratic leaders had a more conciliatory attitude 
toward the seceding South. Republicans were stronger at 
that time than now in New York City. The state and city 
governments changed hands often at the time. There was also 
a very severe economic depression during 1860-61 in New York 
City.
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influx of the Blacks from the South did not necessarily lead 
to the prosperity for Black businesses. Some Black leaders 
thought the lack of racial loyalty was one of the reasons. 
They subsequently urged Blacks to patronize Black owned 
stores. Fred Moore in 1904 declared that "Jews support 
Jews? Germans support Germans...and Negroes should begin to 
support Negroes." Booker T . Washington urged Blacks in New 
York City in 1914 to patronize Black businesses rather than 
White businesses, maintaining that economic success was a 
prerequisite for political and social advancement. Adam 
Clayton Powell Sr. also stated during the same period that 
"[a]s long as Negroes talk race loyalty and race rights and 
then spend their money with White business and professional 
men" there would be no change in the race problem. Powell 
also preached about the "double duty" dollar - buying from 
Black shopkeepers provided more jobs for Black workers 
(Scheiner 1965:70-71).
One of the successful forms of this nationalism was the 
Marcus Garvey Movement. Marcus Garvey formed the Universal 
Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) in 1914 in Jamaica. He 
arrived in New York in 1916 and established his headquarter 
in Harlem. He urged support of Black business and organized 
a chain of groceries, restaurants, laundries, and factories. 
He stressed African pride and history for Blacks. He called 
for the redemption of Africa. The movement raised a strong 
African consciousness among Blacks. However, the movement
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was doomed after Marcus Garvey was deported to his native 
country, Jamaica. But this movement made a great impact 
upon Black people (Martin 1986).8
These appeals became more prevalent after the complete 
transformation of Harlem into a Black neighborhood and have 
continued through this century. These appeals were a 
reaction to the discrimination from the White dominated 
soceity. Since White patrons shunned Black stores and 
patronized the stores opened by new European immigrants 
after the massive influx of European immigrants during the 
late 19th century, Black customers were the only hope for 
Black businessmen.
The Transition of Harlem into a Black neighborhood
In 1741, the Black population was 20% of the 
inhabitants of New York (Harper's Weekly. Dec. 22, 1900).
By 1820, the Black population was the about 9% of the total 
population in Manhattan. The rate decreased to 2% in 1900 
because of the massive immigration from Europe through the 
previous century.9 During the 19th century, the main
8 "Buy Black" campaigns have frequently reappeared in 
Harlem. Black Boycotts against Korean shopkeepers often 
accompany the "Buy Black" campaign. The first boycott 
against Korean shopkeepers in Harlem was organized by the 
followers of Marcus Garvey Movement in 1981. Their main 
theme was "Buy Black."
9 In 1741, among the ten thousand inhabitants in Manhattan, 
two tousand were Black slaves. In 1820, there were some
124,000 people and the number of Blacks was about 11,000.
In 1860, there were 12,000 Blacks among 805,000 residents.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
40
residential area for Blacks moved northward and remained 
separated from White residential areas.
The hostility of Whites10 toward Blacks limited the 
Black residences to segregated areas.11 The residential 
areas for Blacks moved from the present City Hall area to 
Greenwich Village, the Tenderloin district,12 and San Huan 
Hill in the West Sixties. After the draft riots in 1863, 
many relatively affluent Blacks moved to Brooklyn out of 
fear of race riots, wa well as for better housing. After
While the total population of Manhattan in 1900 was 
1,850,000, the number of Blacks was 36,000. (Harper7s 
Weekly. Dec. 22, 1900; Scheiner 1965:221-222)
10 The hostility from the Irish immigrants was especially 
harsh. Antagonism between Blacks and Irish existed since 
the massive influx of Irish immigrants during the mid-19th 
century. They competed for jobs and housing. The Irish and 
other Whites abused and attacked Blacks many times in the 
19th century. The Blacks feared and distrusted the 
immigrants. (Scheiner 1965)
11 For example, a Black sociologist said that Harlem was in 
1927, "a solid Negro community... with as definite lines of 
demarcation as if cut by a knife."(quoted in Greenberg 
1991:15) Residential segregation, to a lesser degree, still 
continues in New York City (Hacker 1992).
12 The Tenderloin district did not have a clear boundary, 
since this name was folk-designated. It referred to the 
streets of the west Twenties and Thirties streets in mid- 
Manhattan in the late 1880s. "Captain Reilly, of a 
Tenderloin police precinct, remarked in 1889 that Negroes 
had xtaken up every street from Twenty-Fourth to Thirty- 
Third, between Sixth and Seventh avenues7"(Scheiner 
1965:18). Soon the tenderloin extended to Forty-second 
street. A "New Tenderloin" extended north from 42nd street 
through the upper Fifties during the 1890s, this area also 
housed the red-light district (Osofsky 1966:12-14).
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the Tenderloin Riot13 of 1900 and another race riot in San 
Huan Hill in 1905, many Blacks moved out of the areas to 
Harlem and later to Bedford-Stuyvesant in Brooklyn (Scheiner 
1965:15-24).
After 1900, the Black population in Manhattan rapidly 
increased in number. By 1910, there were 61,000 Blacks 
(scheiner 1965:221). Because of the broken real estate 
market in 1904-1905 and the vacant spaces, some White 
landlords in Harlem who had not rented their houses to 
Blacks began to rent to them. These landlords charged 
higher rents to Blacks. Other landlords and White residents 
organized associations to stop Black settlement in their 
areas. But when Black families settled in an area 
successfully, many White families sold their houses and 
moved out. Thus Blacks were segregated and concentrated in 
certain blocks. However, there was a steady increase of 
Blacks in Harlem through the early decades of this century 
(Osofsky 1971:31-37). Around 1910, Blacks became a dominant 
racial group in the area above 130th Street, between Fifth 
and Seventh Avenues of Harlem (Gurock 1979:147). In and
13 On August 15, 1900, there was a general assault cn Blacks 
in the Tenderloin district primarily by Irish men and the 
police after one Black killed a policeman on August 12.
Many Blacks were brutally beaten by white mobs (Scheiner 
1965:121-2). Policemen also beat Blacks rather than 
protecting them from the attacks. The policemen arrested 
Blacks instead of White attackers. "As policemen patrolled 
the Negro blocks they were showered with bricks, bottles and 
garbage from rooftops and tenement windows. They fired back 
with revolvers." (Osofsky 1966:48-50)
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near the area, some 50,000 Blacks lived in 1914 (Osofsky 
1966:105) .
However, White landlords and resident associations 
continued to block the influx of Blacks into Harlem. The 
founder of the Harlem Property Owners' Improvement 
Corporation said in 1913, "It is the question of whether the 
white man will rule Harlem or the negro." He suggested to 
fight "the common enemy" by organizing the entire community. 
He also urged that "Whites who lived on streets bordering 
Negro blocks build twenty-four-foot fences to separate 
themselves from Negro neighbors" (quoted in Gurock 
1979:107). But all of their efforts failed.
During the First World War, Harlem experienced a 
massive influx of Blacks. Harlem also experienced the 
physical deterioration of buildings without further 
investment. Landlords increased rent and families doubled 
up in the same space (Gurock 1971:139-141).
Soon new subway lines connected Brooklyn, Queens, and 
the Bronx to Manhattan within reasonable commutation time. 
Realizing the shortage of adequate housing after the First 
World War, New York City exempted almost all tax levies 
until 1932 for housing constructed during the 1920s. The 
construction boom continued through the 1920s in the outer 
boroughs as well as, to a lesser degree, in Manhattan.
Better housing in the outer boroughs, rapid transit system, 
and increased income after the First World War sparked the
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final mass migration of Whites, especially Jews, from Harlem 
to the outer boroughs. Jewish population in Harlem which 
reached 178,000 in 1920 declined to 25,000 in 1930 (Gurock 
1971:142-146)
This sudden departure was also a response to the 
massive migration of Blacks into Harlem during the 1920s. 
With severe racism, the poor living conditions for Blacks in 
the South, and the opening of job opportunities in the North 
for Blacks because of the First World War, massive numbers 
of poor Black farmers in the South migrated to northern 
industrial cities. Many Black immigrants also came from the 
West Indies. Between 1910 and 1930, the Black population in 
New York City increased from 92,000 to 328,000. In Harlem,
87.000 Blacks arrived between 1920 and 1930. By 1930,
165.000 Blacks, about 72% of Manhattan's Black population, 
lived in Harlem (Osofsky 1966:128-130). Whites such as Jews 
and Italians moved out to the Bronx and other outer 
boroughs. Thus during the 1920s, the predominantly Jewish 
Harlem became a predominantly Black Harlem.
After the Harlem Renaissance in the 1920s and the 
Depression, there was little investment in Harlem. With 
socially and economically discriminated Black residents, 
Harlem became a ghetto (Smith and Schaffer 1987:59).
Because of the deprivation of Harlem and the discriminatory
14 The estimate of the Jewish population in Harlem 
varied from 25,000 to 5,000 in 1930 (Gurock 1971:146).
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policies and practices of local governments, police, 
landlords, and businessmen, there has been continuous 
tension in Harlem. As a result, Harlem was one of the most 
active places of Black nationalist groups throughout the 
mid-20th century (Greenberg 1991; Naison 1984).
Alien Shopkeepers and Black Residents
Jewish shopkeepers came to Harlem's Third Avenue 
commercial district after the Civil War to open store. 
Because of the increasing number of Jews and others who 
moved to Harlem, Jewish businesses followed them and 
expanded through the whole Harlem area. After the migration 
of White residents to the outer boroughs during the 1910s 
and 1920s, many Jewish shopkeepers stayed while some others 
followed them. For example, H.C.F. Koch, who opened a large 
store in 1890 on 125th Street, reportedly treated Black 
customers discourteously and sold his store in 1930 rather 
than continued doing business among Blacks. But most 
shopkeepers stayed and Jews remained a prominent ethnic 
group in Harlem business. For example, L.M. Blumstein, a 
German-Jew, who opened a store in 1896 and opposed Black 
settlement in Harlem, remained as one of Black Harlem's most 
successful businessmen (Osofsky 1966:121).
As the Black population increased, there were more 
possibilities for Black businesses in Harlem. Some Black 
shopkeepers successfully established their own businesses
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and served Black residents in the business areas where Black 
customers were discouraged by White store-owners. For 
example/ many Blacks experienced subtle discrimination in 
White-owned restaurants although state laws prohibited 
discrimination in public places. White-owned funeral 
parlors also discouraged Black patronage. Black businessmen 
were successful in these areas. But in the area where Black 
shppkeepers competed with White shopkeepers for the same 
Black customers, the result was dismal for Black 
shopkeepers. In addition suffering the effects of 
discrimination by White wholesalers, bankers, and landlords, 
Black shopkeepers were beginners, had a lack of capital and 
credit, and could not provide a variety of goods, credits, 
and competitive prices to Black customers. "Buy Black" and 
"Double Duty Dollar" campaigns were not effective in drawing 
Black customers to Black stores. "Appeals to race loyalty 
fell on deaf ears when the offerings of the Negro merchant 
were inferior to those of this White competitor." (Scheiner 
1965:78-80)
After the transformation of Harlem into a Black 
residential area during the 1920s, most residential and 
commercial buildings and businesses in the area were owned 
by Whites, especially Jews. One famous Black poet lamented, 
"Black Harlem really was in whiteface, economically 
speaking"(Hughes 1969a:63). In 1930, less than 20% of 
Harlem's stores were owned by Blacks (Naison 1984:147).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
46
Even though most customers were Blacks, White store- 
owners usually refused to hire Blacks as salesmen, clerks 
and cashiers, not to mention managers. They usually 
employed Whites only. Blacks suffered open discrimination 
in all types of employment in New York City at the time 
(Naison 1984? Greenberg 1991). Moreover, the Depression hit 
Blacks the hardest. The rate of unemployment of potential 
labor force reached a staggering 66% in Harlem in 1934 
(Grant 1986:215).
By the spring of 1931, Blacks organized a "Don't Buy 
Where You Can't Work" campaign. Ministers, politicians, and 
newspaper editors appealed to Black residents to follow the 
same campaign which, in Chicago, had opened up hundreds of 
jobs to Blacks. Many nationalist groups, the Harlem 
Business Men's Club, and the Garvey movement preached race 
loyalty as a first step toward winning control of Harlem's 
economy. But because of factional divisions in the Garvey 
movement and vast political differences between the street 
speakers, church leaders, and businessmen who supported the 
concept of a boycott, a well-organized boycott was not 
possible. Nevertheless the boycott, aimed at White stores 
with White employees, drew broad support from Black 
residents (Naison 1984:50-51).
Sufi Abdul Hamid, who was active in the Chicago 
boycott, came to Harlem in 1932. In 1933, he launched a 
boycott on 135th Street and won jobs for members of his
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group, the Negro Industrial and Clerical Alliance. In May 
1934, he organized a boycott against Woolworth's 125th 
Street store after the manager had refused to hire members 
of his group. These activities stimulated other community 
leaders to employ the boycott as an important tactic for the 
campaign (Naison 1984:117).
In June 1934, Rev. John Johnson, Rev. Adam Clayton 
Powell, Jr., several other leaders, and the editors of the 
New York Age formed an organization called the Citizens 
League for Fair Play. They began boycotting Blumstein's, 
the largest retail store in Harlem, to demand jobs for 
Blacks. Ira Kemp and Arthur Reid who led the league's 
"picket committee" were Garveyites who supported the 
development of Black business and the creation of 
economically self-sufficient Black communities. Nationalist 
groups defined the boycott as a struggle of "Negro against 
White." This boycott became a crusade against racial 
injustice and drew support from all sections of the 
community. Blumstein's and other stores finally agreed to 
hire Blacks (Naison 1984:118).
At the same time, White shopkeepers initiated a legal 
action to halt the boycott movement. In October 1934, 
following a meeting between Jewish shopkeepers and the 
mayor, police arrested the boycott leader, Sufi Hamid, on
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charges of "spreading anti-Semitism in Harlem."15 State
Supreme Court Justice Samuel Roseman also granted a shoe
company an injunction order against the boycott on the
ground that "their activity might stimulate 'racial riots
and racial reprisals.'" The judge declared that the
conflict between the boycotters and the company was solely a
"racial dispute." (Naison 1984:121-122) But there had been
no centrally organized anti-Semitic movement in Harlem,
though propaganda was carried on by groups which channelled
the grievances of Blacks. Since the majority of Harlme's
rental collectors, shopkeepers, and money lenders were
Jewish in Harlem, the Jews became a target of resentment.
In fact, the uneasy economic relationship between Jews
and Blacks started earlier. As early as in 1883, the New
York Globe, a Black oriented newspaper, stated that Jewish
control of the southern money market victimized the Blacks
in the region. In 1913, New York Ace, a descendant of the
Globe. continued that
[The Jew] is a peculiar race, ...parasitical and 
predatory... preying upon and devouring the substance 
of others rather than creating and devouring the 
substance of itself. That is essentially the race 
characteristic of all parasites, all race fungi, 
fNew York Age. Aug. 21, 1913, quoted by Scheiner 
1965:131)
15 During Black boycotts in 1990, Korean shopkeepers also 
raised the question of anti-Koreanism of the boycotters 
successfully. Korean and White newspapers also emphasized 
the "reverse racism" of the Black boycotters. State Supreme 
Justice Held also issued an injunction order to limit a 
Blfick boycott against Korean shopkeepers in Brooklyn in May 
1990. See chapter 6 for details.
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Marcus Garvey also complained about the Jewish control 
of the Black economic life. However, some other Black 
leaders urged fellow Blacks to learn from the success of the 
Jews. For example, Booker T. Washinton wrote in 1907, 
"Unless the Negro learns more and more to immitate the Jew 
in these matters, he cannot expect to have any high degree 
of success" (Washington 1907:183, quoted in Steinberg 
1981:88).
The tension between Black residents and White 
shopkeepers culminated in the explosion of a riot. On March 
19, 1935, the riot began with a rumor of the death of a 
Black boy who stole a five cent knife from Kress' Five and 
Ten Cent Store which swept through Harlem. The store was a 
major target for the "Don't Buy Where You Can't Work" 
campaign and refused to hire Blacks (Naison 1984:140).
In the afternoon of that day, a 16 year-old boy whom 
the manager of the store suspected as a shoplifter was 
grabbed by the manager. A policeman took him to the 
basement of the store to avoid onlooking spectators. One 
Black woman screamed that "they had taken "the boy to the 
basement to beat him up.'" (LaGuardia's Commission on the 
Harlem Riot 1969:7) One witness described the starting 
moment:
There were just a few policemen. They walked through 
the store to the back. Then something happened in the 
back. Some people say a woman screamed. All of the 
group surged to the back of the store. When I got back 
there, they were driven forward by the policeman who 
was in front of them, and one woman particularly
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demanded that they produce the manager, and the boy and 
the policeman told her it was none of her damned 
business. All of this time I heard no explanation, 
nothing except among the people themselves indignation 
grew higher. In the meantime more policemen came into 
the store and they said, "drive these people out," and 
became rather rough and pushed the people, (quoted by 
LaGuradia's Commission 1969:14)
Soon the rumor of the death of the boy spread into the
street. The rumor awakened the deep-seated sense of
mistreatment, discrimination, dishonesty, exploitation, and
denial by the shopkeepers and by society in general. One
woman cried out "that the treatment was just like down South
where they lynch us"(LaGuardia's Commission 1969:8). The
resentment turned a hundred or more spectators into a
protest group. The police attempt to disperse the crowd
only aroused resentment and swelled the numbers in the
crowd. Soon the rumor spread all over Harlem. Several
thousand people participated in outbursts here and there.
Leaflets were distributed.16 Windows of hundred of stores
16 Below is the content of a leaflet distributed by the 
"Young Liberators," comprised mainly of young Blacks.
CHILD BRUTALLY BEATEN1
WOMAN ATTACKED BY BOSS AND COPS.
CHILD NEAR DEATH 
One hour ago a 12-year-old Negro boy was 
brutally beaten by the management of Kress'
Five and Ten Cent Store.
The boy is near death, mercilessly 
beaten because they thought he had stolen 
a five-cent knife. A Negro woman, who 
sprang to the defense of the boy, had her 
arm broken by the thug and was then arrested.
WORKERS! NEGRO AND WHITE.
Protest against this Lynch Attack of 
Innocent Negro People.
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were smashed, and often looting followed. The police 
dispersed the crowds, but they gathered and destroyed stores 
again (LaGuardia's Commission 1969:8-12).
In the beginning, the resentment was expressed against 
White stores. But as the crowd grew, but all other stores 
also became the target of destruction and looting. Many 
Blacks also participated in looting "to express their 
resentment against discrimination in employment and the 
exclusive rights of property" (LaGuardia's Commission 
1969:11-17).
The Communist Party of the United States of America in 
New York City organized a city-wide campaign against the 
butcher shops in order to drop the price of meat in June 
1935. It soon spread to Harlem and a branch of the CPUSA 
organized a boycott in Harlem. With help from nationalist 
and religious groups, Harlem Communists led the march of 
Black housewives through the streets and demanded that 
butchers lower their prices by 25%. "Hundreds of aroused 
Negro women joined the demonstrations, warning butchers of a 
repetition of March 19 [1933's riot] if they failed to 
reduce their prices." When butchers agreed to cut prices, 
housewives tore down old price signs and put up new ones.
Demand Release of Boy and Woman.
Demand the immediate arrest of the 
management responsible for this lynch attack.
Don't Buy at Kress'.
Stop Police Brutality in Negro Harlem.
JOIN THE PICKET LINE.
(quoted from Mayor LaGuardia's... 1969:10)
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All but one store reduced the price by 25%. Eventually the 
prices went up, but they stayed lower than that they had 
before the march (Naison 1984:149-150).
Prior to becoming Congressman, Adam C. Powell, Jr. also 
assumed an important role in the "Jobs-for-Negro Movement." 
In 1938, A. C. Powell, Jr., Rev. William Lloyd Imes, and A. 
Philip Randolph organized the Greater New York Coordinating 
Committee for the Employment of Negroes. James W. Ford, 
Black Vice-Presidential candidate of the Communist Party- 
USA, Captain A. L. King, the Garveyite Ira Kemp and Arthur 
Reid, founders of the Harlem Labor Union, also participated 
in the organization (Clarke 1969:235). The Coordinating 
Committee organized picket lines at local offices of 
Consolidated Edison and the New York Telephone Company to 
force them to hire Blacks (Naison 1984:268).
Other major targets were the stores on 125th Street. 
Even after several boycotts and riots, the owners of the 
stores in Harlem had been reluctant to hire Blacks. The 
Harlem Labor Union, a nominal affiliate to the Coordinating 
Committee and a nationalist group, organized a new boycott 
after the Supreme Court decision allowed picketing to 
protest the exclusion of minority racial groups from 
employment opportunities in April 1938 (Naison 1984:268).
The HLU argued that all jobs should be controlled by Blacks 
in Harlem. Enough unemployed Blacks joined the picket line 
to force the shopkeepers to hire the members of the HLU. A
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river-to-river picket line appeared on 125th Street. This 
spectacular event and 'the Don't Buy Where You Can't Work' 
chanting of the picket lines "struck terror in the hearts of 
the store owners"(Clarke 1969:235). The shopkeepers hired 
some HLU members by discharging their own employees, who 
were members of established unions.
However, in constrast to the HLU, the Coordinationg 
Committee tried to avoid racial antagonism and to protect 
employees of established labor unions. Thus, the 
Coordinating Committee organized its own picketlines (Naison 
1984:268). The Coordinating Committee negotiated with the 
White dominated Harlem Chamber of Commerce which, in August 
1938, guaranteed that one third of all jobs be given to 
Blacks. In return, the Coordinating Committee promised to 
stop the picket line of the HLU (Naison 1984:269).
The HLU continuously drew support from the unemployed 
and refused to stop its own picket lines. Thus the conflict 
between the HLU and the Coordinating Committee continued. 
After a bitter controversy, they agreed that the 
Coordinating Committee should focus on companies outside 
Harlem, while the HLU focused on those in Harlem (Naison 
1984:269).
In August 1943, a confrontation between a White 
policeman, a Black woman, and a Black soldier turned the 
potent tension in Harlem into a riot of even greater 
intensity. Thousands of people participated in looting and
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demonstrations. Mayor LaGuardia reinforced the police force 
with 6,000 policemen and 1,500 volunteers. The result was 
six dead, hundreds injured, and hundreds of shops wrecked 
and looted. While Mayor LaGuardia said, "The hoodlums 
quickly sized up the situation and took advantage of it to 
smash windows and attempt to loot," Ralph Ellison, managing 
editor of Negro Quarterly, said that only white stores were 
looted and black stores were not touched by the rioters (New 
York Post. Aug. 2, 1943; Amsterdam News. Aug. 7, 1943).
In January 1948, after a series of pickets on the 125th 
Street area stores by Blacks, the Uptown Chamber of 
Commerce, consisting mostly of White businessmen, agreed to 
a "code of ethics."17 The Chamber also agreed that non­
members of the Chamber would place a pledge to consumers 
inside stores. The pledge promised: to promote efficient 
Black employees; to mark prices clearly on all merchandise; 
to abide by good business standards; to abandon all 
misrepresentation as to quality and classification in the 
sale of merchandise; to abide by an employment policy 
strictly consistent with the provisions of the State 
Commission Against Discrimination; and to cooperate with the 
recognized civic and charitable organizations of Harlem to 
promote the well-being of the community (New York Times.
17 Some Korean leaders also tried to establish their own 
codes of ethics after the Black boycotts against them in 
1988 and 1990. However, the efforts did not receive support 
from ordinary Korean shopkeepers.
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Jan. 28, 1948).
In July 1959, there was an agreement between the Labor
and Industry Committee of the New York branch of the NAACP
and seven Harlem liquor stores, owned by Whites, not to do
business with wholesale liquor houses refusing to hire Black
salesmen. The Labor and Industry Committee organized tight
picket lines against three liquor stores which refused to
buy from Black liquor salesmen. Only two customers crossed
the picket line during the boycott. This move brought
"seven White liquor stores to their knees." The retail
stores sent the signed agreement to liquor distributors. The
agreement included the passage,
... you are hereby informed that forthwith I will 
refuse to continue doing business with any wholesaler 
who will not send as a representative a Negro salesman. 
This salesman, being a Negro, will reflect the economic 
interest of the local community on which I depend for a 
successful operation of my business.
A spokesman for the NAACP declared that they would organize
the picket lines against "other business enterprises
practicing economic discrimination against Negroes"
(Amsterdam News. July 4, 1959).
The riots of 1935 and 1943 were partially successful in
changing some attitudes of the White shopkeepers and pushing
them to hire Blacks. Some residents said, "White folks
respect us more when they find out we mean business.... We
got a great many jobs out of that riot that we couldn't get
before in our own community...." (Hughes 1969b:218-219).
The riot of 1943 also changed the police in Harlem.
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"Chocolate and vanilla teams of policemen appeared on uptown 
streets walking together. Squad cars became integrated.... 
The riots of 1943 almost ended public police brutality on 
the streets of Harlem" (Hughes 1969b:219, my emphasis). 
However, the economic situation of Blacks did not improve 
much.
The repeated boycotts against shopkeepers in the area 
showed that Harlem residents were tired of the status quo 
which persisted with racial discrimination. With the 
minimal change of the situation, the tension and anger of 
Harlem residents exploded again in the 1960s when the whole 
American society experienced a new form of protest, the 
Civil Rights Movement, which culminated the protest history 
of Blacks against racism.
Riots and Shopkeepers in the 1960s
Even though there were some gains in income in the 
early 1960s, racism, poverty, and high unemployment 
continued. In 1964, 48% of Black families were in poverty, 
while 19% of White familes were in poverty (National Urban 
League 1968:477). Most stores in the area were owned by 
outsiders. In Central Harlem, 85% of businesses were owned 
by White shopkeepers. In fact, there had been no progress 
for Harlem residents during the last half-century. The 
frustration ran deep. The struggles in various fronts, 
including racism, housing problems, school problems, and
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economic problems, continued with higher intensity.
The Mew York Times reported, on January 25, 1960, that
moderate Black leaders worried that "extremists" agitated
Blacks about the rate of improvement. One of those was
Malcolm X and his Temples of Islam. In August 1960, more
than 8,500 people were attracted to the speech of Elijah
Muhammad, the leader of the Temple of Islam. He called for
Black unity and said that a White just "kicks you in the
mouth instead of helping you"(Amsterdam News. August 6,
1960). The Temple of Islam preached,
a vision of the doom of the white "devils" and the 
coming dominance of the black man, promised a utopian 
paradise of a separate territory within the United 
States for a Negro state, and offered a practical 
program of building Negro business through hard work, 
thrift, and racial unity. (National Advisory Commission 
on Civil Disorders 1968:229)
They emphasized a doctrine of self-help and provided
programs for the organization and operation of enterprises
by Blacks. They also scoffed at the efforts of the Urban
League and the NAACP to seek jobs in the Whiteman's
enterprises. One Black writer wrote, "except for their
demand for a separate state for Blacks, their enunciated
program and statement have achieved general acceptance by a
majority of colored Americans.... It is no longer a question
of ssocial equality' but rather one of 'economic justice'"
(Stevens 1969:112). The fierce spokesperson of this
perspective was Malcolm X whose thoughts exerted a great
influence on the militancy of young Blacks during the 1960s.
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He pointed out that,
The American, black man should be focusing his 
every effort toward building his own businesses, and 
decent homes for himself. As other ethnic groups have 
done, let the black people, wherever possible, however 
possible, patronize their own kind, hire their own 
kind, and start in those ways to build up the black 
race's ability to do it for itself. That's the only 
way the American black man is ever going to get 
respect. One thing the white man never can give the 
black man is self-respect!
• • • •
In every black ghetto, Jews own the major 
businesses. Every night the owners of those businesses 
go home with that black community's money, which helps 
the ghetto to stay poor. But I doubt that I have ever 
uttered this absolute truth before an audience without 
being hotly challenged, and accused by a Jew of anti- 
Semitism. ... I have told them that if I tell the simple 
truth, it doesn't mean that I am anti-Semitic; it means 
merely that I am anti-exploitation.
... All Negroes... admit the white man's criminal 
record. They may not know as many details as I do, but 
they know the general picture.(Malcom X 1989:275-284)
In Black communities, the tensions as well as the
expectation went high when the Civil Rights movement
stimulated new hope and militancy to achieve it. They took
to the streets in an assault on racial segregation and
discrimination. They sought "a final toppling of the walls
of segregation and discrimination," asserted Percy E. Sutton
(New York Times. Aug. 12, 1963).
One of the continuing tension in ghetto areas was with
White shopkeepers as Malcolm X pointed out. Many Black
residents shared the belief that they were exploited and
abused by local shopkeepers. Caplovitz (1963) showed in his
study of consumer problems in Harlem that "the poor pay
more." Since the poor did not have enough cash and good
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information about merchandise, they were easy victims of
fraudulent credit practices of the shopkeepers. The
continuous destruction and looting of stores during the
riots throughout the country during the 1960s, which
Caplovitz referred to as "consumer revolts," gave a greater
sense of urgency to the problem. Many studies showed that
the prices for durable goods were not only higher in low-
income market stores, but the operating costs of those
stores were also higher. But the differences in the food
prices were not clear (Sturdivant 1969:3-6). The rude
attitude toward Black consumers and the indifference to the
problems of Black residents were other factors for the
resentment of Blacks (Wall Street Journal. Aug. 16, 1966)'.
The high prices and unfair practices of the shopkeepers
in the area were not the only reasons for the resentment and
consequent looting. Some Blacks considered looting as
"getting back at whitey." One Black resident said,
what whitey don't understand is that America is a damn 
rich country and she flashes this richness in the 
brother's face and tells him, NIt ain't for you.' The 
brother gets out and grabs a bit of it now and then.... 
(New York Times. April 8, 1968)
Wide-spread looting occurred during the 1964 and the 1968
riots in Harlem.
In July 16, 1964, during a confrontation between an
off-duty policeman and several young Blacks, a boy attacked
the policeman with a knife, and the policeman shot and
killed the boy. Crowds confronted the police for several
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days. Thousands of people shouted at the policemen and the
Whites, smashed store windows, and looted stores fHew York
Times, July 17,19,20, 1964). Shouting, shooting, and
triggered burglar alarms, as doors and windows were smashed,
made a strident harmony on the streets. The riot ebbed
after three days of violence. During the process, Mr. Gray,
leader of the Harlem Rent Strike, urged the formation of a
revolutionary organization to obtain equal rights for Blacks
(Ferretti and Berck, 1986:353).
This call for the revolutionary organization continued
through the 1960s in Harlem. One of those groups was the
Black Panthers. Max Stanford was a member of the Harlem
branch of the Black Panthers. When a rally was organized by
the branch of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee
(SNCC) in Harlem in August 1966, he spoke in front of 250
cheering people. He proclaimed that Blacks must unite and
overthrow their White oppressors. Stokely Carmichael,
chairman of SNCC, also called for the unity of African-
Americans to take over their own communities (Amsterdam
News. Sept. 3, 1966). One of the major goals of the Black
Panthers Party was to achieve power to determine the destiny
of.the Black community. In relation to the economic
situation of Blacks, they believed that
the federal government is responsible and obligated to 
give every man employment or a guaranteed income. We 
believe that if the white American businessmen will not 
give full employment, then the means of production 
should be taken from the businessmen and placed in the 
community so that the people of the community can
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organize and employ all of its people and give a high 
standard of living.(Black Panther Party 1970:2)
The Wall Street Journal reported on January 13, 1970, that
"a clear majority of Blacks support both the goals and
methods of the Black Panthers." Especially young Blacks
supported them because of "their avowed determination to
overturn the American 'system,' their refusal to back down
under intense police pressure."(Foner 1970:xiii)
The resentment against White America was also shared by
other Blacks. Since a great number of the shopkeepers and
building owners in ghetto areas were Jewish, the Jew was an
easy target. Indeed, "the invective 'Jew merchant' was
spewed at all White merchants in Watts and even some Black
store owners"18 (Sturdivant 1969:9). James Baldwin, a
famous novelist, resented the Jewish shopkeepers because
they were a part of the White domination over Blacks. He
expressed this sentiment in his article, "Negroes Are Anti-
Semitic Because They're Anti-White."
When we ware growing up in Harlem our demoralizing 
series of landlords were Jewish, and we hated them....
...The butcher was a Jew and, yes, we certainly 
paid more for bad cuts..., and we very often carried 
insults home, along with the meat.... The merchants 
along 125th Street were Jewish - at least many of them 
were... - and I well remember that it was only after 
the Harlem riot of 1935 that Negroes were allowed to 
earn a little money in some of the stores where they 
spent so much.
.... It is bitter to watch the Jewish storekeeper
18 Even these days, "Jews" implies some invective meanings 
for some people. One Black shopper spat out "Japanese Jew" 
to a Korean shopkeeper, when the Korean shopkeeper refused 
to refund'. See chapter 6.
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locking up his store for the night, and going home. 
Going, with your money in his pocket, to a clean 
neighborhood, miles from you, which you will not be 
allowed to enter.
• • • •
In the American context, the most ironical about 
Negro anti-Semitism is that the Negro is really 
condemning the Jew for having become an American white
nicin o • « •
• • •
He is singled out by Negroes not because he acts 
differently from other white men, but because he 
doesn't.... And he is playing in Harlem the role 
assigned him by Christians long ago: he is doing their 
dirty work.(Baldwin 1969:3-10)
After several riots, as Blacks continued to believe that
there had been no change in the unfair practices of the
shopkeepers (Sturdivant 1969:16), White shopkeepers
reinforced their stores with steel, cement, alarm systems,
or moved out. As one Black manager of a shoe store in
central Harlem put it, "They don't want their white faces to
be obvious. They're pulling further into the background
rather than joining the group." Most shopkeepers claimed
the riots were not justified and saw no reason for further
involvement in a hostile community (Wall Street Journal.
Aug. 16, 1966). Riots induced many shopkeepers to avoid
ghetto areas. Thus, after the riots, many commercial
buildings went vacant. The fear of looting continued for
shopkeepers, and insurance doubled. Many commercial
buildings stayed vacant in Harlem until the late 1970s.
Even today, vacant stores exist on the busiest street of
Harlem.
New Korean immimigrants were looking for business
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
63
opportunities requiring small capital in the 1970s. They 
found stores with low rent, and customers who would buy 
cheap merchandise which these Korean shopkeepers could 
provide. Thus the Korean immigrants rushed into the inner- 
city area from the late 1970s.
The Influx of Korean Shopkeepers into Harlem 
Many Kotean immigrants made a small fortune from wig 
trading during the 1970s. Some brought money from Korea. 
Others saved their salaries by working at stores owned by 
other Koreans. Some others worked in factories but became 
frustrated after repeated lack of promotion due to their 
broken English, and possibly due to racism. A good number 
of them were looking for better opportunities in small 
business enterprises and began small business with small 
capital from the 1970s. Since a few Koreans already had 
made a fortune from small business, other Koreans followed 
them.19
They found stores with low rent ins Black 
neighborhoods. Some started green grocery stores in the 
1970s. They swept the green grocery business in all areas 
of New York City through the mid-1980s. Many others opened 
various stores in the poor neighborhoods and also in many 
busy commercial strips. One of the first Korean shopkeepers
19 See chapter 4 for detailed discussion of capital 
accumulation of Korean shopkeepers.
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to open a store in Central Harlem recalled:
After making a small savings from my wig peddling in 
Brooklyn and my wife's factory work, I wanted to open 
my own business. When I came here [125th street] in 
1975, I could see a lot of buildings ruined by fire. 
Many people worried about my safety when I decided to 
move in to open a store. Whites were afraid of riots 
and crimes here. But if I had been afraid of crime or 
anything, I would have not come here. I came to 
America to succeed, or I would die.... Because the 
rent was cheap and affordable for me, because I was 
familiar with Black areas, and because some illegal 
activities such as drug trafficking generated cash 
among people here, I thought I could do business here.
...In the beginning, Black customers liked me.
They told me that "we are same colored people. I am 
glad you open a store here. It is nice that I can shop 
at a colored person's." I knew that Whites had treated 
Blacks badly....
Soon many Koreans came here to open a small 
business. Some Koreans were bad and some others 
good.... The troubles with Blacks increased....
Blacks became suspicious of Koreans. They wondered how 
Koreans made money....
New Korean immigrants found that it was very difficult to 
get a decent job because of language problems, cultural 
differences, and sometimes racism. Even when the number of 
Korean shopkeepers was small at the time, it was clear to 
Korean immigrants that a small business produced more income 
than other decent jobs \. Thus, to run. a small business 
became a dream for most Korean immigrants.
Many Korean immigrants flocked into Black neighborhoods 
to open a store soon after they accumulated a savings of 
around $15,000 - $50,000 during the two to four years after 
their immigration. The rent was inexpensive, and moreover 
Blacks would buy cheap merchandise which new Korean 
shopkeepers could provide. The Koreans did not have enough
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capital to compete with White shopkeepers in White 
neighborhoods with quality merchandise. Many Korean 
shopkeepers agreed that it would be difficult to sell cheap 
merchandise in White neighborhoods. One Korean shopkeeper 
in Harlem said, "It is easier to deal with Blacks than 
Whites. Blacks shop impulsively if they have money. They 
are not bothering with details such as price and quality of 
goods." Another Korean shopkeeper continued, "We cannot 
succeed in White areas. White customers will not come to 
Korean stores. They will go to White stores. It is not 
only that White merchants can provide quality merchandise; 
White customers prefer White stores."20
One Korean shopkeeper recalled, "One of my friends 
opened a nice restaurant in a White area. No customers 
came. Soon he learned of a rumor that fleas and lice were 
in his food. That was a rumor spread certainly by a White 
restaurant owner. He lost $300,000 overnight." It was a 
general consensus among Koreans that Korean shopkeepers
20 Loewen (1971) shows that White shopkeepers who opened 
business in Black areas were isolated and degraded by other 
Whites in the Mississippi Delta. Because of it, Whites 
shopkeepers avoided Black areas. However, the Chinese, 
because of their ambiguous social status, could open 
businesses in Black areas and succeeded. Because the status 
rule in New York city is not quite the same as in the South, 
I think there is less pressure (but there is certainly 
pressure) for Whites not to open business in Black areas. 
Many Korean shopkeepers expressed that White customers look 
down on Koreans and are very demanding. However, Korean 
shopkeepers in Black areas expressed that their status is 
degraded because of the low status of Blacks (see chapter 5 
and 7 for more discussion).
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cannot succeed in White neighborhoods except in labor- 
intensive businesses such as green groceries, dry cleaners, 
and fish markets.21
Around 1980, there were already more than twenty Korean 
stores on 125th Street in Harlem. The stores included wig 
stores, green grocery stores, fish markets, clothing stores, 
and variety stores. During 1981-82, Lloyd Williams, 
president of the Uptown Chamber of Commerce now dominated by 
Black businessmen, estimated that "Koreans had opened two 
out of every three new businesses on 125th street" (Mew York 
Times. Sept. 11, 1982). The number soon reached fifty 
around 1985. Sneaker and shoe stores, small restaurants, 
jewelry stores, and dry cleaners were added. Nail shops 
were introduced in 1987. The number of Korean stores in 
1990 was about sixty-six.22
Within fifteen years, the Koreans had taken over more 
than one-third of the 160 stores on the busiest street in 
Harlem, 125th Street. "For years, 125th Street was a street
21 Because the children of White shopkeepers who owned 
labor-intensive businesses such as green groceries already 
had professional jobs or did not like to work hard, the 
White shopkeepers had to sell the stores to others. Korean 
immigrants appeared at the right time to take over those 
businesses. The Korean shopkeepers also destroyed the green 
grocery business of Whites by providing cheaper and better 
vegetables. One Korean green grocer recalled, "After I 
opened my business, nearby White shopkeepers closed their 
stores one by one. And Koreans took over their business. I 
put in extra labor to clean vegetables and sell them 
cheaply. Whites didn't clean enough."
22 The number fluctuated because some Koreans opened new 
stores while others closed theirs.
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made to be off-limits to Blacks, and property owners [mostly
Jews and Italians] have not rented to Blacks," said Lloyd
Williams. "Now they see Asian merchants where Blacks
couldn't get in" (Village Voice. July 12, 1988).
One Black shopkeeper in the area responded to the
influx of Korean shopkeepers:
Some feel that their anger could easily explode and 
then Koreans could be their targets, for they are seen 
by disadvantaged Afro-Americans to be foreign 
exploiters who don't live there, don't employ people 
from the neighborhood, take from the community and give 
nothing in return. The riots and boycotts in Harlem 
were the visceral reaction of people no longer able to 
suppress their anger and frustration, (quoted by 
Village Voice. July 12, 1988)
A boycott toward Korean shopkeepers began as early as 1981.
The complaints and boycotts among Blacks toward Korean
shopkeepers continued not only in New York City but also in
Chicago, Washington, Philadelphia, Atlanta, and Los Angeles.
Black rap songs (Ice Cube's "Black Korea"), Black movies
("Boyz N the Hood" and "Do the Right Thing"), White movies
("Falling Down"), and Korean movies ("Western Avenue") deal
with Korean shopkeepers and their conflict with Blacks.
This increasing attention within popular culture to the
conflict between Black residents and Korean shopkeepers show
that the presence of Korean immigrants in Black
neighborhoods is an important issue in current times.
Conclusion
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Blacks, who were discriminated and segregated because 
of White racism, demanded jobs and fair treatment from White 
businessmen when they dominated Harlem. Since the law and 
the politicians were on the side of the White shopkeepers, 
boycotts became a prevalent tactic beginning in the 1930s 
and drew support from various segments of the residents.
High unemployment, deteriorating housing conditions, police 
brutality, and racism also contributed to sporadic riots and 
uprisings, depending on different perspectives.
In comparison with White race riots which took many 
Black lives during the 19th century, the Black riots were 
mainly directed toward property rather than people. Some 
scholars described the Black riots as "commodity riots" 
(Graham and Gurr 1969:397) or "consumer revolts"(Sturdivant 
1969:3). But these riots were not about commodities. These 
were against White domination and discrimination over 
Blacks. The Black rioters could not attack White people due 
to the complex White domination.23 Therefore, authority
23 This was clear during the LA riots in April 1992. White 
areas were well protected during the riots while Korean 
areas were abandoned by the police. Half of all property 
damage during the riot, about $400,000,000 damage, and 60% 
of all burned stores (about 2,400), were owned by Korean 
shopkeepers in the area of the riots and in nearby Koreatown 
(Korea Times of Mew York. May 11, 1992). While Whites 
killed Blacks during the race riots in the 19th century, 
Blacks do not kill Whites during their riots in the 20th 
century. This reflects the fact that while the Whites who 
killed Blacks in the 19th century were seldom severely 
prosecuted or not prosecuted at all. Blacks who kill Whites 
would get very severe setences through the "Justice" system. 
Thus, there is more protection for Whites.
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and property became the main targets of riots in Black 
areas, as the local symbols of White domination (National 
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 1968:6). Policemen, 
storeowners, and landlords were those with whom the ghetto 
residents had direct contact. Many Black residents 
experienced White domination and racial prejudice through 
their everyday contacts with them.
The Black residents received daily humiliation and 
insults in their contacts with policemen, storeowners, and 
landlords. As Baldwin (1969) put it, the Black residents 
"very often carried insults home" from policemen and 
storeowners. The humiliation ran deep when they were 
totally excluded. As shown earlier, "what whitey don't 
understand is that America is a damn rich country and she 
flashes this richness in the brother's face and tells him, 
vIt ain't for you'" (New York Times. April 8, 1968).
The frustration came through exclusion not only from 
wealth but also from power and culture. Despite the 
spectrum of different orientations, expressed from the 
Garveyites to the Black Panther Party, these movements all 
maintained that economic autonomy is closely related to 
political and cultural autonomy. From the "Buy Black" 
movement to the "Black Power" movement, Blacks of inner-city 
areas had hopes at the beginning, that never really brought 
the desired changes.
Since many Harlem shopkeepers were Jewish, the boycotts
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in the 1930s had some anti-Semitic undertones repeated by 
many Black nationalist leaders in the 1960s. Many 
nationalist leaders were accused of being anti-Semitic and 
anti-White. Many Black leaders were harassed and arrested 
by local, state, and federal governments. Many of them were 
put in jail. While they were described as criminals in the 
"White" society, they commanded sizable support from the 
Black community.
When Korean shopkeepers became a large group of 
storeowners on 125th Street in the early 1980s, the conflict 
between Black residents and Korean shopkeepers started. The 
Black residents carried home insults and humiliation again. 
The Korean shopkeepers took money out of Harlem. Yet 
despites these similarities with the conflict between the 
Black residents and Jewish shopkeepers, the situation is 
different in several aspects.
First of all, New York's City Hall was in the hands of 
a Black mayor in 1990. The main shopkeepers changed from 
Jews to Koreans, whose population in New York City is very 
small and thus whose political influence at the City Hall is 
very limited. Black people experienced the Civil Rights 
Movement and its achievement and frustration through the 
last half-century. While many professional and middle-class 
Blacks left for other areas, Black residents in Harlem 
became poorer during the 1970s and 1980s. New York State 
welfare grant decliend through the last two decades. While
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
71
the welfare grant paid 110% of the federal poverty line in 
1975, they paid 66.7% of the poverty line in the late 1980s 
(New York City Interfaith Hunger Policy Task Forse 1989:4). 
In 1989, the poverty rate was 43.6% and per capita income 
was about $ 6,737 for Blacks in a Harlem census track24 
which included various Korean stores and also boycotted 
Korean stores (1990 Census of Population and Housing Summary 
Tape File 3A, New York County, Tract 213.01).
The process of the conflict between Blacks and Korean 
shopkeepers will be discussed in detail in chapters five and 
six. Before discussing the conflict between Korean 
shopkeepers and Blacks in Harlem and Brooklyn, I will 
discuss the immigration of Koreans to America and the 
emergence of Korean shopkeepers in New York City in the 
following two chapters. These chapters will help us to 
understand how the Koreans are put into contact with poor 
Blacks in certain situations. By understanding the process 
by which social conditions for Korean shopkeepers are
S'
consituted, we can understand better the constraints and 
environments which limit and guide the activities of Korean 
shopkeepers.
24 There were 3,503 Blacks, 157 Whites, 18 Asians, 47 native 
Americans, and 277 others living in the area. (1990 Census 
of Population and Housing Summary Tape File 3A, New York 
County, Tract 213.01)
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CHAPTER THREE
"TO A DREAM COUNTRY": KOREAN IMMIGRATION TO 
THE UNITED STATES AND NEW YORK CITY
After my firm went bankrupt in 1980, I was 
deeply frustrated. I decided to leave Korea and 
came to America alone in 1981. After I converted 
to Christianity, I always prayed for my family. I 
missed my family very much. I swept away tears 
often. I worked for a friend of mine in 
Philadelphia, but soon moved to New York City and 
found a job at a fish market. Tears came down all 
day long when I started to clean fish on the first 
day. I thought, "I was the owner of a small 
company in Korea but now I am just cleaning 
fish...." I regretted my past again and again.... 
Anyhow, my family was able to come to America nine 
months later, (a Korean fish market owner)
When I arrived here, my husband was a fish 
cleaner. What a smell and workI I could not stop 
crying.... Soon, I started to work with him at 
the same fish market. Whenever I heard the sound 
of an airplane, tears fell down. I really wanted 
to fly back to my country.... I had thought that 
America was a really rich and White country. But 
all that I could see were dirty streets and poor 
Blacks. I could not believe it. I asked my 
husband many times, "Is this really America?"
(his wife)
The America-Korea Connection and the Early Immigration 
Beginning in the 16th century, European countries have 
sailed eastward to contact Asian countries for trade and 
colonialization. In the early 19th century, Britain,
France, Russia, and the United States finally arrived near 
the Korean peninsula and displayed their interest in trade 
and colonialization. The Korean government rejected Western 
demands for trade and closed her doors out of fear for
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similar disasters which China had endured after her clashes 
with the Western powers in the early and mid-19th century 
(Lee 1984:262-266).
The United States as well as the European powers 
intruded many times into the Korean peninsula with force in 
the mid 19th century (Chay 1990). Finally, Japan was 
successful in forcing Korea to open her doors in 1876. Soon 
after, Korea and the United States of America signed the 
Treaty of Amity and Commerce in 1882. Britain, Russia, 
Germany and France followed the United States. The Korean 
peninsula soon became the battlefield of China, Japan, and 
Russia for control of this strategic location in East Asia. 
Here, Japan fought China in 1894, and Russia in 1904. Japan 
won both wars.
The Sino-Japanese War in 1894 uprooted a large number 
of Korean peasants, and many of them moved to major port 
cities in hope of finding employment (Yun 1977:34-35). When 
a long drought struck Korea in 1901, the Hawaiian Sugar 
Planters' Association explored the prospect of employing 
Koreans as farm laborers. They wanted to replace the 
militant Japanese who demanded higher wages and better 
working conditions. They tried to import European laborers, 
but Europeans were not willing to work for low wages1
1 Even Europeans received better wages, better housing, and 
one acre of land, and they were not willing to work under 
such poor conditions. They could get better wages on the 
continent.. Asians came to work in Hawaii for less wages 
(Europeans got $18-20 a month while Asians got $15), worse
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(Patterson 1977). After the annexation of Hawaii to the 
United States in 1898, contract labor2 became illegal and 
laborers were legally free to find better employment. Many 
of them left for the continental United States where they 
could often get twice the pay (Patterson 1988:13). The 
Association contacted the minister of the United States 
legation in Korea. The minister asked the Korean government 
to permit Korean migration to Hawaii. The Korean 
government, who feared famine after the severe drought of 
1901, allowed the emigration (Yun 1977).
In December 1902, the first group of Koreans, 121 
emigrants, left Inchon for Hawaii, and during the next three 
years a total of 7,226 Koreans left Korea for Hawaii (Yun 
1977:33). Most immigrants came from the port cities of 
Korea where they had engaged in manual labor.3 Most of
housing, and no land (Patterson 1977:17-18).
2 This contract labor was similar to indentured labor. The 
contract specified the wage and the duration of labor in the 
plantations for the imported laborers. It was illegal to 
violate the contract for farm laborers. Since the contract 
was a result of a very unequal relationship between the 
planters and the poor peasants or laborers in Asian 
countries, imported laborers worked under abysmal working 
conditions without freedom to leave the farm until the 
expiration of the contract. Many farm laborers lived with 
very low wages, harsh supervision, and poor housing.
Remember that Africans and Europeans were imported as 
indentured laborers to the American South during the 17th 
century.
3 "Chinese and Japanese immigrants to Hawaii were mostly 
peasants, but only one-seventh of the Korean immigrants were 
peasants, the others were common laborers, coolies, low- 
grade government officials, ex-soldiers, students, house 
servants, mine workers, and political refugees." (Yun, Yo-
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them were Protestants who had converted through the
influence of American missionary activities after 1882.
"American missionaries had encouraged and persuaded Korean
Christians to depart from their homeland, which was deeply
imbued with the Confucian culture of ancestor worship"(I.
Kim 1981:23).4 One Korean immigrant to Hawaii stated/
the great and good missionary... appeared in Korea and 
began telling the wonderful story of the Cross... 
Eagerly he asked of its power and a sample of its 
results. The one was told him by the missionaries, the 
other was pointed out to him in the advanced life of 
the United States. Soon the United States was the hope 
of Korea, for was it not there that the wondrous Cross 
had brought beneficient results? Was it not worth the 
while of any timid, downtrodden Korean laborer to make 
the attempt to reaching this haven of peace and plenty? 
As the Korean embraced Christianity he began to look 
for a place where it might be lived in peace.(T. Yi 
1932:47, quoted by H. Kim 1977b:49)
The immigrants worked in plantations as farm workers. 
This immigration was soon stopped by the influence of the 
Japanese government which sought to protect Japanese 
plantation workers and to limit the anti-Japanese activities 
by Koreans in Hawaii in 1905 (Patterson 1988).5 Before the
jun 1977:35)
4 The number of Christian converts in Korea increased very 
rapidly through the 1890s and the 1900s and the number 
reached almost 200,000 by 1910 (Paik 1970). Since 
Christianity was considered heresy at the time, the 
Christians were easily ostracized by other Koreans. The 
Christian converts were labeled as "foreign Koreans" (Kang 
1987:10).
5 "In 1902, there were 31,029 Japanese immigrants working on 
sugar cane farms in Hawaii, 73.5 percent of the total 42,242 
sugar cane workers on the Islands... With an increasing 
number of Korean workers on the farms, Japanese workers
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farm work immigration, there were some Koreans who stayed in 
the United States to study or to do business, but the number 
was less than fifty by 1902 (Choi 1979). Some 500 political 
refugees, who opposed Japanese rule over Korea, were allowed 
to enter the United States by 1924 (Mangiafico 1988:79). 
Because the farm workers were mostly bachelors, they sent 
photos to obtain brides from Korea.
The National Origins Act enacted in 1924, banned the 
immigration of all Asians.6 Because of this Act, the
pressed their government to influence the Korean government 
to suspend Korean immigration to Hawaii." (Yun 1977:39-40)
6 Until 1875, there were no immigration laws in the United 
States. It meant that anyone who wanted to immigrate to the 
United States could immigrate freely. The American 
government gave up this Open-Door Policy gradually.
Congress introduced laws for immigration restriction in 
1875, 1882, 1885, and 1888, the restriction culminated with 
the National Origins Act of 1924.
In the 1870s and 1880s, convicts, prostitutes, persons 
likely to become public charges, Chinese, and contract 
laborers were prohibited. In terms of ethnic groups, the 
Chinese were singled out, because of the imagined threat of 
a mass influx of Chinese, the fear of competition in labor 
market, and the racism of White Americans. After the shift 
of the European immigration from northwestern Europe to 
southeastern Europe during the 1890s, the earlier European 
immigrants were alarmed at the possible challenge to their 
racial and cultural domination. The farmers and industrial 
workers feared the possible threat to their economic safty 
from new immigrants.
The Quota Act of 1921 restricted "the immigration of 
any nationality to 3 percent of those residing in the United 
States according to the 1910 census of the foreign-born 
population"(Kung 1962:81). The National Origins Act of 1924 
limited the annual quota to 2% of the population of each 
nationality of the 1890 census. Congress prohibited the 
immigration of many Asians by the Immigration Act of 1917 
which imposed the barred zone, "natives of which were 
declared inadmissible to the United States" (Kung 1962:292). 
While the Act of 1924 imposed quotas for Europeans, the Act 
prohibited the immigration of all Asians. All Asians were
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immigration from Korea became almost impossible after 1924. 
Until 1945, it is thought that there were less than 10,000 
Koreans in the United States (Yu 1986:14). The real influx 
of Korean immigrants to the United States started after the 
introduction of a new immigration law in 1965.
The Immigration Act of 1965 
The introduction of a new immigration law in 1965, 
which changed the National Origins Act of 1924, made a major 
influx of Korean immigrants to the United States possible. 
The Act of 1924, which prohibited the immigration from Asia 
and thus from Korea, was "designed in the 1920s to 
perpetuate the cultural and political dominance of northern 
and western European stocks and which had been reaffirmed 
during the Eisenhower adminstration by the Immigration and 
Nationality Act7 of 1952"(I. Kim 1981:27).
The new immigration act, which was formulated during 
the strong Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, presented 
more liberal openings to the non-Whites. Skill and kinship 
became two major criteria to select immigrants to the United 
States. In other words, immigration now was allowed for
ineligible for citizenship. (Kung 1962:80-82)
7. This Act reduced the annual immigration quota of any 
nationality to 0.166% of the number of that nationality 
residing in the United States in 1920 - While the annual 
quota for northwestern Europe was 125,000, the quota for 
southeastern Europe was 26,000 between 1949-1958 (Kung 
1962:292).
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family reunions or for occupations where employers could not 
find American applicants (I. Kim 1981:26-28). Under the new 
law, each country was assigned with a maximum qota of
20,000, and the ceiling for the Eastern and Western 
Hemispheres was respectively limited to 325,000 each. The 
children, parents, and spouses of American citizens were 
exempted from the quota (I. Kim 1981:26^28).
Even before the new immigration act, a considerable 
number of Korean immigrants had entered the United States as 
wives of American citizens. They were called "war brides" 
because they were usually Korean wives of American soldiers 
who were stationed in Korea after the defeat of Japan in 
1945, and also after the Korean war. The total number of 
these was 6,400 by 1964. Another major group immigrating to 
the United States were orphans adopted by American families. 
The total number of them was 5,300 by 1964. Some students, 
who came to the United States to study, also stayed after 
their graduation. The total number of immigrants from Korea 
to the United States from 1950-64 was only about 15,000 
(United States Immigration and Naturalization Service,
Annual Reports, 1950-1964).
After the passage of the new immigration law in 1965, 
Korean immigration to the United States dramatically 
increased through family reunions and professional job 
applications. Under the new law, some professionals such as 
nurses, physicians, and dentists could immigrate to the
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United States without a pre-secured job certificate. The 
shortage of medical professionals, especially in large 
cities, made the liberal openings to the immigration of 
medical professionals possible. It is estimated that at 
least 13,000 Korean medical professionals immigrated to the 
United States by 1977 (I. Kim 1981:148). Other skilled 
laborers as well as medical professionals found their jobs 
in large cities such as Los Angeles, New York, and Chicago. 
These cities became the nuclei for the expansion of Korean 
communities. When the American job market declined during 
the late 1970s, and the ever-increasing number of Korean 
Americans could invite more Korean relatives from Korea, 
immigrants for professional skills declined while immigrants 
for kinship reunion reached 92% of all Korean immigrants in 
1981 (Light and Bonacich 1988:145).
The code of family reunion made the chain migration 
possible for Korean immigrants. If one migrated to the 
United States, then he/she could bring their family members. 
The family members would bring their brides or bridegrooms 
and again, the spouses would bring their own family members 
from Korea. Thus, there was an endless chain reaction 
effect upon migration. The quota, 20,000 per year, assigned 
to Korea was always exhausted. Many others such as Korean 
wives and children of U.S. soldiers could immigrate as non­
quota immigrants. The annual number of Korean immigrants to 
the United States steadily increased from 3,100 in 1966 to
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33,000 in 1976. Since 1977, it remains around 29,000-35,000 
per year .(The United States Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, Annual Reports, 1965-1989).
This change of Korean immigration made the rapid growth 
of the Korean community possible. The "estimated" Korean 
population in America was 113,000 in 1970 (Yu 1977). This 
soon increased to 460,000 in 1980 (Kco and Yu 1981:4), and 
to more than 1,000,000 now.8
Korean-American Population in the United States
Year 1910 1930 1950* 1960* 1970 1980 1990
Number 4,994 8,321 8,176 14,331 70,598 354,329 799,000
* American-born Koreans were not included? complete data not 
available.
** These numbers are different from the 'estimated' number 
of Korean population (see footnote 8).
Source:U. S. Bureau of Census
Census of the Population (1910-1980).
Summary Report of 1990 Census (1990).
Who Immigrated to the United States and Why?
During the 1900s, the majority of Korean immigrants 
were poor urban "Christians" (Yun 1977). They had been poor 
laborers or low-level public officials. Because of their
8 The population of 1,000,000 includes not only Korean 
immigrants but also students, businessmen, visitors, and 
illegal residents who do not have permanent resident status 
nor American citizenship. The number is unclear since there 
is no precise mechanism for counting them. To count the 
number of illegal Koreans living in the United States is 
impossible. Census reports usually underestimate the Korean 
population in the United States. Because of English 
difficulty and other problems, many Koreans did not answer 
the census questionnaire.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
81
religion, they were estranged from other Koreans and many of 
them also experienced economic hardship. With encouragement 
from American missionaries, thousands of them immigrated to 
Hawaii. But religion was not a significant factor after 
1945 in Korea. The first president of Korea was a 
Christian, and Christianity became one of the most powerful 
religions during the last several decades in Korea. There 
has been a great tolerance of religion in Korea and religion 
was gradually considered to be an individual question rather 
than a public or political question after 1945. However, 
Chritianity is the primary religion of migrants to the U.
S ., and Christianity reamins the dominant religion among 
Korean immigrants. While about a quarter of the total 
population are Christians in Korea, about 80% of all Korean 
immigrants are Christians in the United^ States.9
After the liberalization of the immigration process in 
1965, the majority of Korean immigrants were well-educated 
and from the urban middle-class. The 1980 census report 
shows that 52% of Korean-American males over 25 years old 
and 22% of Korean-American females over 25 years old 
graduated from four-year colleges. Compared to 22% for 
American White males and 14% for White females, the rate of 
college graduation of Koreans in America is very high 
(Census of Population, Bureau of Census, 1980). In fact,
9 This is also in great contrast to the situation of 
Koreans in Japan. The majority of Koreans in Japan are 
Buddhists. Buddhism is the most popular religion in Japan.
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the Koreans are the best-educated ethnic group in the United 
States. A nationwide mail survey of Koreans in 1979 found 
that 66.5% of the repondents had received a college 
education (Chung Anq Daily Mews of L.A.. 1979, quoted by Koo 
and Yu 1981:8).
The Korean immigrants came from urban-middle class 
backgrounds which includes white collar workers, public 
officials,, doctors, nurses, pharmacists, small and medium- 
size businessmen, and students. In 1973, 65% of Korean 
immigrants were from professional or managerial backgrounds 
(Yu 1982:51). However, the number of Korean immigrants from 
a professional or managerial background gradually declines, 
and the number of Korean immigrants for family reunion is 
increasing (I. Kim 1981:31).
In my research area in Central Harlem, 19 in a sample 
of 28 Korean shopkepers10 answered to my formal 
questionnaire that they had graduated from a four-year 
college. Six others had completed at least high school.
Only two were limited to primary or junior high school 
educations, and one did not answer. Among the 28 
shopkeepers, six had had their own small businesses in 
Korea, nine had been white collar workers, two had been
10 My formal questionnaires were addressed only to 
shopkeepers. However, my conversation with Korean workers 
revealed that less than half of Korean workers were college 
graduates (excluding family members). Thus, Korean 
shopkeepers had relatively higher education than Korean 
workers. Korean workers were also younger than Korean 
shopkeepers.
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teachers, two had been laborers, one had been a public 
official, one had been a pharmacist, and three had not had 
jobs because they were too young then. Three had been 
students who came to the United States to study. Two of the 
wives of them immigrated as nurses.
If they had middle-class status in Korea, why did they 
give up their middle-class life and immigrate to America?
The most important reason cited for immigration by Koreans 
has been an economic one (Light and Bonacich 1988:121). 
Koreans heard only the good sides of the American economic 
situations. The American dollar was very valuable and 
strong against the Korean won. The individual annual income 
of American people was at least ten times than that of 
Korean people up till the early 1980s. Thus a one month 
salary in America was nearly as a one year income in Korea 
during the 1970s.11 This huge discrepancy between incomes 
served as the tremendous magnet attracting Korean people to 
America. Because of the high income in America, many 
relatives of Korean Americans and professionals in Korea 
aspired to immigrate to the United States to enjoy a more
11 As of 1993, average income in the U. S. is only about 
three times that of Korea. Thus, Korean white collar 
workers in Korea are reluctant to immigrate to America these 
days. Nowadays the immigration to America is not as popular 
among Koreans in Korea anymore. Many Korean immigrants 
lamented that if they had stayed in Korea their situation 
might have been better. One Korean American who visited 
Seoul, Korea, said with jealousy, "they [Koreans in Korea] 
are living better than us [Korean-Americans]." That phrase 
is not exactly true but expresses the feelings of many 
Korean Americans.
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comforable life. Other Koreans envied the ability to 
immigrate to America. It was a popular idea in Korea up 
till the early 1980s that every one in the United States is 
rich. They did not know that a considerable part of the 
American population is also poor.
One of my interviewees, who illegally immigrated to 
America in 1981, thought that he could "pick up money in 
America:"
Before I came to America, I had thought I could pick up 
as much money as I wanted in America. Thus I decided 
to immigrate to America to pick up money after my 
business failure in Korea. In fact, I could pick up 
money on a beach when I immigrated to Los Angeles. I 
picked up a great number of empty cans on a beach and 
exchanged them a cent per can. I painted during 
weekdays and picked up cans during weekends.
Another immigrant put it this way:
I was a salesman without a college education in Korea. 
But you know, I didn't like to live poor all my life.
I could only live from hand to mouth with my salary.
If your parents are poor and you don't have a college 
education, you will be poor all your life in Korea. 
Since I could immigrate to America for family reunion, 
I decided to make an adventure. Here, I can earn more 
than educated people.
However, ecomonic reasons were not the only reasons. 
Since the strong economic, political, and cultural 
influences of the United States on Korea have continued ever 
since the time, when South Korea was under the U.S. military 
regime for three years after the defeat of Japan in 1945, 
Korean people have related to many aspects of American 
society. Many Koreans admired not only the comfortable life
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of Americans, but also the cultural and educational 
advances, as well as political stability of the United 
States.12
Due to the oppressive regimes in Korea during the 1970s
and the early 1980s, and the severe tension between North
Korea and South Korea during the late 1970s, many Koreans
who feared possible political instability in Korea also
immigrated to the United States. For North Korean
Christians who fled from communist North Korea during the
Korean War, America seemed an especially safe and attractive
place. It was easier for them to leave South Korea than
others since they did not have strong kinship ties in South
Korea. They were feared being the first victims in the
event that North Korea invaded South Korea.13 They have a
strong influence in the Korean community in New York City
(I. Kim 1981:35). One of my interviewees said:
My father was a small landlord and a Christian in North 
Korea. After the establishment of the Communist regime 
by Kim II Sung, they confiscated his land. My family 
was classified as reactionary. The commies bothered us 
everyday. We couldn't find any hope for life in North 
Korep.. My family escaped to South Korea before 6.25 
(the Korean War)... My brother came eventually to
12 However, an increasing number of Koreans, especially 
students, became more critical of American support for the 
military government in Korea after 1980.
13 Tension between South Korea and North Korea was high, 
especially in the late 1970s. When an American captain was 
killed by North Korean soldiers near Panmunjum in 1975, the 
tension was so high that many Koreans believed that the war 
would start soon. Both Korean governments tended to 
exaggerate the possibility of war in order to oppress 
internal dissent.
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America and established his business. All other family 
members followed him....
The authoritarian regime in South Korea also made some 
intellectuals and professionals emmigrate to the United 
States. One ex-professor told me that he could feel the 
pressure after he criticized the government. Thus he 
decided to leave Korea and drove a taxi in Manhattan for 
several years. Even though many others did not feel severe 
fear or pressure, they aspired to possess the political 
freedom that the citizens of the United States enjoyed.
The United States has also been an attractive place for 
education for many Koreans. Education has been admired for 
centuries in Korea. The discrepancy of earnings and 
privilege between high school graduates and college 
graduates is very large in Korea. Degrees from good 
universities in the United States have been a great 
privilege for Koreans. Koreans also knew that the American- 
educated high bureaucrats, business leaders and professors 
assumed the leading role in their respective areas. Many 
parents stated that they emmigrated for the education of 
their children. Many students who came to study in America 
during the 1960s and the 1970s also stayed in the United 
States after their graduation because they could find better 
jobs in America, and they had already become accustomed to 
American culture.
Many professionals, who could not find good jobs in
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Korea, also wanted to immigrate to America.
By the 1970s South Korea had a population whose 
educationnal level was exceptionally high relative to 
the economic development of the country. Un- and 
underemployment was common among college graduates. In 
particular, Korea had difficulty absorbing the rapidly 
expanding numbers of health professionals produced in 
her own schools and hospitals. (Light and Bonacich 
1988:111)
Thus the first block of immigrants who came to the United 
States as professionals were these medical professionals for 
whom demand was high during the late 1960s and the early 
1970s (I. Kim 1981:chap.5).
However, most Korean immigrants usually followed the 
chain of connections which Korean immigrants could find. If 
they had some personal connections in the United States, it 
would be easier for them to come to the United States. Thus 
connections to American personnel stationed in Korea, "war 
brides," and previously immigrated Koreans were important 
for the actual chain migration. During the 1950s and 1960s, 
Korean brides of American soldiers and those who were 
working for American forces stationed in Korea were the 
majority of Korean immigrants. After the change of the 
immigration law in 1965, relatives of the "war brides" and 
many other Korean-Americans could easily immigrate to the 
United States for family reunions. The relatives of Korean- 
Americans became an ever-increasing majority of new Korean 
immigrants. These kinship chains also helped new Korean 
immigrants to open and manage their small businesses.
Then, why did urban middle-class Koreans immigrate to
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the United States? First of all, the new immigration law 
simplified the immigration of professionals, whom the United 
States needed, by giving them more opportunities. The 
American consul in Seoul could select immigrants by giving 
visas selectively. Well-educated urban middle class Koreans 
also had better connections and information about America. 
Because Koreans studied English from 7th grade until college 
graduation, the educated middle class commanded some 
English. Through education and news about America, and the 
influence of American society upon Korea, they were 
accustomed to some American culture.
However, as one Korean immigrant put it, "now some less 
educated Koreas are allowed into the United States through 
family reunions. But 15 years ago, only higher-educated and 
professional people were allowed to immigrate." The 
majority of present Korean immigrants come for family 
reunion and are less educated than before.
Urban Settlements
As with other ethnic immigrants since the mid-19th 
century, most Korean immigrants also settled in a few of the 
largest metropolitan areas of the United States. The major 
areas for Korean settlement include Los Angeles, New York 
City, Chicago, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Washington 
metropolitan areas. The Korean population in these six 
metropolitan areas occupies a clear majority of the Korean
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population in the United States. Ninety three percent of
the Korean-American population was living in urban areas
while seventy four percent of the total American population
was living in urban areas in 1980 (Yu 1986:21). Because of
economic opportunities, as well as family and ethnic
connections, Korean immigrants tend to settle in the
metropolitan areas.
Since their English was very limited and subtle racial
discrimination existed,14 the Korean immigrants did not
have many opportunities to obtain good jobs except through
the medical profession. Thus, Korean immigrants preferred
to establish their own businesses rather than labor under
the supervision of "foreigners."15 Even those who had a
professional job such as nurses gave up their jobs to help
in their husbands' business.16 One Korean nurse recalled,
I immigrated to New York City with dozens of other 
Korean nurses from Germany in 1972. We married here 
and provided money for our husbands to establish small 
businesses. We had a lot of trouble in the hospitals. 
We had a poor command of English poor. Collegues, 
supervisors and other administrators despised us, 
perhaps because of our poor English. All of us often
14 In fact, English language problems and racism are 
intermingled for many Koreans; it is difficult to separate 
them.
15 Korean immigrants often differentiate "us" [Korean- 
Americans] from "foreigners" [other Americans].
16 Since many well-established small businesses can deal 
with considerable amount of money, small businessmen always 
need reliable employees (a lot more things can be stolen by 
employees than by customers). A professional nurse will 
often give up her job to help husband's business. A small 
businessman often earns more than $100,000 per year.
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wanted to quit. Since their husbands needed extra 
labor and they could make more money in a small 
business, all but me eventually quit. Now 1 am left 
alone....
I married a Korean graduate student here. He 
dropped out of his graduate school and opened his small 
business. We hoped to continue our education to an 
advanced level, but after opening a store and having 
babies, we did not have time to do so. I wanted to 
quit the hospital, but my husband did not like the 
idea. He is conservative and doesn't like adventure.
My job provides my family a safty net: a steady income 
and health insurance. But I often still feel 
frustrated in the hospital.
Korean immigrant white-collar workers or factory 
workers also found it attractive to open their own 
businesses. When older immigrants, who spoke fluent 
English, found their advancement in professional or white- 
collar jobs limited because of racism or their lack of 
ability, they simply turned to small business. In general, 
small business produces more income than many professional 
or white-collar jobs. Small businessmen need not concern 
themselves with cultural and language nuisances or "foreign" 
colleagues and supervisors.17 If they own their own 
business, they become their own boss and work for 
themselves. Since they came from a country where the 
average working hours per week had been the longest in the 
world until recently and they were accustomed to work often
17 It is true only in a relative sense. They experienced 
many problems in their business becuase of their English 
laguage problems. However, one Korean shopkeeper told me, 
"if you know only how to count in English, you can open a 
business.Jl
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10-12 hours a day, six days per week.18 Therefore, they
were eager to work longer, to make more money quickly. They
could also mobilize family and kin members, and use cheap
but loyal co-ethnic workers.19
Since they could only open a store with small amount of
capital, they tended to concentrate in poor minority
neighborhoods. Host their businesses were small and served
poor minorities neglected by White businessmen: the Blacks
in Los Angeles, New York City, Chicago, Philadelphia,
Atlanta, Washington, and many other smaller cities; Chicanos
in Los Angeles and in many Texan cities; and Puerto Ricans
and other minorities in New York City. One Korean
businessman put it this way,
Many Koreans in this [New York] city work "twenty-five 
hours" per day. We set up small businesses in run-down 
areas where other people are afraid to go.... We have 
helped restore areas like Harlem. That's why Mayor 
Koch said that Koreans are number one. We open 
businesses in parts of the city where [business] people
18 The average working hours in Korea had been longest in 
the world for the last 20 years until 1988. It was common 
especailly for factory and white-collar workers to work for 
10-12 hours per day, five and half or six days a week during 
the 1970s and the early 1980s. Because the government and 
capitalists oppressed the labor movements harshly, the 
movement to improve working conditions and hours had not 
been successful during that period. Another reason why the 
Korean workers would work long hours might be that many 
Korean workers were transformed from rural boys an4 girls 
into fatory workers. While about 80% of the Korean 
population was living in rural areas in 1960, now only about 
15% live in there.
19 See chapter 4 for a detailed discussion.
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Expansion of Korean Community in Mew York City
New York City has been a center for immigrants for many
centuries. About 24% of New York residents came from other
countries in 1980, and 31% of New York residents were
immigrants in 1990 (Arian et al. 1990:6).21 New York City
has been the second largest receiving city, next to Los
Angeles, of new Korean immigrants to the United States.
The beginning of Korean settlement in New York City
dated back to the 1900s. However, the existence of a Korean
community in New York City was not visible before 1970,
because of the small size of the community.
In 1920, some seventy Koreans lived in New York, and 
about thirty Christians from among them established the 
first Korean church in the city, which still exists, 
near Columbia University. From that time until 1970, 
when a large number of Korean immigrants began to enter 
the city, the situation did not change much. A few 
Korean-Americans lived in Manhattan, and students from 
Korea came to America and stayed here or went back to
20 This raises the very important issue of why it is that 
Koreans and not Blacks are opening businesses in Black 
neighborhoods - this is the source of the conflict and 
conflicting interpretations about American society between 
Black residents and Korean shopkeepers. Both the reasons 
and the conflicting interpretations will be discussed in 
chapters 4, 5, and 6.
21 In 1970, there were 1,437,058 foreign-born residents 
among 7,894,862 New Yorkers. In 1980, 1,670,199 were 
foreign-born people among 7,071,639 and there were 2,227,000 
(estimated by a 1988 CUNY survey) foreign-borns among 
7,322,564 New Yorkers. Thus the rate of foreign born 
population is increasing. The new immigrants include West 
Indians, Latin Americans, and Asians. (Arian et al. 1990:5- 
6)
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Korea after their graduation. The total number did not 
pass a few hundred. The activities of the Korean 
community were led by students.( I . Kim 1981:182)
During the 1960s, an increasing number of Korean
students came to the United States to study. Many
physicians also entered the United States for internship or
residency training through the Exchange Visitor Program.
The majority of them stayed here because of the poor
economic and job situations in Korea. Many other students
also gave up their studies because of economic hardships or
sometimes because of their business success. They turned to
small businesses such as wigs or Korean imports.
During the 1970s, some Koreans who had lived in
Manhattan moved to Flushing, Queens. The new Korean
immigrants and other Korean immigrants who had lived in
small and mid-size cities came to New York and settled in
Flushing where the White middle-class had deserted in favor
of surburban areas.22 The Korean immigrants could find
relatively inexpensive and safe housing in Flushing, Queens,
and commuted to Manhattan where they had wig shops or green
grocery stores or worked for hospitals and others. One
Korean businessman recalled moving to Flushing from
Manhattan,
We had lived in mid-Manhattan for several years. Once
22 Korean immigrants whom I interviewed did not remember 
whether there was racial conflict when they entered 
Flushing. (Remember that a communty's transition in ethnic 
or racial composition was usually accompanied by tension in 
the United States.)
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we got our business going, we moved to Flushing,
Queens, in 1976.... Now, there are almost forty 
thousand Koreans living in Queens. Back then the 
neighborhood was mostly Jewish. We found a nice 
apartment with enough room for the kids, who were 
becoming pretty active.
Our home in Flushing was very near the subway to 
Manhattan [thus convenient to commute].... (C.Kim 
1988:174)
Koreans and other Asians filled Flushing and eventually 
expanded into neighboring communities following the No.7 
subway line, which runs from Flushing through mid-Queens to 
mid-Mahattan.23
The size of the Korean population in New York 
metropolitan areas soon reached about 20,000 in 1972,
100,000 in 1980, and 200,000 in 1987(Korea Times of New 
York, 1988).24 It is now estimated that around 70,000 
Koreans are living in Queens and the rest are dispersed in 
the Bronx-, Brooklyn, Long Island, and New Jersey. After 
Koreans amass some savings, they tend to move from New York 
City to the surburban areas of Long Island and New Jersey.
23 See Kyeyoung Park (1990) for detailed discussion about 
the spread of Korean immigrants into mid-Queens.
24 This number is exaggerated because some Korean 
leaders and ethnic newspapers prefer a bigger number in 
order to emphasize the importance of the Korean community in 
the New York area and thus gain attention from others. 
However, it is a good indication of how fast the Korean 
community in the New York metropolitan area has expanded. 
Professor Min in Queens College estimated the size of the 
Korean population in the metropolitan area to be about
70.000 in the late 1980s. The summary report of the 1990 
census reported that the size of the Korean population is
96.000 in New York state and 39,000 in New Jersey.
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Conclusion
The immigration of Koreans to America reflects the 
American immigration policy. The American government 
controls not only the number of immigrants but also the 
their racial and ethnic composition. The immigration policy 
of the government also decides who can immigrate. This 
process implies that the government can discriminate over 
certain groups of the population, based on some racial, 
national, and occupational categories. While Africans were 
the least numerous immigrants during 1881-1983, Europeans 
were the most numerous.25 After the changes of the 
Immigration Act of 1965, Asians and people from Latin 
America became the most numerous immigrants.
By importing large numbers of immigrants, the 
government provides relatively cheap laborers for the 
capitalists. The availability of numerous immigrants, 
sometimes combined with mechanization, pushed wages down. 
Most of the immigrants took the unskilled, lower-paying 
jobs. The immigrants not only contributed to the expansion 
of the American economy but also took jobs which might have 
otherwise been available to lower-class Americans, 
especially Blacks. Thus, some Blacks expressed their 
perception that "foreign" immigrants "stepped over" the
25 Total number of immigrants from Africa during 1881-1983 
was 200,900; the number of European immigrants during the 
same period was 28,045,800; and the number of Asian 
immigrants was 3,897,500 (1987:42-43).
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shoulder of Blacks to move upward.
According to Wolf (1982:380)/ "Racial designations, 
such as 'Indian' [Native America] or 'Negro,' are the 
outcome of the subjugation of populations in the course of 
European mercantile expansion." Koreans were mobilized as 
plantation laborers at the turn of this century, and after 
1965 Koreans came to America as free labor and eventually 
became incorporated as a predominantly shopkeeper ethnic 
group.
In the process of the reproduction of American society, 
various groups have been differentially segmented, 
integrated, stigmatized, privileged, excluded, included, 
incorporated, and displaced. Korean immigrants experience 
these processes.26 The introduction of new immigrants 
requires not only a new economic incorporation, but also a 
new symbolic and hierarchical incorporation into American 
economic and racial relationships. Korean immigrants
26 For example, Koreans also had to accept or develop new 
identities as Asians in American context. Asian identity is 
a very strange concept for Koreans in Korea. But in 
America, Korean immigrants are categorized and treated as 
Asian. This circumstance, coupled with their need to make 
connections to other Asian groups to increase their power, 
made them accept and develop some sense of Asian identity.
The concept of Korean may also change. In Korea, 
regional identity is very important. However, in America, 
Korean identity becomes more prominent than regional 
identity because they meet and experience themselves as 
Koreans or Asians in counter-position to Whites, Blacks, or 
Hispanics in American life. This development of new 
identities happens in the context of an already structured 
playing field, that is, the racialized subjugation and 
mobilization of world-wide labor through the American 
economic and political system.
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concentrate in metropolitan areas and in small businesses in 
poor urban neighborhoods not because their original intent 
but because their circumstances in America made them 
suitable for the small business. This economic 
incorporation into American society will be discussed in the 
next chapter.
However, this economic incorporation also accompanies 
their symbolic and hierarchical incorporation into American 
racial relationships. The vague conception of racial 
hierarchy held by Korean immigrants has colored their 
expectation of racial order in America. Upon arrival it 
must quickly be adjusted in order to incorporate and explain 
their new experiences in America. Other racial or ethnic 
groups must also adjust their conceptions of racial 
stratification in order to incorporate newly arrived groups 
into their racial conceptions.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER FOUR
98
"BITTER FRUIT": EXPANSION OF KOREAN SHOPKEEPERS
IN NEW YORK CITY
I, my brother-in-law, and other family members 
worked for my aunt's fruit and vegetable store in 
Harlem. We saved all that we earned. Two years 
later, in 1983, we took over a fish market across 
the street. The cost was about $170,000. We got 
some money from Keh [Korean rotating credit 
club]1 and borrowed some other money from our 
relatives. Since our money was not enough for the 
cost, we paid the remaining $100,000 to the 
original store owner on a monthly basis for three 
years after taking over the store.
My brother-in-law, my sister, my parents, and 
I were working for the store. Meanwhile, my wife 
and brothers arrived from Korea. They also worked 
with us in the store. We hired nobody in the 
beginning. My children were raised in the 
store.... We could save enough money to open 
another store soon. My brother-in-law opened a 
small restaurant nearby, my brother opened a fish 
market later in New Jersey, and another brother 
also opened a fish market in downtown Manhattan.
(A Korean fish market owner)
Historical Recollection 
New Korean immigrants and some Korean students found a 
gold mine in the wig business during the late 1960s and 
early 1970s because of the sudden popularity of wigs among 
Black females. To wear a wig was in vogue among Black
1 The sum of the money from Keh and from their relatives was 
more than $100,000. They used some of this money for an 
operation fund. For Keh. see the section of Capital 
Mobilization in this chapter.
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females in the mid 1960s.2
The artificial wig business was very brisk. For many 
Koreans and students, the wig business was a starting point 
of their small capital accumulation for business. One 
Korean importer in mid-Manhattan remembered his small 
capital accumulation in the mid-1970s,
My wife went to various wholesale stores during the 
day, while I worked at a factory. We were able to buy 
wigs for $3 apiece in bulk orders. On weekends I would 
go into the streets and sell them. I started out 
peddling in Harlem....
In one day of selling wigs I could make as much as 
one week salary in the factory. Soon I left the 
textile job and expanded my selling trips to Newark and 
Philadelphia. Then I found out where the black 
neighborhoods were, where people appreciated our low- 
cost merchandise....
I would walk down a street and see someone having 
a party in their backyard. They'd say, "We don't want 
to buy any wigs." I'd say, "Okay. I'll just rest here 
for a minute." I'd look around and choose the most 
beautiful lady. I'd go up to her and start to talk: 
"Whether you want to buy one or not, I'd like for you 
to try this new style one time." I'd take out a wig 
that was very beautiful. She'd shout, "Oh! That's 
beautiful." And all the people would come around and 
buy.(C. Kim 1988:171-172)
Korean immigrants were soon established in the wig 
business. For example, the above wig peddler became a wig 
wholesaler after several months of peddling. He and his 
wife imported and distributed wigs to many Korean immigrants
2 One wig peddler of that time remembered, "Black ladies 
liked the wigs because they don't have long straight hair. 
Most couldn't afford to buy a $300 or $400 human-hair wig.
My wigs looked like human hair but only cost $10. They were 
made from a nylon material. The colors were black, red, all 
shades of brown" (C. Kim 1988:173).
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and graduate students. In a short period, many Koreans 
flocked into the wig business. They established wholesale 
stores in mid-Manhattan or retail stores in Black 
neighborhoods. They imported human-hair and artificial wigs 
from Korea3 and distributed them all over the United 
States. As they could import cheap wigs directly from 
Korea, they could compete with Jewish wig wholesalers.4 
The Korean wholesalers who imported wigs mainly from Korea 
organized the Korean Wig Business Association in New York 
City in 1972 (Korea Times of New York 1988:46). They tried 
to monopolize and regulate the wig business through co­
operation among members but failed because of the threat of 
the anti-trust litigation by Jewish wig wholesalers and the
3. Korea started its export-oriented economic development in 
the early 1960s. They exported various cheap merchandise 
produced by very cheap labor. Thus, their labor-intensive 
products such as artificial wigs were very competitive 
because of their cheap price. By 1970, the wig industry was 
the leading export industry in Korea, earning 94 million 
dollars (I. Kim 1981:127). The wholesale price of an 
artificial wig was around $ 3 and the retail price was 
around $10 in the mid 1970s.
There were many human hair collectors during the 1960s 
in Korea. I also saw them shout in villages, "I buy hair, I 
buy hair." In order to sell long hair which commanded 
higher price, many women and girls in Korean villages did 
not have their hair cut for long time.
4 Labor intensive wig manufacturing was in a boom in Korea 
from the 1960s because of the increasing demand from the 
United States. Most wig products in Korea were sold to 
America (I. Kim 1981: 124-125). However, Korean wholesalers 
in mid-Manhattan had connections to Korea and could import 
directly from Korean wig makers. Thus, they could buy 
cheaper than Jewish wholesalers who bought from importers in 
America or imported from Korean exporters who again gave the 
order to subcontractors.
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severe competition among Korean importers.
Because of the sudden waning in wig popularity, 
accelerated by the oil shock of 1973, many people started 
dumping wigs. The wig business collapsed during the mid- 
1970s. However, many Korean who accumulated small capital 
in a wig business could establish other kinds of wholesale 
or retail businesses.5
Some green grocery stores were taken over by a few 
Korean immigrants in the early 1970s.6 By offering 
customers well-cleaned and trimmed vegetables,7 they could 
attract many New Yorkers to their small stores away from 
supermarkets and other groceries (Young 1983:54-55). They 
took over the business from retiring Jewish and Italian
5 For example, nine out of 28 Korean shopkeepers in my 
research area started their life in America as a wig 
retailer, peddler, or salesman. One Korean shopkeeper still 
owns a very successful wig store in the area. His parents, 
two brothers, and sister established the store there in 
1976. The annual sales for the store was about one million 
dollars and 20% to 30% of that was profit. His parents are 
retired now, and the two elder brothers and one sister moved 
out to start other business. He said that there were many 
wig shops and wig peddlers in the area until the late 1970s, 
but every one left except him after the demand for wigs 
declined.
6 The beginners of the green grocery business included 
Koreans from Brazil or Argentina. They emigrated from Korea 
to Latin America during the 1960s but migrated to the United 
States after the change of the Immigration Act in 1965. As 
a means of population control, the Korean government 
encouraged migration of Koreans to Latin America during the 
1960s.
7 One of my interviewees said that vegetables and fruits 
were sold without cleaning and trimming by Jews and Italians 
previously. He said that Koreans changed the face of green 
grocery stores.
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green grocery owners. Soon the green grocery business 
became the main small business for Koreans in New York City. 
A few other Koreans also ventured into other small 
businesses such as small garment manufacture, deli 
groceries, or fish markets from the middle and late 1970s.
The common characteristics of the wig and green grocery 
business were cheap starting capital in relation to other 
businesses. In the case of the wig business, anyone could 
start wig peddling without any initial capital. In a 1981 
study, 70% of the sample of Korean green grocers (28 out of 
40) said they started their green grocery business because 
relatively little start-up capital was required in the 
business (Young 1983:57). Both the wig industry and the 
green grocery business also depended on the extremely low 
costs of labor at some point in the process.8
The green grocery business is also known for its 
requirement of intensive labor in the process of retailing. 
Other businesses which Koreans have taken over also required 
intensive labor. New Korean shopkeepers input their long 
labor hours and free family labor9 for buying, cleaning,
8 The difference between the wig and vegetable businesses is 
that for the wig business the ultra cheap labor existed in 
Korea and for the vegetable business, Korean immigrants are 
the source of cheap labor.
9 Because of Confucian ideology and the hard-presse,d urgency 
required for establishment in a foreign country (see Park 
1990:chap.4 for the discussion of the establishment), their 
family members (brothers, sisters, wife, sons, and 
daughters) were loyal to their family head.
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and arranging vegetables and fruits. Because they competed 
well with Italian and Jewish green grocers, many Italian and 
Jewish green grocers gave up their businesses.10 M&ny 
other Italian and Jewish green grocers also gave up because 
they became old enough to retire, and their sons did not 
want to continue the business. Koreans took over those 
establishments or established new green grocery stores (I. 
Kim 1981:281). In 1991, about 85% of about 1,500 green 
grocery stores in New York City were owned by Koreans. They 
also owned about 80% of 900 fish markets.
After amassing a small capital in labor-intensive small 
businesses, many Koreans moved to other small businesses 
such as liquor stores, dry cleaning shops, variety shops, 
stationery shops, and clothing stores. Because of this 
aggressive advance in various small businesses, the rate of 
self-employed persons among Koreans is the highest among all 
ethnic groups.11 A survey done in 1977 revealed that an 
astounding 32% of Korean households in the United States
10 One Korean green grocer told me that an Italian gave up a 
green grocery after he and other Koreans had opened green 
grocery stores in an area. He heard that some Korean green 
grocery stores were set on fire because of this kind of 
competition. Some fish markets were also set on fire. This 
is a result not only of competition with other ethnic groups 
but also of competition among Korean immigrants.
11 "Koreans have the highest business-ownership rate of any 
ethnic group, according to the Census Bureau's most recent 
survey, conducted in 1987. That study showed that more than 
one of every 10 Korean-Americans is a business owner. The 
figure for non-minorities is one in 15; for blacks, it's one 
in 67" (Wall Street Journal. June 16, 1992).
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were engaged in business and that an additional 28% were 
thinking of opening a business.12 About 9,000 
establishments were believed to be owned by Koreans in New 
York City in 1,986 (Korea Times of New York, 1988:56). While 
their population consisted of less than 2% of the total 
population in New York City, they owned 5% of all the 
establishments in New York City. This is a great change 
from 1967 when the number of Korean business establishments 
in New York City could be counted with fingers (Korea Times 
of New York. Sep. 25, 1990) .
Networks and Overwork 
As I mentioned in the previous chapter, once Koreans 
have immigrated to America, they could invite their family 
members. The majority of Koreans immigrated to the U.S. as 
family members. When Korean immigrants to New York City 
arrive at the Kennedy International Airport in Queens, 
mostly their family, kin members, and friends who fcave 
already immigrated to New York metropolitan area welcome 
them at the airport. These family and kin members are the 
guides in the New World for the recently arrived immigrants. 
If a new immigrant's family or kin members already have an 
business, the new immigrant's family or kin will certainly 
hire him/her. For the Koreans who come from other parts of
12 Notice the difference from the footnote 11. There are 
various possibilities. It may be caused by the difference 
of unit of count: individual and household.
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the U.S. to New York area, stores of their family and kin 
members also provide the first working place in many cases.
If new immigrants have no relatives who own stores, 
they can use other ethnic networks. They can look in the 
classified advertisements of Korean ethnic newspapers. They 
can also church members in the Korean church where they 
attends.13 They can also visit Korean stores by themselves 
and inquire about jobs. Since Korean store owners prefer 
co-ethnic workers for various reasons,14 the new immigrants 
have a greater possibility of finding a job in a Korean- 
owned store. Because of Korean small business in New York 
area, one Korean business leader boasted, "In our Korean 
society, there is no unemployment problem" (quoted by I. Kim 
1987:226-27).
13 There are more than 600 Korean churches in New York City. 
Approximately 80% of the Koreans in New York City attend 
church. Churches provide sources of various networks for 
Koreans: job opportunities, capital mobilization, counseling 
and assistance for domestic life, and political 
mobilization.
14 Because store owners need reliable laborers who do not 
and who always work hard, Korean store owners prefer 
Koreans, and better get, relatives. Koreans believe they 
work harder than other ethnic groups. Because of English 
language problems, Korean owners feel more comfortable with 
workers who speak Korean. Because of the wage difference 
between Korean workers and Hispanic workers (they are 
usually undocumented immigrants from Central America), many 
Korean green grocery owners prefer Hispanic workers for 
simple but hard work. The Hispanic workers usually got $250 
-300 while Korean workers got $300- 450 in 1989. Both 
groups worked about 10-12 hours per day, six or seven days a 
week. However, if a worker is needed on whom the owner can 
rely, like cashiers or managers, relatives or fellow Korean 
workers are preferred.
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It is almost impossible for most new Korean immigrants, 
with the exception of qualified doctors and nurses, to 
obtain professional jobs even though many of them have 
college degrees. Those who find a job in American companies 
often feel frustrated because of their problems in English, 
skills, lack of status, and/or racism. Even those who find 
jobs in American companies will continue to look for jobs 
and business through Korean community networks after saving 
a small amount of capital because they think that they, as 
Koreans, have little hope of being promoted, and that they 
can earn more money through small business. It was well- 
known among Koreans during the late 1980s that the income 
from small businesses could range from $50,000 to 
$100,000.15
Thus, most new Korean immigrants begin their lives in 
America in a store owned by a fellow Korean. Sung Soo Kim, 
the president of Korean American Small Business Service 
Center of Hew York, Inc., estimated that "in 1986 some 70 
percent of employed Koreans in the New York Metropolitan 
area found employment in Korean businesses" (quoted in I.
Kim 1987:226). In a sample of 28 shopkeepers in Harlem, 
about two-thirds (18 of 28) began their life in America by
15 One Harlem shopkeeper told me in 1989 that a well- 
established Korean shopkeeper can earn at least $100,000 per 
year. That was also his expectation for his new business. 
However, because of the grim expectation due to the 
recession of 1991 and 1992, the estimate is changed. Many 
of the Korean shopkeepers in Harlem said the recession of 
1991 was the worst period for them.
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working for Korean shopkeepers.16
When they begin to work in Korean stores, through 
connections with kin, fellow Koreans, Korean store owners, 
or the Kojrean news media, they quickly realize that their 
most achievable goal in America is to become a store owner 
and eventually a successful businessman.17 Thus, to save 
money, open their own establishment, and expand their 
business becomes the only hope for their future life in the 
U.S. For this dream, the new immigrants endure the long 
hours and intensive labor of the green grocery stores, fish 
markets, deli groceries, or garment factories with low pay 
without medical or other fringe benefits. It is common for 
them to work 12-15 hours a day, six to seven days a week.
Not only do they have no time to spend money, they also have
no intention of spending that money.
In general, both spouses work together in the 
beginning- Koreans say that they usually spend the wages of 
one person for living expenses and save the wages of the 
other at the beginning. The stories about saving money are
frequently reported in Korean ethnic newspapers. For
16 Four others were working for American companies. Three 
began their business as soon as they arrived here with money 
they brought from Korea or they borrowed from their kin. 
Three other situations were not clear.
17 All of Korean workers and small store owners whom I met 
expressed this dream. Because they think they cannot get a 
privileged high-ranking job in America and that only 
business is relatively open to them, many Koreans want to 
compensate for their lack of status or downward mobility by 
earning more money.
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example, one Korean taxi driver who immigrated in 1986 
earned $2,500 and his wife earned $1,500 per month. They 
spent $2,000 for living expenses and deposited $2,000 into a 
Keh. Their goal was to save $150,000 till 1991 in order to 
open a variety store (Korea Times of New York. Oct.2, 1989). 
Single persons have more difficulty saving money than 
couples:
A Korean green grocery owner who illegally entered into 
America in 1977 had worked in five green grocery stores 
in NYC for five years before he opened his own store on 
Grand Concourse, Bronx. He spent only 50 cents per 
week for living costs. 50 cents were for two subway 
tokens for a round trip to a Buddhist temple. He had 
meals and slept in the stores where he was working even 
though sleeping in a store was illegal.
He did not have time to spend money.18 He worked 
from the dawn, to the late evening. Sometimes he 
worked on New Year's Day. Many of new workers quit in 
a week because the owners of stores pushed workers to 
work all day long without any rest, seven days a week. 
He sent most of the money he made to his family in 
Korea and saved the rest. He got his permanent visa in 
1982 and invited his family from Korea. He opened a 
green grocery store with $30,000 in 1982 since he knew 
only about the green grocery business. He was very 
delighted because he now worked for himself. (Sae_Gae 
Ilbo, Sep.2, 1988)
However, it is well-known that the work in a green grocery
is very difficult. Most Korean immigrants did not
experience such hard work in Korea. One Korean worker
remembered,
At the beginning of my work in a green grocery store, I 
couldn't sleep because of pain. My leg muscles were 
often "wrenched" when I slept. I felt pain in all my 
muscles before I slept. I didn't know that working in 
green grocery stores was that hard. I didn't do this
18 In 1980, his weekly wage might be around $200. He should 
have saved all the money he earned.
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kind of hard work in Korea. Maybe, nobody works like
this in Korea.
There are more problems for Koreans with babies who 
want to save money. One female Korean college-graduate 
married a Korean American, who had immigrated one year 
earlier, in a hope that she could enjoy the comfortable 
American life. She thought that everyone in America was 
rich and enjoyed their leisure. But as soon as she arrived 
in New York City, she realized that life in America was like 
"a life in the hell." She did not expect that she would 
work as a cashier in America. Especially, a cashier who had 
to stand up for 12 hours a day, six days a week. Whenever 
she returned home, she was too tired and exhausted. "What a 
pain in the legs!" When she delivered a baby a year later, 
the situation was worse. She and her husband reasoned that 
"if we paid for baby-sitting, we couldn't save any money." 
With no savings, their dream for a comfortable life was 
gone. Thus, she carried her baby to the store where she was 
working and tied the baby to a stroller all day long in a 
nearby room. Whenever she heard him crying, her heart was 
torn. However, she and her husband saved $20,000 after 
three years of heartbreaking work. Because of problems with 
child-care, many Korean couples invite a mother-in-law, 
usually the wife's mother, from Korea. These grandmothers, 
or sometimes grandparents, took care of the babies, while
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
110
their daughters and sons-in-law worked hard to save 
money.19
Capital Mobilization and New Store 
Because of a strong desire to save and mobilize money, 
the Keh. a traditional Korean rotating credit club, has 
survived the transition to the U.S. and has been rather 
revitalized in Korean American communities. For many 
centuries, Koreans have pooled their rice, and later cash, 
for expensive expenditures such as funerals, wedding 
ceremonies, the education of their children, and the 
purchase of land or other expensive things, as well as 
smaller expenditures for socialization.
The present Kehs in the Korean community can be divided 
into two categories. One is just for friendship,20 and
19 One of the common complaints of Korean grandmothers in 
the Korean community in New York City is that they have to 
take care of their grandchildren. However, it is well 
accepted that taking care of babies or toddlers is the 
responsibility of a grandmother if a grandmother is alive. 
The grandmothers complain often that baby-sitting is 
physically demanding. Three generation families are the 
norm in a Korean community if the grandparents are alive. 
However, an increasing number of Korean grandparents want to 
live separately if money is available for them (it means 
refusal of baby sitting and avoidance of family tension).
20 Because people are busy and concentrate on their own
problems, it is difficult for many people to meet or visit
friends and colleagues if there are no specific reasons.
Many Koreans organize Keh clubs to meet friends. Monthly 
meetings for contributing a share of money to a Keh club is 
a good excuse to meet friends. They share various 
information and help each other if members have problems. 
This kind of Keh club usually has a small monthly pool and
each member contributes a fixed amount of money. The order
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Ill
the other is for capital mobilization. The latter is the 
issue in this section. This Keh usually has a bigger 
monthly pool, $30-100,000, and gives the pool to the bidder 
who will pay the highest interest.
For example, 20 out of 28 in my sample of Korean 
shopkeepers joined from one to three Keh clubs. One Keh 
club whose members are mostly shopkeepers on 125th St. was 
organized as a $30,000 pool Keh. The majority of them are 
shopkeepers and the others are store workers.21 Six have 
half memberships and the others have full memberships. One 
full membership requires a contribution of $1,200 every 
month for 25 months. The Keh-Ju (the president or leader) 
who organized the Keh club is responsible for any problems 
in the management of Keh.22 In every monthly meeting, a 
member who bids the highest interest23 for the pool can 
obtain that month's pool. Those who receive the pool will
of who will take that month's pool is predetermined before 
each Keh starts.
21 These 28 members include 20 shopkeepers and 8 store 
workers. Store workers tend to join at half membership 
because their income is not enough to afford a full 
membership.
22 Keh-iu literally means the owner of the Keh.
23 The interest is usually between 14% and 17%. For this 
Keh. the interest was between $200 and $500 per month. If 
the interest is too high, there is a greater possibility 
that the member who gets the pool may default her monthly 
contributions($1200 + interest) later. The high interest 
also hurts mutual-help spirit. Thus, the leader usually 
controls the possible high interest and prearranges who can 
get the monthly pool if there is competition on bidding. 
Each member can receive only one monthly pool.
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contribute not only $1,200 but also their interest payment 
to the total pool every month until every member has taken 
the monthly pool. For the first month, the total pool is 
$30,000. However, the pool gradually increases because of 
interest payment. Thus, the last person of the Keh can get 
about $36,000 without paying interest because the Keh 
dissolves after every member has taken a monthly pool.
Thus, for those who use the monthly pool at the early 
stage, a Keh club is the source of a loan, and for those who 
do not take their turn until the final month, a Keh club is 
the place to deposit money at a high rate of interest. 
Because one can immediately obtain a considerable amount of 
money if one joins a bidding Keh club, many Korean 
shopkeepers who have not established credit for formal 
financial loans join Keh clubs. Korean store workers can 
take the monthly pool when they want to open a business.
They can also obtain a higher interest rate than available 
at any other financial institution.
Since there is no written contract among members, 
mutual trust is very important in Keh participation. 
Sometimes, the leader (Keh^ju) runs away with the pool or a 
member may disappear after obtaining a pool. Because of 
business failure, some members may be unable to pay back 
their monthly shares after taking a pool. This happens 
often. However, the Keh-~iu has the responsibility to find
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members and organize a Keh club. She24 has the privilege 
to take the first month pool without interest. She also has 
to secure money from members until her Keh has gone through 
its cycle. The duration of one Keh usually takes two to 
three years.
Because most new Korean immigrants have no credit 
history in bank, no bank will lend money to Koreans who want 
to start a new business or to expand existing business.
Even though only 3 out of 28 shopkeepers in my sample 
answered that they used money from a Keh for their first 
small business,25 these statements by no means decrease the 
significance of Keh for the Korean community. Through my 
research, I have found that many shopkeepers help their 
family, kin, or friends open a store with money from Keh. 
Thus, many of those who receive help from family members or 
friends when they establish their own business have actually 
raised small capital indirectly through Keh. For example, 
one fish market owner worked with his entire extended family 
members which included five couples. The owner assisted two 
couples with money from Keh when they established their
24 Traditionally, Keh-ius are mostly female. The most 
frequent participants in Keh clubs have also been females. 
They usually join the Keh as a family representative.
25 Of the 28 respondents, 19 answered they used individual 
savings for their first stores. However, this individual 
savings often includes money from Kehs.
In a study of Keh in the Chicago Korean community, only 
20% of shopkeepers answered they used Keh money to start 
their business(Korea Times of New York. March 27, 1991).
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independent business. The fourth couple plan to establish 
their own business with money from Keh. Of 28 my sample 
shopkeepers/ 11 obtained financial assistance from their kin 
or friends. A Keh is even more important for those who have 
already established their own business. Most Keh members 
use money for floating capital (to expand inventory stocks, 
to remake stores, or to purchase new equipment) or for the 
expansion of business (e.g. opening another small business).
One of the most important functions of the Keh club is 
that the membership forces members to save money in order 
not to default on their club membership. Members who 
default will lose face in the Korean community among their 
acquaintances. Once they default, they will experience 
difficulty in borrowing elsewhere in the Korean community. 
This mandatory saving mechanism forces many Koreans to work 
two jobs, to seek other venues to make extra money, or to 
avoid spending money.
In fact, many Koreans prefer Keh clubs with a high 
monthly share in order to force themselves to save more. 
Thus, they give first priority to securing a monthly deposit 
for the Keh from their earnings and use the remainder for 
living expenses. If the income is not enough, they will 
endure substandard living conditions in order to deposit a 
monthly share or find another source of income.
A Korean worker who saves a considerable amount of 
money is usually intending to establish an individual
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
115
business. Since many of them are looking for a store while 
savings are still insufficient, they are also looking for 
various sources to mobilize capital. Frequent sources of 
money are family, kin, and friends. It is very difficult 
for Korean workers to borrow money from banks since they 
have little credit and have problems providing the 
appropriate documents.26
It is an ethical responsibility for Koreans to help 
their family and kin. Any who do not assist their family 
members will be often accused of ignoring fundamental ethics 
by other Koreans. Thus, the frequent financial helpers were 
parents, brothers, and sisters. Parents, brothers, and 
sisters who had immigrated earlier usually gave advice and 
money to new immigrant family members ready to open a store. 
Usually the money was provided without interest. New Korean 
immigrants also expected their brothers and sisters would 
help once the new business was opened. For example, one 
couple received $10,000 from the husband's elder brother 
when they opened a green grocery. They also used their own 
$20,000 savings. However, when the husband's brother's wife 
demanded the money back, the couple complained that the
26 There was only one shopkeeper who borrowed enough money 
from a bank to open a business among my 28 sample 
shopkeepers. He borrowed $100,000 from a bank and $80,000 
from a relative for a gas station in California. He 
mortgaged his gas station for the loan from the bank.
Because he had been in the U.S. Army before he started the 
gas station business, he could borrow money from a bank. He 
failed in his business and moved in New York City in 1984.
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sister-in-law was very stingy.
Distant relatives or friends usually lend money with
interest. Mutual credit associations have been formed in
the Korean community, but the range of their activities is
still very limited. Some immigrants bring money from Korea.
Among my sample of 28 Korean shopkeepers, five brought a
considerable amount of money to help themselves open a
business. They brought $50-200,000 from Korea. These are
relatively recent immigrants. All but one immigrated to the
U.S. after 1986. The Korean government had strictly
restricted the amount an emigrating family could carry to
$10,000. From 1981, this sum was raised to $100,000 per
family. However, some Korean immigrants illegally carried
more than the limit.
Occasionally, despite small capital, some Koreans will
nevertheless open a store. Sometimes, they take over a
store and its debt without paying any money for the business
establishment. The newcomer merely needs to pay off the
debt. Another method is to consolidate capital from two or
three persons. For example, one Korean immigrant spent only
$4,000 to own a business.
The salary from my factory work was not enough for my 
family's living expenses. Since I heard and read about 
Koreans who were doing the green grocery business, I 
wanted to do the same business. When I heard that one 
green grocery owner was looking for a co-owner, I 
decided to start with him. I invested $4,000. The 
other person also invested $4,000. I learned from him 
how to do the green grocery business. tSae Gae Ilbo. 
Sep.l, 1988)
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In short, capital for the new store came from personal 
savings; from loans from family members, other kin, and 
friends; and from money acquired in Korea. The cost of 
opening their first stores among my sample shopkeepers was 
between $5-200,000. Most opening costs fell between $15- 
20,000 during the late 1970s, $30,000 in the early 1980s, 
and about $50,000 in the late 1980s. However, the cost 
depended on the kind of store and on the expected volume of 
sales.
Most shopkeepers in my sample established their own 
business within four years of their immigration to America 
(10 within 2 years, 7 within 3 years, 6 within 4 years, 2 
within 5 years, another 2 within 6 years, and 1 after 6 
years). But the increasing start-up cost of a store makes 
Korean workers save longer in order to establish their own 
business. One store worker complained that even though he 
worked two jobs, he still had problems saving enough 
money.27 A Korean peddlar on 125th St. also complained 
that he needed much more money to open a small business than 
did those who immigrated in the late 1970s. It is now said 
that about half the Korean households in the New York area 
have their own business.
However, the expansion of Korean shopkeepers sets its 
own limit of growth. Because of the expansion of new Korean
27 He is single. He spent considerable money to get a permanent 
visa.
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businesses, cheap and loyal Korean laborers become scarce. 
Thus, Korean shopkeepers employ undocumented Mexicans or 
other Hispanics. The expansion of Korean shopkeepers makes 
the competition among them very intense. Some Korean 
shopkeepers in the same area do not talk to each other 
because they are in competition. Many Korean shopkeepers 
complain that the competition among Korean shopkeepers is 
the primary problem for them. Those remaining Korean 
workers also need much more savings than before to open 
their own business. There is an increasing possibility for 
Korean workers that they may not achieve their dream of 
owning their own business. This will probably stratify 
Korean immigrants into two different groups and increase the 
tension between these two groups will increase.
Self-Denial and Pain
Once Koreans establish their own small business, they 
begin to exhaust themselves in business. Since the primary 
small businesses for Koreans are labor-intensive businesses 
requiring low capital, the profit depends on mobilizing 
cheap and intensive labor. In order to push the store 
workers to work hard, the owner must work hard. Korean 
shopkeepers are also very worried about the possibility of 
failure. In order to secure success, they push family 
members, workers, consumers, and themselves to the limit.
Most Korean green grocery owners and fish market owners
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work from dawn to dusk, six or seven days a week. Because 
they must buy vegetables and fruit at dawn at the Hunts 
Point Terminal, the major vegetable and fruit wholesale 
market in Hew York City, the green grocers get up anywhere 
between 1 and 5 A.M. Due to parking problems in the market, 
many green grocers arrive at 1 A.M. to get a parking place 
and to select better vegetables and fruits. It is said, "the 
earlier the better." They must also clean and trim 
vegetables and fruit in preparation for sale during the 
early morning. They either close their store about 8 or 9 
P.M. or stay open 24 hours. As one Korean green grocer put 
it, "sometimes you get so tired, you cannot see the dollar 
in your hand"(Harris 1983).
One grocer recalled that he slept at 11 P.M. and arose 
up at 1 A.M. to shop in the Hunts Point Market. He slept 
only two hours at home (he also slept at the store when 
business was slow). He and his wife did everything for the 
green grocery store which needed at least 6 workers (Cho Sun 
Ilbo, April 1, 1987).28 Many Korean green grocers pleep in 
their trucks or stores during the day. Fish market owners 
and deli grocery owners also feel the effects of lack of 
sleep.
28 Another Korean green grocer had a similar experience. 
Because he could not sleep enough he always looked forward 
to red lights when he returned from Hunts Point. Pulling up 
to a red light, he would fall asleep for a moment. Then the 
car driver behind him always honked a moment later because 
he did not move when the light turned green. Then he awoke 
and drove again. (Sae Gae Ilbo. Sept. 1, 1988).
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Korean shopkeepers who own other kinds of small
business can sleep better. However, they must also have
their stores from 10 to 16 hours a day, and at least six
days a week. Most take no vacations. Among my sample of 28
shopkeepers, only five shopkeepers took a vacation from 2 to
10 days off during 1989. The rest had no vacation. If they
do not open their store, they believe they will lose money
doubly because of no sales on that day and because the
customers who use other stores on that day will begin to
patronize other stores. One shopkeeper said, "I can hear
the customers step to other stores when I take two or three
days off. Even during a vacation, you cannot rest if you
have a business."
The long and intensive work certainly produces a lot of
problems for their body. Common complaints were pains in
their legs, back, shoulders, or stomach. One female green
grocer, working as a cashier, complained,
Since I have stood up all day long and have struck cash 
registers for six years, 12-14 hours a day, seven days 
a week, my knees and shoulders are ailing. I predict 
the weather better than a meteorologist because my 
knees and shoulders always bring prickle pains before 
rain fall.
A fish market owner also complained,
I hardly have a good breakfast because I must shop at 
the wholesalers at dawn. I also have lunch irregularly. 
If you are busy at 1 P.M., you cannot have lunch at 1 
o'clock. Even if you have lunch, you have to pay 
attention to whether shoplifters come in and customers 
steal. Thus, you don't have any time to relax. I have 
to have dinner at home after closing my store. It is 
always around 8 or 9 o'clock. But I don't have time to 
digest before sleeping because I have to go to bed
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early for tomorrow's shopping at dawn.
One Korean doctor reported that 3 or 4 of every 10 
Korean patients had stomach problems. That is 3 to 4 times 
higher than the rate for American patients (Korea Times of 
Mew York. July 17, 1989). The Korean green grocers also 
have physical strain - aching backs, kidney damage from 
overexertion, and arthritic hands (Harris 1983).
A common saying among Korean green grocers is, "You 
cannot do this business forever. Make money quick and do 
some other business which gives you more time to relax."
The reason why they want to move to other businesses is not 
only because of pain but also because of status anxiety. 
Among Koreans, the green grocery business is considered on a 
bottom rank because the owner should work "dirty" and 
"hard". Many green grocers are ashamed of it. Thus, many of 
them want to move to "clean" business such as dry cleaning 
or a jewelry store.
Mobilization of Family Members and Tensions
Once a store is established, the whole family and 
possibly other kin are mobilized to ensure stability and 
maximum profit. Family workers are reliable29 and do not 
complain much about hard working conditions because they 
think they are working for themselves. Individual family
29 The store workers steal more than shoplifters. One third 
of the store workers steal something fSae Gae Ilbo. May 26, 
1989).
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members are not paid, and the total income of a store is 
considered to be family income. Female participation in 
work dramatically increased in Korean communities in America 
in comparison with that in Korea. Professor Min of Queens 
College30 reported from 1983 and 1984 data that while only 
18.8% of married women in Korea were working, 56% of married 
women among Korean immigrants were (the rate for all 
American married women was 49%). Most Korean shopkeepers in 
Harlem were working as couples in 1990. Among my sample of 
28 shopkeepers, 18 of them worked with their spouse.31
However, the participation of women in family business 
does not decrease their domestic work load. Husbands are 
reluctant to share housework with their wives. Most of the 
decision-making in business is done by husbands even though 
wives fully contribute to the establishment of the business 
and work as much as husbands do. Since wives contribute a 
lot, many women feel they must have some input into home and 
business matters.
Other family members and kin are also mobilized.
Twenty eight Korean shopkeepers of my sample hired or rather
30 This information comes from an article clipped from Korea 
Tiinfts of New York, circa 1988. The date did not appear on the 
clipping.
31 Two (a wife and her husband) have separate stores nearby. 
The eight others includes two single men, a widow, a 
divorcee, two whose spouses have businesses in other areas, 
and two whose wives stay at home. Therefore, only two 
female spouses in my sample did not participate in business. 
Female spouses usually worked as cashiers.
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mobilized sixteen family members and kin, excluding spouses. 
They include fifteen household members (four sons, one 
daughter, two mothers, five brothers, one sister, one 
sister-in-law, and one niece), and one distant relative.
This number included part-time workers. However, if we 
consider casual help from sons, daughters, or other family 
members, the number will be higher. For example, when a 
grandfather from Korea visited his son who owns a store in 
Harlem, he came to his son's store everyday and watched 
shoppers.
Grandfathers and grandmothers who are usually living 
with their son or daughter are also frequently mobilized. 
Because they do not know English and can not drive a car, 
they can only stay home. However, it is very monotonous for 
them to merely stay at home.32 Many old people said that 
"to stay at home is like staying in hell." They often come 
to the stores and stay there as a "watcher," taking care of 
babies and making meals for family members. As I mentioned 
previously, many of them who stay home take care of 
grandchildren.
One grandmother who came to a store in Harlem everyday 
told me she enjoys herself more at store even though she 
cannot speak English. "I take care of a grandchild and cook 
food for my son, daughter-in-law, and other employees in the
32 They cannot visit friends or centers for the old because 
they cannot drive.
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store. If I just stand any place in the store, my presence 
will deter shoplifters. So I believe, I am more productive 
at the store than at home." Another grandmother was an 
active worker for at a store on the 125th St. She said, "I 
gladly work hard because I can see that I make money."
Grown children, who attend junior-high and high 
schools, often help their parents in stores during weekends, 
holidays, and vacation. In order to save the cost of baby­
sitting, babies are often brought to the stores. One 
shopkeeper raised his babies in the store for two years. 
Babies or toddlers often play by themselves in the store 
without close supervision by their parents.
Since all family members are participating in the same 
store with intensive labor, there is often tension about who 
enjoys the fruit of hard labor and who decided what. Since 
many Korean immigrant women are active participants in small 
business, they have more influence on family matters here 
than in Korea. However, the increased participation of 
Korean immigrant women doesn't result in the change of 
attitudes of husbands. Many husbands want to maintain the 
patriarchal relationship. This and other matters heightened 
the tension in many couples. One wife of a Korean 
shopkeeper complained about her husband.
My husband has no ability in business at all. He 
doesn't pay attention to the arrangement of the 
window. The color and arrangement of clothing in 
the window is messy and cannot get attention from 
passers-by. Because he is so bored waiting 
customers at the store all day long, he just calls
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his friends all day. When I saw this, I told him 
to cut the calls short. How do the conversations 
help our business? That doesn't make money....
I urged him to help with the children at home 
but to no avail. He doesn't move even a finger at 
home. When I managed a store, everything at home 
was in trouble. I took care of my youngest son at 
the store. I couldn't relax at the store because 
many things that are troublesome could happen. At 
home, I had to do all domestic work alone. I was 
easily irritated and felt anger at him...
Even if we can enjoy a little comfort now, 
how meaningful is it if my children fail? He 
doesn't pay any attention to the children.
Some couples who have severe complaints about their
spouses endure their relationship out of fear of being
single, having no money, or raising children alone.
However, the rate of divorce among Koreans in America is
rising even though the rate is much lower than the average
in America. Professor Min of Queens College33 reported
that while the divorce rate in Korea is 6.2 among 1,000
couples, it is 36.8 among 1,000 couples for Korean immigrant
couples (it is 72.6 among 1,000 couples for all America).
Thus the divorce rate among Korean immigrants in America is
six times higher than the rate among Koreans in Korea.
However, divorce brings more difficulties to wives than 
to husbands among Korean immigrants because it is easier for 
males to find a new spouse than for females (e.g. the 
ideology that values chastity). More problems arose when 
females run a business with their husband because of 
differential experiences of business (while Korean females
33 From an article clipped from Korean Times of New York, 
circa 1989. The data does not appear on the clipping.
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concentrated on cashier, Korean males concentrated on 
business transactions). There are also possibilities of 
sexism directed against female divorcees in jobs or in 
business. Separation from children also often cause more 
pain for women. Because wives suffer far more than husbands 
after divorce, some Korean immigrant wives endure various 
hardships in order to avoid a divorce.34
However, the role of a wife is very important in 
capital accumulation. Therefore, she tries to exert a more 
important role in the family and business decisions in 
comparison with wives in Korea. Thus, Korean immigrant 
wives are increasing their influence and becoming more 
assertive. This also increases tension in some families 
because many Korean husbands are reluctant to relinquish 
their power. In comparison with females in Korea, Korean 
immigrant wives wield more power not only because of their 
contribution to the family economy but also because Korean 
immigrant families maintain a closer relationship to the 
wife's family. The influence of sisters of husbands also 
increases. While the importance of patrilineal kinship
34 There was one divorced Korean couple in my research area. 
The wive lamented that while she had worked really hard in a 
green grocery business with her husband, her husband did not 
give her any say in business and home matters. She had 
endured hard work and tension with her husband until he 
assaulted her brother who had co-invested in the business.
To make a long story short, the couple sold the business and 
divorced. Both were socially and economically in very bad 
shape in 1990. Usually wives rather than husbands endure 
various difficulties as far as possible in order to avoid 
the divorce.
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networks declines, the importance of a wife's or a mother's 
kinship networks increases in comparison with the situation 
in Korea (Park 1989). For example, when a mother helps her 
daughter and son-in-law in baby-sitting or when other 
members of the wife's family help the couple in business 
(these are common phenomena in Korean community), the wife's 
family claims more say in the couple's home and business 
matters.
The tension and change in family relationships is also
coupled with the tension and anxiety of Korean immigrants
regarding their social status. Many Koreans feel no
satisfaction from their business because they experience a
decline of social status (they were usually well-educated
urban white collar workers in Korea). Because of this
anxiety, they often try to compensate for their downward
mobility by making "big money" quickly. The hard-pressed
desire to quickly make money for that compensation also
contributes to tensions not only in the relationships with
family members but also with store workers and customers.
One Korean shopkeeper in Harlem lamented,
We Koreans are slaves of money. We don't have any 
holiday. Because we want to make more money as quick 
as possible, we cannot rest... If the business is not 
good, we are anxious. If the business is good, we 
continue to overwork for extra money. Thus, we open 
stores even on holidays. We just chase money without 
realizing how we are living.
The Sweat of Workers 
As I already told, because Korean shopkeepers think
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that Korean workers are more loyal than any other ethnic 
workers to Korean shopkeepers, they hire Korean workers as 
managers or cashiers. Korean workers are also hired as 
workers for hard labor as in the green grocery business or 
in fish markets. However, because of the decreasing 
availability of Korean workers (many of whom have already 
opened their own business), the increasing avoidance of hard 
labor by Korean workers (they find better jobs now because 
of the expansion of Korean business during the last two 
decades), and the relatively higher wages paid to Korean 
workers than to Hispanics and Blacks, Korean store owners 
are employing an increasing number of Hispanics, usually 
illegal immigrants.35
The Korean shopkeepers think Blacks are not qualified 
for green grocery or fish market work because they do not 
want to endure the hard work and easily quit.36 According
35 In 1990, 28 Korean shopkeepers in my field area employed 
41 Koreans (including family and kin members), 26 Blacks, 22 
Hispanics, and 1 Chinese.
36 This is a very important ideological point in the 
conflict between Blacks and Koreans. Korean shopkeepers 
think Black people are lazy because they do not work hard 
and quit easily. Blacks think that Koreans do not pay 
enough, disregard the labor laws, and over-exploit Black 
workers and others. A Black in Harlem answered my question 
about why he doesn't work in a fish market, "He [the Korean 
owner] doesn't share profits with me." He meant that Korean 
owners pay very low wages. In fact, the wage for Blacks and 
Hispanics was at minimum wage or lower, especially for 
undocumented Hispanics. In 1990, an illegal Hispanic 
received $200 for 72 hours work per week in a green grocery 
store. The wage for undocumented Hispanics was between $150 
and $300. Six Korean green grocery or fish market stores in 
my field area employed only 2 Blacks (one as a security
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to Light and Bonacich (1988:363), hard work, long hours, and 
low pay are not welcomed by the local poor or unemployed 
because "the local poor had a certain conception of the 
length of a reasonable workday, of how hard they ought to 
expect to work, of how much leisure time a good life 
entailed, and so forth." Thus, Korean green grocers and 
fish market owners usually employ Koreans and undocumented 
Hispanics who endure hardship due to their expectation of 
becoming independent small businessmen or to the problems 
with their illegal status. Because they also come from 
relatively poor countries, the low wages and bad working 
conditions do not look bad in comparison with the conditions 
of their native country.
However, the Korean and Hispanic workers complained 
about long working hours, physically demanding work, and low 
wages. The workers in the green grocery or fish market 
business work 12 to 16 hours per day without overtime pay or 
any other benefits. One Korean fish cleaner said,
guard, the other one as a fish frier), while they employed 
14 Hispanics (illegal residents), and 15 Koreans.
Korean shopkeepers often hire Blacks as sales work 
which does not require hard physical labor. Still the wage 
was low (about $3.50 per hour without any benefits) but the 
sales work was easier (physically) than the work in a green 
grocery store or fish market. However, because of low wages 
and no benefits, there was a high turnover for store 
workers, not only for Blacks but also for Koreans. Since 
Korean workers got better wages (about $5-7) and they 
thought they were learning how to manage a business (Korean 
workers more often do supervisory and managerial work in 
Korean stores), their turnover rate was lower than that of 
Black workers.
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I have no time to do anything except work and sleep. I 
work and sleep, work and sleep. On Sunday? I sleep 
all day long or sometimes I watch Korean video tapes.
I don't know what happens in New York City or in the 
world. I can't do anything because I am tired. I just
want to open my business soon. I don't think of any
thing else.
One Korean green grocery worker also complained:
I worked for him [a Korean green grocer] for seven 
years. Thus, when I tried to buy my own business, I 
expected he would help me in terms of money. Because 
of my hard work, he made a lot of money. Right? I 
didn't expect much from him. But he didn't give me 
even one dollar. He is not a human being.
This statement shows that Korean workers expect help
from their Korean employer when they try to open or manage a
new business. This is true for some Korean immigrants,
especially kin employees. Thus, they consult with their
Korean employers about new business and get advice from
them. Because of this expectation, many Korean workers are
very loyal (at least in appearance) to their Korean
employers. However, the majority of Korean workers did not
get help from their previous employers. The paternalistic
relationship between Korean workers and employers often
means the exploitation of those workers with a vague future
promise. When the promise is not realized, the Korean
workers often express their disbelief and anger.
However, there is no paternalistic relationship between
Korean shopkeepers and their Black or Hispanic workers.
When I worked in a restaurant,37 the Korean owner told me
37 I worked in a restaurant which was located in mid-Manhattan 
for three months in 1986.
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not to be close to Hispanic workers. His reason was that it 
"spoiled them."38 One of his real reasons was his 
reluctance to let Hispanic workers know the difference in 
the wages of Korean workers and Hispanic workers. However, 
the Hispanic workers already knew the difference but endured 
the difference because of their undocumented status. Since 
they receive low pay in other areas, they do not have many 
choices.
One Korean green grocery worker told me of a similar 
experience. "When a Hispanic worker ate an unsalable fruit, 
the Korean owner told me not to give it to him but rather to 
throw it nway." When I worked in a clothing store in 
Harlem, the manager tried hard to create a distance between 
Korean and Black workers. The manager also told me not to 
greet Black workers and not to compliment their sales 
ability. This distance is, in fact, an effort of Korean 
shopkeepers to create a hierarchical order among Korean 
shopkeepers, Korean workers, and Hispanic or Black workers. 
This hierarchical distinction is not only an effort to 
justify their authority but also an effort to justify 
different wages among different groups. Many Korean 
shopkeepers in the area were cold and expressionless to
38 A similar thing happened when I worked as a sales clerk 
in a Korean store in Harlem in 1988. When I told a Black 
sales clerk, "You are selling better than me," the manager 
of the store later told me that I should not say that again 
to the clerk. His reason was, "it spoils him." In fact, 
"spoil" is a code word regarding more demands from the sales 
clerk.
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Black employees.39 Through this cultural manipulation, the 
Korean shopkeepers try to devalue the labor of the 
employees, especially Black and Hispanic workers, to justify 
discriminatory wages for them. Certainly, Hispanic and 
Black workers know that they are devalued and isolated from 
Korean shopkeepers and workers. One Black worker in the 
above clothing store complained that the Korean shopkeeper 
was very stingy. However, they stay and work for Korean 
shopkeepers because they cannot find a better alternative.
Those Shopkeepers Who Failed 
Even though the success rate among Korean shopkeepers 
is relatively high, many fail in their small business. The 
competition in small businesses became severe during the 
1980s. Because the poor Blacks became poorer since the 
welfare for the poor was reduced, the enforcement of drug 
regulation decreased floating money in Black neighborhoods, 
the rent for a store has doubled and tripled during the 
1980s, and the New York City economy declined since Black 
Monday in the stock market in 1987, the rate of failure 
among Korean shopkeepers has been increasing. In fact, more 
and more Korean shopkeepers complain about the fierce 
competition. It is said, "the old immigrants made money 
easy, but now it is really hard."
39 It is also applied to Hispanics. However, a few Korean 
shopkeepers did have very close relationships with their 
Black or Hispanic employees.
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There were 3 Korean shopkeepers among 28 shopkeepers of
my sample who experienced business failure. For example,
one Korean shopkeeper said he realized as soon as he had
opened a green grocery business in the mid-1980s that there
was no hope for making money from that store because sales
were very slow. He gave up in a few months and started
another business. He believed that the previous Korean
owner of the store deceived him about the prospects of that
green grocery store. One variety store owner said, he also
gave up his green grocery business soon after its purchase,
but he could not start another business because he lost all
his investments in that business. He and his wife worked
again as store employees.
One couple eventually divorced after they had failed in
their first green grocery business in Harlem. With a small
amount of money left and a small loan from a relative, they
opened another small green grocery store in Queens after the
failure. But the husband and wife could not agree on
business matters, and they argued and fought over many
things regarding the business. Under stress, he began to
beat his wife. Eventually, the new business failed, and
they divorced. The wife lamented,
I couldn't forget the [first] store [in Harlem]. I put 
all of my hope, love, sweat, and blood into every 
corner of the store. Because that was my first store,
I dreamed of many things from the store. The store was 
the hope for my hard life in America. But that's all 
gone now. Still, I miss the store. I couldn't leave 
here. I came back here to see my first love, my first 
store. Now, my life is broken. My family is broken.
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I really feel sorry for my son and daughter. I always 
feel anxiety, and my mind is empty now. I  don't have 
any more joy in my life.... (She shook her head with 
tearful eyes).
Because of the possibility of failure, those who have 
not yet stabilized their business or those who are on the 
borderline of profitability are very fearful for their 
future. In order to establish their business quickly, they 
try everything they can do. Owners of newly established 
businesses are more anxious because of the higher rate of 
failure for the beginners. Since the owners of newly 
established stores often treat customers and shoplifters 
harsher to extract more profit and establish themselves 
quickly than established business owners, the store-owners 
boycotted by Blacks were usually newcomers in small 
businesses.
Conclusion
Korean immigrants who were eager to take root and make 
money in the U.S. discovered some possibilities in small 
business. In fact, they had no other "respectable" choice 
other than small business. Good factory jobs disappeared as 
the manufacturing industry declined. Only a few 
professional jobs were available for them. However, they 
had a competitive edge in small business in comparison with 
other ethnic groups. They came from a country which has the 
longest labor hours in the world. They brought strong 
family and kin networks. They revised, strengthened, and
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mobilized the family and kin networks which made the rapidly 
expanding reproduction of small businesses among Korean 
immigrants possible.
However, every social relationship for Korean 
shopkeepers is geared toward the quick accumulation of 
capital. This accumulation is based on sacrifices of 
shopkeepers, family members, store workers, and customers. 
The sacrifice of individual family members is justified as 
inevitable for "family survival" in a hostile environment. 
The small business is explained as a matter of whether the 
whole family can survive or die. With failure, they think 
that the whole life of the family will be ruined because 
everybody will look down on them, and an extremely hard life 
will follow.
Because of the hard-pressed desire for success and fear 
of failure, excessive hard work and family mobilization are 
exemplified. Because of this, the rate of failure among 
Korean shopkeepers is extremely low;40 their income is also 
relatively high.41 But, children were ignored and the 
burden for wives was doubled. Family life was forgotten. 
Tension among family and kin members erupted. Tension with
40 A survey conducted by Min and Jaret indicates that only 
8% of Korean shopkeepers were not successful. The average 
failure rate within five years is about 50% for all American 
small businessmen. (From an undated newspaper clipping from 
the Korea Times of New York, circa 1989)
41 A poll for 374 Koreans across America reported that their 
annual income was $40,590. (Lotte News. July 7, 1992)
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customers also erupted. This tension and consequent 
struggle for meanings and power are the subject for the next 
two chapters.
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PART THREE
BOYCOTTS, MEANINGS, AND POWER
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"KOREANS NEED TO BE TAUGHT A LESSON?": BLACK BOYCOTTS 
AGAINST KOREAN SHOPKEEPERS
They [Korean shopkeepers] came here only with rice 
bowls, but now take everything, money. They 
charge much more... No jobs for [Black] kids and 
nothing to [Black] people... They ain't say hello 
to us.... They create a very bad situation. (A 
Black in Harlem)
The Koreans needed to be taught a lesson. (A Black 
Reverend in Harlem, quoted in Lombardi 1986:15)
If they have time to boycott me, they have to work 
and save money to establish their own business. 
Those niggers [gumdungyi] want to drive me out.
But it is a waste of time because I will never 
leave this place. If I leave, they will force 
other Koreans out.... This is free America where 
anybody can open a store in any place. (A Korean 
shopkeeper in Harlem)
In Washington, D.C., 11 Korean-owned shops were fire- 
bombed between 1984 and 1986 (Song 1989:10). The Black 
boycotts against Korean shopkeepers occurred in many cities 
such as Atlanta, Philadelphia, Chicago, Columbus, Los 
Angeles, and New York City during the last decade. Some 
boycotts began because Korean shopkeepers shot Black 
robbers, shoplifters, or innocent Blacks. For example, when 
a Korean shopkeeper shot a Black girl dead in 1991 after an 
altercation between them, the Brotherhood Crusade, a Black 
organization, began a boycott against the store. Some other 
boycotts stemmed from allegations of short-change, 
mistreatment, or shoplifting. Resentment of Korean
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shopkeepers is considerable among Black neighborhoods even 
though many of Black residents do not participate in the 
boycotts.1
The anger is also wide-spread among Korean shopkeepers 
against Black shoplifting, robbery, and burglary. Nineteen 
Korean shopkeepers were killed in the Los Angeles area 
during the period of 1988 to 1991 (Washington Post. Nov. 29, 
1991). Two to three Korean shopkeepers or their employees 
per year were also killed in New York City during the same 
period.2 The general perception of Korean shopkeepers in 
poor Black areas is that they are serving Black consumers in 
"dangerous" Black neighborhoods.3
What are the causes of this mutual anger and 
resentment? The killings are only a minor part of the 
relationship between Korean shopkeepers and poor Blacks. For 
the majority of them, the mutual distrust comes from their 
everyday interactions. The everyday relationship between 
Korean shopkeepers and poor Blacks is also leading to more 
conspicuous social tensions and conflicts between them.
1 For example, Korean stores were the major target of the 
looting and arson during the 1992 L.A. riots.
2 The title of an article which dealt with a killing of a 
Korean employee by a Black customer, who was denied credit 
for a pack of cigarettes, was, "A Korean Employee Was 
Stabbed to Death by A Black" (Sae Gae Shin Bo. Dec. 2, 1986, 
my underline added) The title emphasized the Blackness of 
the killer. These kinds of articles in local Korean news 
media made Korean shopkeepers heighten their negative 
attention to the Blacks.
3 The killers of Korean shopkeepers are Blacks in most cases.
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Tension and Feelings in Everyday Interactions4
In a Korean green grocery store after 3 P.M. on a clear 
Friday, the cashier lines were long. The cashiers were the 
owner and his wife. The cashiers weighed vegetables and 
fruits and received money from customers. The customers 
paid money and left the store with their plastic bags. The 
cashiers said hello to a few of customers whom they knew 
well but had little interaction with the rest of the 
customers. The cashiers were watching corners of the store 
carefully while weighing, packing vegetables and fruits, and 
receiving money from the customers. Suddenly, the owner 
(husband) shouted in Korean to a Korean worker who was 
trimming vegetables, "Watch that girl near you. She looks 
like a shoplifter." Some customers in the lines looked 
around, wondering what had happened. The worker watched the 
suspect carefully. She eventually bought some vegetables 
and exited the store with apparent anger, murmuring, 
"Fucking..." 5
4 For a further description of the meanings related to this 
section, see chapter 6.
5 Because of prevalent stereo types and racism about Blacks, 
many Blacks have similar experiences in other stores. Harry 
Mayo recounted his experience when he and his friend were 
browsing, in order to buy a gift, a department store in 
Washington D.C. A clerk was following them. "He (a clerk of 
the store) went to check [the price] on a couple of things 
and then he said, 'If ya'll aren't going to buy anything, 
would you please leave the store.' He told us it was a 
female store, and to see young Black males walking around 
the store raised his concern. My friend called him a racist 
bigot and a white bitch." (Washington Post. Oct. 17, 1991) 
Even a well dressed Black female professor was also accused
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One former Korean owner and cashier of a green grocery
store in Harlem described her experience,
When I opened a green grocery store in 1986, all kinds 
of bums in the area came to my store to steal. At the 
time, I couldn't differentiate shoplifters from other 
customers. Some who wore coats put bottles of Mazola 
in their pockets, some who brought a diaper box with 
their babies stole Pampers and put them in the box.
They picked up fruits on the stall outside of the store 
and ran away. When I caught them, they shouted me that 
"Why did you catch me? I just picked up a few things 
when you, Chinks, make big money in my country." And 
they often shouted at me to go back to Korea. Once I 
start to argue about why it is your country, the 
argumentation and fighting would continue. Because of 
my English problems, it was very difficult for me to 
win the verbal fights. Gradually, I could find who the 
shoplifters were and understood how they steal. The 
shoplifting decreased gradually when I became more 
familiar with people. At the peak, the amount of 
stolen reached two tenth of total sales.... Many 
ordinary customers also tended to steal when we didn't 
watch them carefully.
Some Korean store-workers also complained about Blacks'
attitudes in their everyday interactions. One female Korean
fish fryer in Harlem complained,
It is like a war everyday to deal with Blacks here. 
Every morning, I drag my foot to the store because I 
know I have to come here and fight for my living. 
Literally, I fight everyday. I am exhausted after 12 
hours' fighting everyday. They don't pay money when I 
do pay attention to another customer. They insist they 
paid when I didn't really receive. Sometimes they run 
away. If one complains, others follow without any 
apparent reason.
Similar complaints are also common among Korean 
shopkeepers in other poor Black neighborhoods. Mr. Hong in
of changing price tags for clothes in Saks in Fifth Avenue, 
New York City, even though the change, in fact, had been 
done by a clerk. (New York Times, April 30, 1991)
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Brooklyn reported that he argued and struggled everyday with 
Blacks. He experienced three burglaries within 10 days 
after he had opened his green grocery store. Local "bums" 
of the area victimized him because he was a new face. Thus 
he bought a toy gun and carried it always. He often 
polished the gun and showed it to many customers. After 
that the area gang did not bother him (Sae Gae Ilbo. Sept.2, 
1988) .
A daughter of a Korean shopkeeper in Brooklyn described
her parent's experience more vividly:
Of special horror is a group of children, 10- to 14- 
year-olds, who rush into our store chanting anti-Asian 
slurs, making fun of my parents' English and touching 
everything in sight. Asking them to leave would be a 
joke. My father, in his limited English, usually 
resorts to raising his voice to somehow intimidate 
these wild things into leaving. Of course, another 
barrage of colorful words and gestures toward my 
parents follows before they are finally out of the 
store.
Every time that happens, my mother tells me, her 
heart pounds and her whole body shakes so badly she 
stays paralyzed for minutes. She often loses sleep over 
such events. We chide her for worrying, but we feel 
worse. There is nothing more painful than knowing that 
your parents feel degraded and helpless.(Cindy J. Suh's 
letter to New York Times. May 18, 1990)
But some Koreans have a different perspective from the
majority of Korean shopkeepers. One Korean shopkeeper well
respected by Black residents in Harlem said,
I have had a business here almost 20 years. I think 
Blacks are very good people. I am very close to them. 
If you treat them well, they will treat you well. 
Because Koreans don't concern about Black people and 
only make money from Blacks, Blacks don't like us. New 
Korean shopkeepers made trouble because they are in a 
hurry to make money quick. Because they are scared by
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the possibility of failure, they don't want to lose 
even one cent and are very aggressive. They only make 
money and don't want to give anything to Blacks. We 
have to give something to them to win their mind. We 
have to be more flexible to shoplifters. They are 
poor, and they need food and clothes. Give them what 
they want. They will be graceful to us. The amount of 
stolen goods is only a small portion of our profit.
For Korean stores, like other business, extreme 
security is one of the key aspects of business in Harlem. 
Jewelry stores and bank branches are well protected with 
bullet proof glasses and alarm systems. The bulletproof 
barriers cut the physical contact between the jewelry 
shopkeepers and the customers. Other stores also have 
monitors, protected cash registers, security guards, or 
watchmen.
For example, one Korean green grocery store employs a 
Black watchman. His duty is to watch customers and 
passersby all day long in front of the store. Although, he 
primarily deters shoplifting by his presence, he also 
sometimes catches shoplifters. His other role is to 
mediate. When there is an argument between Black customers 
and Korean shopkeepers, he is expected to intervene. The 
Korean shopkeeper expects him to get rid of the Korean 
owner's possible nuisance with Black customers. Thus the 
Korean owner can avoid direct arguments or fighting with 
black customers.
Most Korean shopkeepers in Harlem agreed that the 
newcomers among them are more aggressive. One of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
144
newcomers in Harlem explained that he and his wife were very
anxious when they began their business. They worried that
they would fail and then have to start again from nothing.
I am scared to death about the possibility of losing 
all of my investment. If I lose, I have to work like 
hell again from the bottom. If you experienced the 
bottom, you know what I am saying. That was not the 
life of a human being. Fourteen hours of physical work 
without any rest just for a little money1 Those 
unstable days scared me very much. I was really mad 
whenever I saw someone shoplifting. I really wanted to 
beat them. They could ruin my business and my life, 
not only me but also my family, you know. I admit I am 
very harsh to Black shoplifters. But it happens 
because they steal. If they didn't steal, I wouldn't 
bother them. They deserved it. I know the Korean old 
timers accused me of mistreating Blacks. But they have 
already made enough money. I have nothing. They don't 
understand me.
However, this is not a full story. He not only 
mistreated shoplifters but also showed the cold shoulder to 
ordinary shoppers. Most other Korean shopkeepers are also 
very suspicious about Black shoppers. They suspect most 
Black shoppers as possible shoplifters. When I started to 
work in a clothing store in Harlem in 1988, the first thing 
that the manager of the store told me was "Suspect and watch 
all shoppers carefully. If we don't watch them, they tend to 
steal. We have to give them no opportunity to steal."
Every shopper was watched as a possible shoplifter. When 
Black shoppers, particularly, young Black shoppers, came 
into the store, a sales clerk would follow and watch them. 
This suspicion creates tension between Korean shopkeepers 
and Black shoppers.
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Black customers know that they are watched and 
suspected by Korean shopkeepers in their own "home turf." 
Usually Korean shopkeepers do not greet Black shoppers as 
they come in. This silence is an expression of the social 
distance which Korean shopkeepers try to create between them 
and poor Black shoppers. During a study conducted in Los 
Angeles, many Black residents stated, "I get so tired of 
being watched all the time like I'm some kind of criminal," 
"As soon as you walk into the store, they watch you until 
you leave," and "You can tell by the look on their faces 
when you go into those stores that they don't want you in 
there. I wonder why they set up businesses here in the first 
place" (quoted in Stewart 1989:94). A Black woman who 
participated in a boycott against Korean shopkeepers in 
Brooklyn said that she was angry because all Blacks were 
considered to be shoplifters (WLIB, a news in Feb. 6, 1990).
The majority of Korean shopkeepers not only suspect 
Black customers but also degrade them. Korean shopkeepers 
and Koreans in general think that they are superior to 
Blacks. Because they think poor Blacks are inferior, Korean 
shopkeepers do not want to treat poor Blacks as their 
equals. Some Korean shopkeepers are also anxious about 
their degraded social status because some of their fellow 
Koreans in Korea and in America as well as many Whites look 
down on Korean shopkeepers because they are staying in 
"decayed," "crime-ridden," and "dangerous," neighborhoods
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where 'socially degraded' people are living.
Black residents often feel that Koreans are offenders
who cannot even speak English correctly. Black residents
consider the Koreans as "arrogant and rude" (Veneroso
1989:5). They also think Koreans are very suspicious. They
feel unwelcome in Korean stores. They know that they are
also watched and treated badly. The suspicion of Koreans
and the anger of Black residents often result in violent
altercations. In other cases, the offended shoppers endure
the humiliation and stop using that specific store.
One Black in Harlem complained, "They [Koreans] talked
to me like I was a fool, like I couldn't count money. I got
so mad I wanted to slap his face. I never bought anything
from there [Korean green grocery store] again" (quoted in
Benjamin 1990:39). Another Black resident recalled,
...I found myself in a confrontation with a Korean man 
in a fish market..., where an elderly, dignified black 
lady got in a dispute with a Korean man who ended up 
calling her a niggerI Without giving the matter a 
thought I asked, 'Who are you calling a nigger 
muthafucka?' and demanded an apology. He said it was 
none of my business, I invited him to kiss my ass, he 
went for his fish knife, and I went for my boxcutter 
razor... That was when I decided to chill out on 
Korean markets. Except for [a] dry cleaner, with whose 
service I was superbly satisfied... Koreans wouldn't 
get a dime more of my money.(quoted in Benjamin 
1990:39)
Lloyd Williams, the Black president of the Uptown Chamber of
Commerce which covers all Harlem, explained,
Black anger arises from high unemployment and 
gentrification: developers buying whole blocks of 
Harlem to put up luxury condominiums. Rising rents 
drive out the local residents and merchants who have
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been there for generations. And although they are 
responsible for neither the unemployment (65 percent 
among Harlem's Black youth) nor the gentrification, the 
Koreans are the most visible beneficiaries of Harlem's 
revitalization... The [Korean] newcomers are the 
problem. They come with a poor sense of history and a 
negative attitude toward blacks: shiftless, lazy, on 
drugs and don't want to work, (quoted in Veneroso 
1989:5)
Many Blacks resent Koreans for siphoning money out of the 
Black community. Blacks see Korean shopkeepers as outsiders 
who come into their neighborhoods and become wealthy whetted 
helping any community cause. Lloyd Williams continued, "But 
we couldn't convince the Koreans that their interest should 
go past their store fronts into the community. When the city 
threatened to close down a local hospital, we couldn't get 
the Koreans interested" (quoted in Veneroso, 1989:4). This 
kind of complaint is irrelevant for many Korean shopkeepers 
since such community problems, Korean shopkeepers believe, 
should be solved by the local residents themselves and 
governments rather than the shopkeepers.
The anger of Black residents is often expressed in 
graffiti. The graffiti on the walls and gates of Korean 
stores includes "Bloodsucker," "Jews," "Fuck," "Vice," etc. 
However, many Black residents are indifferent to the race of 
store-owners - or at least they still use Korean stores.
One Black woman in Harlem who used a boycotted Korean green 
grocery store explained that, "it's convenient." Because of 
the convenience, Black residents like to shop at the closest 
stores rather than Black stores even if they sympathize with
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the Buy Black movement. And, in fact, they often do not 
have an alternative; most green grocery stores in poor Black 
neighborhoods are Korean-owned. Many Blacks in Brooklyn 
said, "they found the Koreans rude, but felt they had no 
choice because most nearby fruit and vegetable stands were 
Korean-owned " (New York Times. Dec. 21, 1988).
Because of this resentment, individual Blacks stop 
using Korean stores or start their own picketing. For 
example, a Black shopper had fought with the fish market 
owner because of a problem in change before the boycott. He 
brought a sign of boycott and shouted "boycott, boycott" in 
front of a Korean fish market in the afternoon. The next 
day, he did not appear. Some others threaten Korean 
shopkeepers to boycott without actually boycotting. Because 
boycotts are expensive in terms of both money and time, it 
is difficult for a boycott by an individual to succeed, 
of money and time, it is very difficult for an individual to 
succeed. Individual boycotts generally fail to change the 
attitudes of the targeted shopkeepers.
In general, a shopkeeper can exert more power than a 
poor customer in the shopkeeper-customer relationship in 
poor neighborhoods. A shopkeeper deals with hundreds of 
customers per day. Thus, one customer cannot affect the 
sales of a shopkeeper much. A shopkeeper can refuse to 
serve and can show disrespect to a customer while a customer 
does not have many alternatives. The customer can complain,
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shout foul language, or resort to violence. Most customers 
simply swallow the humiliation rather than resist. Other 
options include avoidance of that specific store or pursuit 
of legal action. But courts are not concerned with minor 
mistreatment or disrespect. It also costs a lot of money 
and energy to bring a case to court. Thus, poor customers 
are not protected from routine minor mistreatment or 
humiliation. One potentially effective customer reaction is 
collective action.
One such collective action is a sriot.7 On August 4, 
1990, about a hundred Black residents rioted and destroyed 
part of the R & M fruit store in Brooklyn after an 
altercation between two Black women and Korean shopkeepers. 
Some young Blacks raided the store, beat a Mexican worker, 
and fired guns. However, a sudden riot, without a long-term 
boycott, is often dismissed as immoral violence. Thus, it 
is the riots rather than the mistreatment and humiliation by 
a specific shopkeeper drew the attention from the public and 
the state agents. But when the boycott is well-organized, 
the situation is very different.
The Beginnings of Boycotts 
Boycotts in Harlem
Because of the pervasive racism in America, many Black 
grass-roots groups have been organized to protect the rights 
of Blacks and to achieve more equal social relationships.
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Black churches have also been traditionally important 
organizations for Black movements. These groups often 
organized boycotts against some shopkeepers and companies. 
During recent years, PUSH, organized by Rev. Jesse Jackson, 
boycotted NIKE, because NIKE, PUSH insisted, did not hire 
enough Blacks even though Blacks constituted a sizable share 
of NIKE consumers.
The first Black boycott against Korean shopkeepers in 
Harlem started in July 1982. Members of the Universal Negro 
Improvement Association, a Black nationalist group which was 
originally organized by Marcus Garvey in 1914 in Jamaica and 
flourished in the late 1910s and 1920s in Harlem and other 
Black areas in the United States (Martin 1986:xv), 
"distributed leaflets asking black residents to boycott 
Korean shopkeepers on grounds that they didn't employ Blacks 
and pushed out other minority-run small businesses" (Harris 
1983:198). Rumors such as the assertion that Koreans got 
resettlement money from the U.S. government when they 
entered the United States exacerbated the resentment of 
other minority small businessmen against the Korean 
shopkeepers in the area. However, this boycott did not have 
a specific target store. In fact, the UNIA promoted 
boycotts of all non-Black shopkeepers - not just Korean 
shopkeepers (New York Times. Sep. 11, 1982).
The Association's coordinator of the boycott, Shaka 
Zulu, said, "Our goal is for blacks to control the economic
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life of the black community" (quoted in ibid.)* Many Blacks 
in the area also believed that the Koreans were favored for 
Federal Business Loans over Blacks} the rapid growth of 
Korean business in the area further stirred this suspicion 
from the Black residents in the area.6
Because of the tension heightened by the boycott in 
1982, Lloyd Williams feared that, "some hot day, a misguided 
remark or an insult could trigger anti-Korean violence" 
(Harris 1983:198). In order to mediate the brewing conflict 
between Harlem residents and Korean shopkeepers, a federal 
conciliator stepped in. The conciliator organized meetings 
between Korean shopkeepers and Black shopkeepers. The 
meeting did not produce a meaningful result. However, the 
boycott by the UNIA did not last long.
Another organized boycott, this time, against a 
specific Korean shopkeeper in Harlem started on Oct. 12, 
1984. I will quote a detailed story in order to show how 
this boycott started from Lombardi's article in Daily News 
Magazine, March 17, 1985.
Jinks(Black male) had bought a can of soda... He banged 
the can on the counter and said he wanted his money 
back. He started to go outside... and changed his mind 
again. "Gimme the soda," he told Shi-Chen (Korean 
owner's wife, cashier). Jinks got his soda and change
6 The total number of Korean shopkeepers reached more than 
three dozen in 1982. The number of Black small businesses 
on the 125th St. was more than 60 at the time, according to 
Malvin Locus, president of the 125th Street Business 
Association (New York Times, Sept. 11, 1982).
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and started to leave the store. He hesitated in the 
doorway, turned again, and said he hadn't got all of 
his change.
"I gave to youl" Mrs. Shin said. "You got it, 
man!" One of the customers protested. "Go on now!"
Jinks rolled his eyes. He said he was tired of 
being short-changed, insulted and laughed at by these 
Korean bloodsuckers. He said some worse things.
Charlie [the Korean owner] went up to him and touched 
his arm, urging him to leave. Jinks yelled at Charlie, 
told him he shouldn't be pushing black folks around.
Then Bong Gu Lee, Charlie's brother-in-law, who 
was helping out, began moving in. Jinks grabbed a 
chair... and threw it, shattering the right side of the 
store window. By now a number of neighborhood people 
were gathering. Chung Lee, Charlie Shin's sister, who 
was working next door... came out and angrily told 
Jinks to leave.
... People were hooting and cursing, and Chung 
Lee... picked up part of the broken chair and threw it 
at the crowd. Then Jinks, encouraged by some hotheads, 
retrieved a piece of the chair and hit Chung Lee with 
it... Charlie Shin insists, " ...he[Jinks] reach in 
back pocket and come out with fold-knife. sWhy don't 
you go back to Korea?' he says. We go into store. He 
try to come in. I pick up mop..." (Lombardi 1985:13- 
14)7
The account, like other stories of altercations which 
caused the subsequent boycotts, is in dispute. Whereas 
Blacks emphasized the immoral aggression by the Korean 
shopkeepers, the Koreans' stories emphasize the immoral or 
illegal behaviors of Blacks. In this case, while B.B. 
Wilson, a Black employee of a nearby Korean store, said, "he 
[Jinks] wasn't drunk, Sjust mad,'" and "they [the Koreans] 
were out there beating on the dude," the Shins insisted
7 Certainly, this story is not an objective observation. The 
reporter (Lombardi) collected stories from various witnesses 
and wrote it. It seems to me that this story reflects the 
stories of Koreans more than the stories of Blacks. The 
subsequent story of the boycott of 1985 in Harlem is based 
on Lombardi's article (1986).
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that Jinks was "juiced" and that they were only trying to
scare Jinks off, acting out aggressive moves. According to
Rev. Juanita Hagan, who started a boycott next day against
the Korean green grocery store, the Koreans were armed with
"long sticks" and one was carrying "a long knife." Other
Koreans in the area agreed that the Shins were tough guys
and guick with their fists (Lombardi 1985).8
The next day, Rev. Hagan started a boycott and others
joined. She said, "one of those Koreans ran a cart across
my foot and didn't even apologize!" Rev. Hagan felt "the
brother in the street was outnumbered," though she admitted
she did not see the beginning of the argument. But from her
experience, she believed that she knew what would have to
happen. She said,
the Koreans needed to be taught a lesson. They have a 
bad attitude about Black people in Harlem. They watch 
you like you bound to steal. They givin' you 45 cents 
when it should be 50, and three-quarter pound of string 
beans instead of a pound. After all, this is our 
neighborhood...
8 A Korean shopkeeper told even in 1989 that the Shins had 
hot tempers and were aggressive. The blacks thought the 
Shins beat Jinks. Of course the Shins denied any wrong 
doing. The Shins also denied that they have a history of 
violence: "They say we beat up an old black lady! We 
wouldn't have lasted three years on this street if true... 
people wouldn't come to us. In clothing business or fish 
business, not so easy to steal as with potato or apple, so 
they don't know... We see someone steal, we say 'Put'em 
back'; sometimes they throw fruit or vegetable on floor and 
call bad name... sometimes we know someone hungry, we give 
soda and bread...but you can't give everything away"(quoted 
in Lombardi, 1985:14).
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On the second day, a group of people joined the line 
and were unusually vociferous and angry. By the third day, 
they were dominating the picketing. Rev. Hagan didn't know 
them and planned to stop the boycott on the third day. But 
the unknown group took over the boycott and started 
picketing several Korean-owned stores. The leader was 
Mantide Evans, a political organizer from Elmhurst, Queens; 
he headed an "umbrella group" calling itself the "Concerned 
People of Harlem" which included members of the old Marcus 
Garvey back-to-Africa movement, a Buy Black movement group 
founded by Carlos Cooks, some members of the Black Muslims, 
and a few Communists. He stated that the picketing was "a 
training process to educate Harlemites about the business 
world." He said that "we are trying to raise the 
consciousness of our race" to the understanding that Blacks 
should own 50% of the businesses where they reside and that, 
short of leaving Harlem, there was little the Koreans could 
do "to placate the community."
Leaflets handed out on the street urged neighborhood 
people to "Buy Black... Boycott all non-black merchants in 
the black community... koreans, arabs, east indians, 
hispanics and europeans"(sic). An open letter circulated in 
1982 demanded an "apology" to the community in the form of 
turning over the leases of four Korean businesses to the 
Concerned People of Harlem, for free. The letter also 
required the 125th Street Korean Merchants' Association and
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the Korean Produce Association to agree to restrain their 
members from entering the fish or fruit-and-vegetable 
business in Harlem altogether. Other leaflets referred to 
"bloodsucking Koreans" who "think blacks are stupid" and 
take profits out of the community to "their luxurious Korean 
homes... and laugh1"(Lombardi 1985:15). The boycotters also 
demanded the employment of Black people in Korean stores (W. 
Kim 1986:227).9
This boycott was the first long-term boycott against 
Korean shopkeepers in Harlem. The Korean shopkeepers were 
very scared because they realized that they were politically 
very vulnerable and that the anger of the Black people was 
directed towards them. They saw that unlike what the
9 It is not clear whether the boycotters really represented 
the Concerned People of Harlem or another independent 
organization. Lombardi (1985:15) reported that "A man at 
the Concerned People of Harlem headquarters at 29 E. 125th 
St. who calls himself Marcus Garvey III dismisses Evans(the 
leader of the boycott) and disavows the demands, charging 
they were authored by 'an agent of the Koreans.7 He says 
the demands sdo not represent the views of the Concerned 
People of Harlem.7" However, Marcus Garvey III accused 
Koreans of "moving into the black community, uninvited, and 
taking over small businesses, preventing blacks from 
controlling their own economic destinies..." (Lombardi 
ibid.).
Some Koreans believed that a female Korean shopkeeper 
who had a bad relationship with the Shins instigated Rev. 
Hagan and the boycotters. Korean local newspapers also 
reported similar stories. But I think that the 
circumstances show that the boycott was not instigated by a 
Korean shopkeeper, because the demands of the boycotters 
were not limited to the questions related to the Shins. The 
boycotters raised the questions about the presence and 
attitudes of all Korean shopkeepers. The Korean shopkeeper 
accused as an instigator denied the accusation. However, 
she was very critical to the attitudes of the Korean 
shopkeepers in Harlem toward Blacks.
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authorities in their home country, Korea, would do in a 
similar situation, the New York Police did not disperse the 
boycotters. They also found that the City Hall did not have 
the power to solve the problem. This experience made them 
consolidate their local merchant association and more 
actively solicit the support from politicians and government 
officials.10
The same green grocery store, again, became a target of 
Black boycott in 1988. This time, the owner of the store 
was another Korean green grocer. The store owner was well 
known for his violence against Black shoplifting 
suspects.11 The boycott started because, the picketing 
group claimed, the Korean store owners had physically 
assaulted a Black couple accused of shoplifting in the 
store. The female owner said that the couple took some 
grocery items and left without paying for them. She blocked 
them from exiting and the altercation started. She also 
claimed that the couple hit her with a frying fan when she 
demanded that they return the stolen items. However, the 
news of this incident was soon relayed to Father Lucas of 
the Resurrection Roman Catholic Church.
Father Lucas, the leader of the boycott, said he had 
heard about the repeated assaults on Black people by the
10 This will be discussed in chapter 6.
11 The owner told me that he often chased shoplifters for 
many blocks and grabbed stolen items back. He often fought 
and beat shoplifters.
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store owner.12 He also asserted that the Koreans o f  the 
target store were racists because the owners beat old Black 
women, disrespected Blacks, sold inferior produces, and said 
to Blacks "why don't you go back to Africa?". After 
learning of the incident, Father Lucas announced a boycott 
in his church. This boycott was supported by the December 
12th Movement which, at the time, also boycotted three other 
Korean stores in Brooklyn and Queens.13
During the boycott, policemen were deployed everyday in 
front of the store. Six to twelve boycotters appeared from 
6 to 8 P.M. on weekday evenings and all day long on 
Saturdays. They shouted "boycott, boycott, boycott" and 
other slogans with megaphones, distributed leaflets, and 
insulted and harassed those who entered the store.14 Their 
boycott pursued various goals: to demand respect from Korean
12 Sabihya Prince interviewed Father Lucas for me.
13 Father Lucas said that he announced the boycott in his 
church without discussing with the leaders of the December 
12th Movement. Because he is one of the important leaders 
of the Movement and they share the decision-making process 
of the Movement (Hornung 1990b), I doubt his assertion. At 
the time, the December 12th Movement organized boycotts 
against Korean stores in Brooklyn and Queens too. The 
boycotts were manned by the December 12th Movement and all 
leaflets distributed during the boycott were printed under 
the name of the December 12th Movement. Sonny Carson, a 
leader of the December 12th Movement, claimed his group did 
not lead four boycotts of Korean stores in New York City. 
Instead, Sonny Carson asserted, the boycotts were the 
"spontaneous reactions" of outraged residents and that his 
group merely "supported" them." (Song 1989)
14 From the perspectives of the store owner and the police, 
the boycotters was threatening the customers or local 
residents rather than representing them.
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shopkeepers; to close the store; and to promote the NBuy 
Black' campaign.
During the boycott, the sales of the store fell by 50%. 
The Korean Produce Association of New York and the Korean 
Merchant Association in Harlem tried to solve the problem, 
but they failed. The target store owner and the leadership 
of the Korean Merchant Association of Harlem tried to reach 
Father Lucas in order to forge a compromise, but Father 
Lucas rejected the attempt. In order to pursue a solution, 
the Korean Merchant Association petitioned a meeting of the 
community board of the area. At the meeting, Father Lukas 
accused Korean shopkeepers of being rude, violent, and 
racist. His views received applause from the attendees and 
prevailed at the meeting. The targeted Korean shopkeeper 
was booed and humiliated by the attendees. The targeted 
Korean shopkeeper was furious that the other Korean 
shopkeepers were apologetic and did not defend him 
vigorously enough in the meeting. The boycott continued for 
14 months. However, the store survived the boycott because 
the sales during non-boycott hours produced enough profit to 
survive.
Boycotts in Brooklyn
Before the Harlem boycott which I described above, a 
boycott against a Korean green grocery store in Bedford- 
Stuyvesant, Brooklyn, started in August, 1988. A 67-year-
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old Black woman and her daughter claimed that Koreans of a 
Korean green grocery store had attacked them on Aug. 27, 
1988. The Korean store owner accused the two Black women of 
stealing a package of codfish.
The City Sun, a Black newspaper, reported that "Witness 
said the owner had lunged at the women with a knife, causing 
the elderly woman to be hospitalized. Within minutes of the 
incident, outraged area residents and local activists 
descended on the store, demanding that police arrest its 
owner" (City Sun. Dec. 7, 1988). However, the store owner 
said, "the trouble... began... when his wife spotted a black 
woman, Paulette Clark, shoplifting a piece of dried codfish. 
When his wife confronted Ms. Clark, the woman punched 
Mrs.Chung and fled outside. Mrs. Chung followed, a couple 
of other Koreans intervened, and by the time it was over Ms. 
Clark was flailing away with a plastic bottle of fabric 
softener and waving a knife" (Wall Street Journal, Oct. 26, 
1988).15
One of the flyers distributed by the December 12th 
Movement insisted that "Koreans are not our enemies, but we 
cannot allow anyone to disrespect us or used against us" 
(quoted in Amsterdam News. Nov. 12, 1988). Certainly other 
flyers of the December 12th Movement promoted the boycott of 
all Korean stores in the area. One flyer, which featured a
15 I am not sure which description is correct. As usual, 
both descriptions possibly exaggerated one aspect of the 
confrontation.
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caricature of vampires in the center of the leaflet, read 
"Boycott Korean Merchants1 Korean merchants are vampires 1" 
The pamphlets also described Koreans as parasites and 
profiteers. The boycotters in front of the store shouted, 
"Boycott, boycott... Close'em down... pass'em by... let'em 
die... Koreans out of Bed-Stuy" (Wall Street Journal. Oct. 
26, 1988). The number of boycotters ranged from one half- 
dozen to a hundred.
The most famous Black boycott against Korean 
shopkeepers started on January 18, 1990, on Church Ave., 
Brooklyn, when a rumor that an old Haitian lady was severely 
beaten by three Koreans in a Korean grocery store spread 
throughout the neighborhood. Yet again, the story was in 
dispute. The boycotters insisted that when a Korean 
employee demanded that the Haitian women open her bag to see 
if anything was stolen, she refused. Then, three Koreans 
grabbed her and knocked her down. The Koreans said that 
then she refused to pay the full price. When confronted by 
a Korean cashier, she threw a pepper at the cashier and 
yelled "You fucking Chinese." Thus the melee started. The 
hospital's record shows that she was treated for a small cut 
on her cheek (Hornung 1990a:33).16
Some customers and residents soon appeared in front of
16 Since there is no evidence, it is hard to know what 
exactly happened at the time. Three Koreans who were 
accused of the beating were eventually acquitted. But the 
question here is not the exact fact but how the reality was 
constructed and why it was constructed in that way.
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the store to protest.17 The protesters were organized by 
the Flatbush Coalition for Economic Empowerment.18 This 
group "is concerned with bringing money and power into the 
neighborhood," one leader of the group said. In order to 
manage daily mobilization for the boycott, they soon
17 The protest seemed to start right away after the 
incident. One woman in a next store recalled, "The 
customers were mad and they went right after the store. They 
never bothered us." While some remembered "a ragtag picket 
line springing up within a hour," others said it appeared 
the next morning. (Hornung 1980:33)
18 Right after the incident, the Flatbush Coalition for 
Economic Empowerment distributed the below leaflet.
FLATBUSH COALITION FOR ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT 
INCIDENT: WOMAN BEATEN BY RED APPLE OWNER 
KNOWN FACTS
l.ON JANUARY 18TH ABOUT 6 P.M. A WORKING MOTHER ENTERED 
THE RED APPLE MARKET LOCATED AT CHURCH AVENUE AND 
ST.PAUL'S PLACE
2.THE PATRON(WORKING MOTHER) WENT IN TO PURCHASE 
GREEN PEPPER, BEFORE SHE COULD DO THAT A FEMALE 
EMPLOYEE ASKED TO LOOK IN HER SHOPPING BAG. THE PATRON 
REFUSED AND WAS ACCUSED OF STEALING.
3.THE PATRON TOLD THE EMPLOYEE IF SHE WAS BEING ACCUSED 
OF THEFT, THEN THE POLICE SHOULD BE CALLED. AT THIS 
POINT 3 KOREAN MEN ASSAULTED HER, KICKING AND BEATING 
HER UNTIL SHE WAS BLEEDING AND JUST ABOUT UNCONSCIOUS.
4.THE POLICE ARRIVED DURING THE ASSAULT. THEY SEARCHED 
HER BAG AND FOUND MEAT PURCHASED ELSEWHERE. THE OWNER 
WAS TAKEN TO THE 70TH PRECINCT ISSUED A DESK SUMMONS 
FOR ASSAULT AND RELEASED.
5.THE VICTIM WAS TAKEN TO CALEDONIA HOSPITAL WHERE SHE 
SAT FOR 8 HOURS WITHOUT ANY ATTENTION AND WAS SENT HOME 
WHERE SHE IS STILL SUFFERING FROM INTERNAL INJURIES. 
BOYCOTT MERCHANTS WHO DISRESPECT AND DON'T
SUPPORT THE COMMUNITY
MASS COMMUNITY MEETING
THURSDAY: JANUARY 25, 1990 AT 7:30 P.M.
AT ST.PAUL'S CHURCH-ST. PAUL'S PLACE & CHURCH AVE.
TEXTE FRANCAIS AU VERSO
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organized a group called the Flatbush Frontline Collective. 
The two groups had a combined membership of 17 (Hornung 
1990a:33). "People automatically came out and gathered in 
front of the stores once word spread that a woman had been 
assaulted at Red Apple, ...due to the fact that the 
community residents had constantly and repetitively 
witnessed... [p]hysical and verbal abuse " (Albert, spoke- 
person for the Flatbush Frontline Collective, in 'Like It 
Is7 aired Oct. 28, 1990 by WABC).19
The Flatbush Frontline Collective soon reached Sonny 
Carson, a famous community activist who led the struggle for 
community control of the public schools in Brooklyn in the 
late 1960s, or alternately known as the kidnapper who was 
convicted for kidnapping in the 1970s. Sonny Carson was 
also a leader of the December 12th Movement which had 
organized many boycotts against Korean stores. He became 
the leading strategist of the boycott.
The Boycott Process
Since physical violence could potentially strengthen 
the moral position of the other group, the boycotters aimed 
at the reduction of the targeted stores7 revenue. The 
shopkeepers and the Korean Produce Association of New York 
similarly distributed propaganda that depicted the
19 Sabine Albert was the spoke-person for the boycotters.
She also asserted that what happen at the Red Apple is not a 
solitary incident.
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boycotters as "reverse racists." The boycotters' other aims 
were to increase the participation of local residents, to 
stir and heighten their consciousness, to garner pnblic 
support, to secure equitable treatment, and to close down 
the targeted stores as a lesson to other racist shopkeepers. 
The store owners' options were: to increase police 
protection, to decrease the moral legitimacy of the 
boycotts, to get financial supports from other Koreans, 
and/or to wait until the boycotters stop the boycotts.
Since the Koreans did not want to give up their businesses 
and the boycotters did not want to compromise, the conflict 
became a long-term stalemate. Thus, the boycotts became a 
routine demonstrations in front of the targeted stores.
The boycotts led to a 50% to almost 100% decline in the 
daily revenues of the targeted stores. During the first few 
months of the boycott in 1985 in Harlem, about 7-10 people 
(later only 3 people) picketed behind the police line. At 
the beginning, "they literally stood in the store's doorway 
and followed customers up the block, berating them"
(Lombardi 1985:16).
In the 1988-9 boycott in Harlem, the picketers 
stationed themselves behind the police-erected blue 
sawhorses five feet away from front of the store. The 
boycott against the NaNa Fruit and Vegetable Market20 on 
125th street had continued from September 1988 to October
20 The name of the targeted store is altered.
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1989. The boycotters demonstrated from 6 to 8 PM on 
weekdays and all day long on Saturdays. During weekdays, 5 
to 8 boycotters stationed in front of the store shouted 
through the bullhorn, "Don't shop- shut'em down," "Pass 'em 
by- Watch 'em diel," "Boycott! Boycott!" On Saturdays, more 
people participated in the boycott. Sometimes, they shouted 
to entering customers that "the owner beat old Black lady." 
"Don't buy here." "Boycott, boycott." They also booed and 
insulted those who defied the boycott. When Joe Harris, a 
carpenter who lived nearby, bought five lemons, the 
boycotters shouted toward him "house nigger1" and "Uncle 
Toml" (Amsterdam News. Oct. 1, 1988). Because of this 
combative boycott, sales plummeted to almost zero during the 
boycott hours. To attract more sympathy and participants, 
the boycotters distributed leaflets which accused the store 
owners of being violent racists.21 However, the
21 One boycott leaflet states,
9 MONTHS STRONG! THE BOYCOTT CONTINUES!
SEPT. '88
-Gap Dol Kim and U1 Sun Kim, owners of NaNa's Food Market, 
125th St., brutally attack an elderly Black woman.
-The boycott begins.
NaNa'S MUST GO
Oct. '88
-Police from the 28th Precinct, working with the Kims, began 
arresting boycotters on phony charges in order to break the 
boycott.-Police began providing Nana's 24 hours a day/7 days 
a week personal security.
NOV. '88
-Gap Dol Kim says, "Niggers should put their chains back on 
and go back to where all Niggers come from.
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DEC. '88
-Gap Dol Kim proudly says he believes in the philosophy of the 
KKK!
JAN. '89
-Ul Sun Kim says on Channel 13 that she would never hire Black 
people to work for her because "all Black people are lazy."
FEB. '89
-The Kims and the Korean Merchant Association of Harlem go to 
Community Board #10 and try to end the boycott. They fail!
MARCH. '89
-Gap Dol Kim arrested for assaulting a demonstrator. He spends 
7 hours locked up in the 28th Precinct, then released.
-The police, having upset the Koreans, arrest 2 demonstrators 
for no reason at all.
APRIL 789
-The court dismisses phony assault charges brought by the 
Kims.
MAY 789
-The Kims plead poverty in court. They say they are bankrupt 
because of the boycott and ask for a tax-payer funded 
attorney.
JUNE 789
-Gap Dol Kim falsely accuses young Black girls of stealing but 
because community demands Gap Dol to be locked up instead, 
police let the girls go.
-State Senator David Paterson publicly supports the boycott. 
JOIN THE LINE! MAKE HISTORY IN CLOSING NANA7S 
DECEMBER 12TH MOVEMENT 
NO JUSTICE!- NO PEACE! ON TOWARD THE GENERAL STRIKE!
Another leaflet goes,
Buy Black, WE MUST CONTROL: OUR MONEY, WHAT WE BUY AND WHEN, 
WHEN WE PRODUCE FOR THEM, AND WHEN WE DON'T!
ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE 
Brothers and sisters, we are engaged in a struggle for our 
very survival. The boycott represents one aspect of our 
continuing struggle for self-determination and total 
liberation of the Black Nation....
It is extremely important that we view the ongoing boycott of 
NaNa7s in its proper perspective. Anyone or any group that 
comes into our community must respect us; no exceptions. 
Especially when it comes to the actuality of our spending our 
hard earned money with them. Under no circumstance should we
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distribution of the leaflets failed to increase 
participation. They also displayed a big cloth screen which 
showed a big, powerful Black fist. This image symbolizes 
the Black power and the destruction of the racist white 
power. The banner also carried the name of the group, the 
December 12th Movement, which organized the boycott.
Another poster read "BUY BLACK" in large print and featured 
the addresses of four Black fruit and vegetable stores (or 
vendors). One day there was a figure made of wood and paper 
which carried a small sign that read, "Owners said, Black go 
back to Africa."
But business during off-boycott hours was almost the 
same as before the boycott. Many Harlemites had on several 
occasions ignored the pickets and patronized the store.
Some were afraid of being harassed by the protesters, and 
had simply changed their shopping hours. At times they 
showed up as early as 8 A.M. or 9 A.M. before any pickets 
arrived (Amsterdam Mews. Nov. 12, 1988). Thus, the store
be subjected to verbal or physical abuse. An attack on our 
women and children should be an act of war. As a community we 
should never tolerate disrespect.
The question or issue that we should focus our attention on is 
not whether or not the boycott action at NaNa's is a correct 
or incorrect strategy, but rather who is going to control the 
vital life lines; and what are you doing about them....
As we enter into the 52nd week of the boycott, we say to our 
bothers and sisters "NaNa's Must Go, join the boycott line." 
We must consciously participate in the struggle to recapture 
our community. No one is going to do for us, what we can and 
must do for ourselves. Never give up. We love you....
The Black Nation Must Be Free! FREEDOM or DEATH
[Original bold letters. I changed personal and store names]
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could generate enough profit to survive during off-boycott-
hour s. However, almost nobody came into the store during
the boycott hours.
The store owners also tried to placate customers by
explaining that they were not beating any Black. A. poster
on a window of the targeted store carried an explanation of
the boycott from the perspective of the owner.
Dear Customer: They claim that Koreans have beat up 
black people. But it is not benefit to Koreans to beat 
up our customers and we have the evidence to prove this 
fact. The management of "NaNa fruit market" will work 
harder to serve our customers and Harlem community.
Dear Customer, the management of NaNa Fruit Market 
apologizes for the shopping inconveniences caused by 
December 12 Movement. The Dec. 12 Movement has been 
boycotting Koreans for past four years. The Dec 12 
movement are organization located in Brooklyn. Their 
purpose of boycotting "NaNa Fruit" is solely to benefit 
their movement, not to benefit the harlem community and 
its people. They boycott us because we are Korean. [I 
changed the store's name]
When troubles occurred in a fish market near the 
boycott site, Black shoppers often threatened to boycott the 
fish market. This threat and the actual boycott of Korean 
stores made the Korean store owners pay more attention to 
Black shoppers. Several Korean shopkeepers in the area told 
me that they became more careful and polite to Black 
customers after the boycott. They also reported that 
several Black shoppers threatened to boycott when the 
shopkeepers did not satisfy them. Other Black customers 
also became more assertive.
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One college professor22 told me that a Black radical 
group in Harlem had a list of stores whose owners were 
mistreating Blacks and the group would burn down those 
stores when a crisis started. The professor informed me 
that when the store owners mistreated Black shoppers, the 
group collected such complaints from Black residents in 
Harlem. She also asserted that she dissuaded some of them 
from setting one store afire during the boycott. According 
to her, they did not set the store on fire. I could not 
confirm this story from any other source. However, two 
Asian stores (the boycotted Korean store and one Yemenite 
store) were set on fire during the boycott period. Police 
suspected drug related fights, but the Korean shopkeepers 
suspected the boycotters.
The Brooklyn boycott against two Korean stores in 1990 
drew great attention from local residents and the news 
media. After the altercation on Jan. 18th, 1990, the ranks 
of the protesters grew swiftly. The Flatbush Coalition for 
Economic Empowerment soon distributed flyers in the area and
22 She was living in Central Harlem and teaching in a 
college in New York City when I met her in Spring 1989. She 
complained about the rudeness of Korean shopkeepers and 
talked about many racist aspects of American society. She 
insisted that Koreans should get a preferable treatment from 
White banks. According to her, without it, Koreans could 
not expand their business so rapidly. When I explained how 
Koreans mobilize capital within their ethnic community(see 
chapter 4), she doubted my assertion. However, she seemed 
to have some connection with radical groups in Harlem 
because she said she met them and discussed with them. She 
supported the activities of the boycotters.
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organized mass-community meetings and nearby rallies before 
marches to the targeted store. The Flatbush Collective 
Frontline soon started to organize the boycott. The members 
called people through their networks and distributed flyers 
in the area. Their meetings and rallies drew hundreds of 
local Haitian and Black residents. The speakers included 
various local and city Haitian and Black leaders. The 
December 12th Movement soon got involved into the boycott. 
The Frontline got advice from Sonny Carson. The December 
12th Movement also participated in mobilizing people, and 
members of the Movement were key speakers in rallies. They 
also organized rallies in Harlem and distributed flyers to 
passersby in order to promote the Brooklyn boycott.
Policemen were deployed as the protesters' number grew. 
Widespread media attention beginning in May 1990 also 
increased the number of participants in the boycott. At its 
peak, about 600 protesters gathered and about 400 policemen 
were deployed in front of the store. New York City's Human 
Rights Commission(Commissioner de Leon) intervened. 
Eventually, the Mayor, courts, state politicians, FBI, and 
federal politicians intervened as the boycott grew and got 
more attention from the news media. Carson advised the 
protesters not to negotiate with the city until officials 
arrested the three Koreans who had allegedly beaten the 
Haitian woman.
The Korean shopkeepers in New York City thought that
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Carson organized a boycott against another Korean store 
because of his political ambition. The Koreans believed 
that Carson exaggerated the incident to sell his nationalist 
Black Power ideas and to drive Korean shopkeepers out of 
from Black neighborhoods. Thus, Koreans were determined to 
support the Korean shopkeepers at any expense. Koreans 
supported the store owners with hundreds of thousands 
dollars. During the boycott, daily sales dropped from 
thousands of dollars before the boycott to mere tens of 
dollars.
The Ends and Impacts of Boycotts 
There are several different reasons why the boycotts 
eventually stopped. First, some small individual boycotts 
did not continue for a long time because the protesters 
could not support them. When a spontaneous boycott against 
a Korean C-Town supermarket in Elmhurst, Queens occurred, 
the Korean owner apologized right away and fired the 
employee who was accused of beating a young Black who was 
suspected of shoplifting by the employee.23 The owner also 
sought help from local Black leaders; these leaders decided 
that the boycott was not necessary because the owner had 
helped many community causes. The boycott did not continue 
for even a week.
23 Again, the stories from the young Black and the Korean 
employee were contradictory.
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In some other cases, local residents opposed boycotts. 
Two 1988 boycott attempts by the December 12th Movement in 
Jamaica, Queens, ceased within a month because participants 
were harassed by local residents and the police severely 
their boycott activities. However, when organizations were 
involved, the boycotts could continue for a longer time.
Boycotters and organizations behind boycotts needed 
reasons not only for the beginning of the boycotts but also 
for the end of the boycotts to maintain the sympathy of 
local residents. If the targeted store owners sold their 
stores and left the area, the boycotters eventually stopped 
their boycotts and could celebrate their successes. They 
stopped their boycotts in a 1985 Harlem boycott and in a 
1988 Brooklyn boycott after the targeted store-owners moved 
out. However, there were also political pressure to stop 
the boycotts from Black politicians.
The 1988-89 Harlem boycott supposedly ended under 
pressure from then mayoral candidate David Dinkins. Even 
though the leader of the boycott denied this rumor, Dinkins 
stated several times that he was influential in stopping the 
boycott.24 The 1990 Brooklyn boycott might also fall into 
this category. When the court decided that there was no 
evidence that three Koreans beat a Haitian woman and Mayor 
Dinkins pressed hard on the boycott leaders, the boycotters 
eventually lost support from the residents and stopped the
24 See chapter 6 for detail.
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boycott.
The first boycott in Harlem in 1982 stopped without a 
closure of any Korean stores because the boycotters did not 
target a specific store. The distribution of flyers which 
charged Koreans with getting preferential treatments from 
the American government and White banks increased suspicion 
of Korean shopkeepers among the area residents. The Koreans 
shopkeepers in Harlem were also scared after realizing that 
they were described as vicious merchants. After the boycott, 
the Korean shopkeepers started to participate in local 
business associations and community affairs and to donate 
funds to the Police Athletic League and other community 
events in the area. Eventually, the Korean shopkeepers in 
the area organized their own business association to deal 
with community relationships more effectively.
The 1985 boycott in Harlem led to economic disaster for 
the targeted store owners. They sold their building and 
business to another Korean and eventually gave up their 
green grocery business in Harlem. They had to sell their 
building at a discount price because of the stigma that 
caused Black shoppers to avoid the store. When the 
boycotters expanded their boycotts against other nearby 
stores, they did not get enough support from the local 
residents. Other shopkeepers survived without economic 
hardship but developed deep resentment of the Black 
boycotters. One shopkeeper, whose store was boycotted in
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1985, said that he hated the demonstrators. He also 
insisted that the boycotters victimized Koreans in order to 
heighten the political presence of the boycott organizers 
among the Blacks. Some Black residents in Harlem also 
complained that the boycotters boycotted Korean shopkeepers 
in order to increase their political influence in Black 
neighborhoods.
Even though the targeted store owner in the 1988-1989 
Harlem boycott survived, Korean shopkeepers in Harlem felt 
that the boycott threatened all Korean stores. The Korean 
shopkeepers in the area noticed that Black shoppers had 
become more assertive in their demands. The Korean 
shopkeepers also told me that they became more receptive to 
the Black shoppers' demands and more careful about possible 
conflicts. The Korean shopkeepers were afraid of being 
boycotted. The Korean stores near the targeted store also 
experienced a decrease in their revenue. The targeted 
shopkeepers and nearby Korean shopkeepers criticized the 
boycott, the leadership of the Korean Merchant Association, 
local police, and the city government very harshly. They 
tended to blame the problems of poor Blacks on the poor 
Blacks themselves.25
25 It is not clear why they place the blame more on poor 
Blacks than other Korean shopkeepers. One explanation may 
be that they experienced a decrease in their revenue because 
of the boycott. The other one might be that the nearby 
Korean shopkeepers of the targeted store were young and 
relatively new shopkeepers. They were more aggressive in 
making money and more anxious about Black shoplifting.
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In all three Harlem boycotts, there were efforts to 
solve the problems through negotiation. In the 1988-1989 
boycott, Father Lucas rejected any negotiation because he 
thought that respect could not be the object of negotiation. 
He and the boycotters insisted on the closure of the 
targeted store. In other Harlem boycotts, the demands from 
the boycotters included the surrender of some leases of 
Korean stores to Blacks. The Koreans rejected the demands. 
Thus, in fact, there was no successful negotiation between 
Korean shopkeepers and Black boycotters in Harlem.
The only case where negotiation between the Korean 
shopkeepers and Black leaders succeeded involved the 1988 
Brooklyn boycott. In this case, the actual boycotters and 
the Black participants in the negotiation were different.
The Black participants were main-stream Black leaders such 
as Assemblyman Al Vann. Assemblyman Vann agreed with the 
December 12th Movement-led boycott's charge that "Koreans 
gave little or nothing back to the communities in which they 
reap economic benefits." Rev. Butts of Abyssinia Baptist 
Church in Harlem explained the Black boycotts as "coupled 
with a resentment of the Koreans' attitude, in resentment of 
the fact that blacks have been unable to develop their 
communities" (quoted in Amsterdam News. Nov. 12, 1988).
The negotiated resolution in the 1988 Brooklyn boycott
Because they worked hard, they considered others who did not 
work hard more negatively.
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addressed a number of Black grievances in Bedford- 
Stuyvesant. All 32 Korean merchants in the areas agreed to 
open accounts at either Freedom National Bank or Carver 
Savings Bank, two local banks owned by Blacks. They also 
agreed to donate money to community organizations and to 
start a job training program for local youths. The 
resolution stipulated,
1). Korean merchants would contribute to a local 
trust fund whose resources will help encourage 
entrepreneurship, presumably for Blacks, in the area.
2). The merchants would utilize the services of local 
Black-owned and/or operated banks.
3). The merchants would advertise their products and 
services in the Black media.
4). They also would utilize the services of other 
local business in the predominantly Black neighborhood.
5). The merchants would support financially and in 
other ways cultural and educational programs aimed at 
the youths of he two communities in order to promote 
racial understanding.
6). The owner of the Tropic Market must sell his 
business.
This resolution did not satisfy all factions of both 
groups. Sonny Carson and the December 12th Movement had 
steadfastly refused to accept any negotiation and accused 
the Black negotiators of "selling out".26 Many Korean 
shopkeepers were also angry because they thought that the 
Korean representatives had sold out the Korean shopkeepers. 
They considered the resolution as a defeat which included 
many unacceptable concessions by Korean representatives.
The targeted store owner was also dissatisfied with the
26 See chapter 6 for detail.
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resolution. But he had no other alternative than to leave 
the ares.27 After the resolution, the targeted Korean 
shopkeeper gave up his business and left the area. 
Accordingly, the boycott lost its steam, and the boycotters 
eventually disappeared. Despite the resolution, the 
situation in the area did not achieve racial harmony. No 
education program for young Blacks was started. Humiliation 
and poverty continued.
This negotiation only revealed the chasms between 
different social classes among Blacks. Carson admitted that
his group has little support from the black middle 
class. But Carson says he does not need their support, 
who he calls 'sellouts' to the white culture (Song 
1989*6).
The boycotters and some Blacks in the area also thought,
"the negotiators were selling out and not addressing the 
major question of who will control business in black 
neighborhoods" (New York Times. Dec. 21, 1988). In 
contrast, a Black participant in the negotiation said, "If 
Mr. Carson won't accept the agreement, that's his 
problem.... Mr. Carson is not the community. The community 
had decided what it wants" (Song 1989:8).
In the case of the 1990 Brooklyn boycott, negotiation
27 The store owner's brother told me that the store owner 
lost all investment in the store(more than 100,000 dollars). 
The store owner's brother was very critical to the 
resolution and considered that as a great defeat. From his 
discussion, I got the impression that the store owner 
reluctantly admitted the selling out of the store.
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was not possible because the boycotters were successful in 
mobilizing hundreds of protesters and because the Korean 
leadership in Kew York City did not want to repeat the 
"defeat" they experienced in the 1988 Brooklyn boycott .
The alleged victim of the beating brought the incident to 
court. However, a Jury of the State Supreme Court in 
Brooklyn acquitted all of the accused Koreans. Eventually, 
support from area residents and the number of boycotters 
decreased after the decision. In Spring, 1991, the 
boycotters seldom appeared in front of the target store. In 
Summer 1991, the targeted store owner sold his store and 
left the area.
Even though the continuing boycotts failed to produce 
any noticeable change in poor Black neighborhoods, many 
Korean shopkeepers from Church Ave. Brooklyn to Harlem 
admitted that they were more cautious and polite to Black 
shoppers than before the boycotts. The Black customers 
became more aggressive in asserting their rights. One 
Korean shopkeeper near the targeted store on Church Avenue, 
Brooklyn, said that the Black customers became more 
aggressive, and that there were now even more problems in 
business. She also expressed her increasing fear of doing 
business in Black neighborhoods. Many Harlem shopkeepers 
expressed similar opinions. Black customers also noticed 
the change of attitude in Korean shopkeepers. As one 
newspaper reported, "An East Flatbush shopper notices the
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Korean shopkeepers now smile more and always say sthank 
you'"(Kwong 1991).
Korean newspapers also started their campaign for the 
change of attitudes of Koreans toward Blacks. One Korean 
newspaper routinely carried a short slogan, "Don't use the 
term, aumdunovi [nigger]." One Korean news article 
suggested that Korean shopkeepers needed to understand Black 
culture and to refrain from giving Blacks the impression of 
insult or contempt. Koreans also worried about the rumor 
that some Blacks were willing to blow-up stores by injecting 
propane gas into stores if they could get a few thousand 
dollars I Chung Ana Ilbo. May 16, 1990).
The December 12th Movement 
A group which organized most prominent boycotts against 
Korean shopkeepers during this period was the December 12th 
Movement.28 The December 12th Movement frequently provided 
key manpower, strategy, and ideology for the boycotts 
against Korean shopkeepers. This December 12th Movement is 
an organization of Black community activists mainly in 
Brooklyn and in Harlem.
28 The December 12th Movement has organized many protests 
against police brutality and white racism, and boycotts 
against many Korean shopkeepers. They also promoted a 
general strike in New York City. Their main hero is Malcolm 
X. (Hornung 1990b)
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Coltrane Chimurenga,29 Sonny Carson, and other Black 
activists organized in 1986 the Black Men's Movement, an 
amalgam o£ Block associations and neighborhood patrols that 
organized around two issues: police brutality and the influx 
of crack in Black neighborhoods. This group led many 
protest marches against New York City Mayor Koch and police 
precincts (e.g. protesting the authorities' handling of 
Howard Beach incident) after Michael Griffith was killed by 
White mobs in Howard Beach, New York City. This group also 
protested police killing of Black suspects and marched 
against crack dealers. Carson and Chimuranga severed their 
alliance with Revs. Al Sharpton and Louis Farrakhan because 
of their differences in social philosophy and protest 
strategies.30 They renamed their organization the December
29 Chimurenga holds a master degree in Education from 
Harvard University. He was one of New York Eight Plus who 
were arrested as urban terrorists(planning a jail break and 
armed car robberies) but eventually acquitted in 1985. The 
eight were the first people to be held under a newly passed 
National Preventive Detention Law, called the Bail Reform 
Act of 1984. Chimurenga was a member of Republic of New 
Afrika and associate of the Black Acupuncture Advisory 
Association of North America which provided community health 
care in Harlem and South Bronx (Churchill and Wall 1988:364- 
365). Jiuliani, Republican candidate for the Mayor of New 
York City in 1989, was the prosecutor of New York Eight 
Plus.
As a self-styled communist, Chimurenga proclaimed 
himself to be staunch opponent of capitalism, but he 
insisted on Black neighborhoods developing their own network 
of small businesses that would provide goods and services, 
jobs, and capital for Blacks. (Hornung 1990b:29)
30 The December 12th Movement has a militant position 
against social injustice and racism than other Black 
politicians or activists. See chapter 6.
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12th Movement to memorialize the separation date from Revs.
Al Sharpton and Louis Farrakhan. The December 12th Movement
includes Marxists, community activists, a Father, and a
lawyer as its core leaders.
The December 12th Movement tried to provide Black New
Yorkers an alternative leadership to
the leadership offered on the one hand by Dinkins and 
Jackson, modern-day Booker T. Washington who cut deals 
and compromises that sell their people short, and that 
offered on the other hand by Sharpton and Farrakhan, 
Garveyite caricatures who use their pulpits to preach 
false sermons of black nationalism...(Hornung 1990b:29)
Chimuranga further explained that the position of the
December 12th Movement is to make "us control our own lives,
and watch our own streets, begin and conduct our own
businesses, teach our own children, take care of sick and
old" (ibid.). Thus, Sonny Carson expressed "We need men who
can come together and work, who can protect our community
and our families. That's what we're all about, achieving
self-determination" (ibid.:28).
Chimurenga also commented on the boycotts organized
and/or supported by the December 12th Movement.
It frames a number of very important ’ssues... First, 
an attack upon one of our women is an attack upon all 
of us. Second, the boycott shows that we still do 
something to take power away from people who don't give 
us the respect we deserve. And third, we are showing 
our own people that we do have power, purchasing power, 
economic power, if we act together... The boycott is 
an issue of black people standing up... To the simple- 
minded, it's a matter of pitting black against yellow.
This statement shows that the December 12th Movement's
purpose is to protest various "racism" and "social
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injustice” against Blacks and to promote "Black Power." 
However, various government officials considers them to be 
"dangerous criminals." Because of the movement's militant 
position, the FBI and New York Police Department monitor the 
members very closely. Chimurenga said, "I have been 
watched, bugged, followed, filed, and cross-filed for so 
many years that I just consider it part of my life" (ibid.,
p.28) .31
Conclusion
Because of humiliation and mistreatment by Korean 
shopkeepers and because of anger and suspicion regarding the 
sudden and rapid growth of Korean businesses, many Blacks 
expressed their anger and initiated personal boycotts 
against Korean shopkeepers. However, these silent personal 
boycotts did not affect the attitudes and revenues of Korean 
shopkeepers. But when organizations organized and supported 
boycotts, boycotts could be sustained for long period of 
time and seriously affect the financial situation of the 
targeted stores. The organizations mobilized people by 
stimulating the resentment of racial injustice among Black 
residents. Flyers and rallies conveyed these feelings. 
However, because some Blacks patronized the targeted stores 
during the boycotts, it was very difficult for many Black
31 For the detail discussion of the relationship between the 
December 12th Movement and the state agents such as police, 
prosecutors, and politicians, see chapter 6.
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residents to maintain moral enthusiasm during the long-term 
boycotts.
The boycotts also demonstrated that there are many 
people who are ready to fight against racism and organize 
for a "justice" for Black people. The December 12th 
Movement includes such individuals. This group is staunchly 
resistant to racist practices and capitalism. However, in 
everyday practice, they emphasized not their anti-capitalist 
ideas but their anti-racist ideas, propelling the latter 
into the foreground of protests because anti-capitalist 
ideas have less appeal than anti-racism among the Black 
population.
Their boycotts were simultaneously a failure and a 
success. They did not achieve their original goals of the 
closure of targeted Korean shopkeepers, the rise of Black 
Power, nor the creation of a permanent Buy Black Movement, 
and had to end their boycotts with no visible results. 
However, they heightened the consciousness of many Blacks 
regarding the attitudes of Korean shopkeepers and their 
massive presence in Black neighborhoods as important issues 
and caused Korean shopkeepers to change their attitudes to 
some degree. They also raised questions for many Blacks 
about the racism in American society.
Whether the causes of the boycotts are minor 
altercations between Korean shopkeepers and "suspicious” 
Black shoppers or not, those incidents made participants
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examine the meanings of the relationship between the two 
groups and the events in the context of American sQciety.
In the process of the conflict, various meanings and 
interpretations were deployed and argued. This contest of 
meanings cannot be understood outside the context of power. 
Some groups will try to spread certain meanings and 
interpretations and other groups will counter with different 
meanings and interpretations.
The challenge, toward existing social relationships, 
not only with Korean shopkeepers but with White-dominated 
society as well, was accompanied with related meanings and 
interpretations of social relationships. The challenge to 
existing ideological, political, and economic social orders 
by the boycotters and the December 12th Movement raised 
questions regarding how the social order is criticized, 
reconstructed, or maintained in relation to the existing 
social forces and existing normative order. These issues 
will be dealt within the next chapter.
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CHAPTER SIX
"BLOODSUCKER" vs. "THOSE NIGGERS": CLASHES OF 
MEANINGS AND POWER
When a Black shopper wanted to get refund of his 
deposited money($20) for a lay-away suit, the 
Korean shopkeeper responded to him, "no cash 
refund." The conversation continued with tension.
B:(a young Black male customer) Why not?
A:(pointing a sign on a window) Look at over 
there. You can just exchange. No refund at 
all.
B:(hesitant with anger) You have to refund.
A:(with a flat face, pointing to a sign, "no 
refund", on the window): Read the sign over 
there.
B :(looks at the Korean shopkeeper with 
apparent anger) ...
A:(no change of expression) ...
B:(finally choosing a pair of pants) It is 
$19.99. No tax. O.K.?
A:(with a despising smile) No. Pay tax.
B:(with apparent anger) Where are you from?
A: America.
B : Japan?
A : ....
B: China?
A • «...
B: No money for tax.
A: Pay it.
B: (angrily) Japanese Jew.
A : ....
B:(finally pays a 20 dollar bill and three 
quarters and gets change, $19.11, from 
A) Japanese Jew...
He spat out again "Japanese Jew" when he went out. 
After he went out, the Korean shopkeeper also spat 
out "michin saeki [crazy asshole]".
This story was the conversation between a Black shopper 
and a Korean shopkeeper at whose store I worked in 1988. 
'Japanese Jew,' 'michin saeki.' and other invective words
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express well the mutual mistrust and negative images, 
separating these two groups. This exchange occurred within 
in the concrete political and economic environment between 
the two individuals involved. How can this individual 
incident be interpreted in the context of the general 
relationship of the two ethnic groups in New York City?
One of the posters on the walls on 125th street in 
Harlem depicted a young Black sweating to pull a rickshaw 
with a Korean in it. Another poster depicted a Black hand 
powerfully grasping and crushing something. Why is it that 
discontented Black shoppers or boycotters cannot crush 
Koreans in reality as they do in drawings? In this chapter, 
I will explore how the meanings are expressed; how and what 
kind of social relationships are mediated through the 
meanings in the Black-Korean conflict; how both groups try 
to achieve moral high grounds; how they contextualize the 
conflict in relation to American society; and how their 
efforts and presentations are limited by and related to 
state agents, especially politicians and law enforcers.
The Stories of Boycotters and Blacks
There is a difficulty in measuring how many Blacks in 
the poor New York City Black neighborhoods share the ideas 
of the boycotters. However, the boycotters' success in 
closing several Korean stores and the degree of intensity of 
the boycotts show that there is considerable sympathy for
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the boycotts in poor Black communities. Views of the 
boycotters and Blacks about Korean shopkeepers in poor Black 
communities have certain core themes.
Koreans as Arrogant and Racist Individuals
The most common complaint of Black residents was that 
Korean shopkeepers are rude to Black shoppers. Blacks 
explained their experience in Korean stores in a meeting 
between Korean shopkeepers and Black local leaders in 
Harlem. "When Blacks stay in a store for a while in order 
to look at commodities, Korean shopkeepers often said vif 
you want to buy, buy it. Or go out'." They also said that 
Koreans do not say hello to Black customers. Other 
complaints also included, "Koreans don't treat us like human 
being," or "Koreans don't smile to us." Similar complaints 
can be heard in many areas where Korean shopkeepers do their 
business.
One letter from a Black expressed the feeling. "
You [Korean shopkeepers] look down upon us [Blacks] and 
treat us like shoplifters. You, in general, don't 
greet us, don't smile, and are very scornful of us.
When you talk among yourselves, you don't call us Black 
but qumdunqyi [nigger]. Many of us know what you mean 
by that... Of course you will point out that there are 
a lot of drug, violence, and crime in Black 
neighborhoods. But the majority of the shoppers are 
decent citizens. How can you mistreat us like that 
when we support your income? You have to thank us 
because our difficult struggle for equality for a 
century after the Civil War achieved an equality, at 
least, before law... How do you dare to show contempt 
for us when you make money from our neighborhoods and 
you are protected by the laws which resulted from our
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struggles? We are really shocked and angry.1
When Black shoppers hear Korean shopkeepers and their 
employees use Korean, the customers are often suspicious of 
the Koreans' discussions. They suspect that the Koreans are 
attempting to cheat or insult them by using language 
unintelligible to consumers. Others Blacks complained that 
Koreans put money on the counter instead of in the hands of 
the shoppers. One of the Harlem boycotters said they 
boycotted a Korean store because "its owner showed 
disrespect to Blacks, and we[the boycotters] heard a bunch 
of complaints about the mistreatment by the store owner." 
Reverend Calvin Butts, a pastor of a large Black church in 
Harlem, said that Koreans came in with a very bad prejudice 
instilled by media and other sources (Korean Times of Mew 
York. Sept. 6, 1986).
Another complaint was that Korean shopkeepers are very 
suspicious of Blacks. When the Church Avenue boycott 
started in January 1990, one Black women complained that 
Korean shopkeepers are suspicious about Blacks. It is 
certainly true that Korean shopkeepers and, I think, other 
shopkeepers too, consider Blacks, especially young Blacks,
1 This letter seemed to be translated into Korean by a 
Korean Professor and sent to the Korea Times of Hew York. 
This letter appeared as a series in Feb. 1990. I 
retranslated those articles into English.
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to be potential shoplifters.2
Certainly, Harlem Korean shopkeepers knew about the 
complaints of the Black residents in the area. The former 
secretary of the Korean Merchant Association in Harlem said, 
"the complaints of Blacks are 'Korean shopkeepers pushed 
Black shoppers to buy, pay, and go out fast. If they did 
not buy, Koreans would frown their face.'" He continued, 
"Koreans do not talk to a shopper if the customer seems not 
to buy any thing... Korean shopkeepers might be trying to 
hustle shoppers through the checkout process as quickly as 
possible to avoid hiring an additional cashier - as might be 
necessary if they take the time to count change for every 
shopper, as Americans do." Other Koreans explained that in 
Confucian culture women cannot touch male hands, thus female 
(usually Korean) cashiers put change on the counter rather 
than in the hands of male customers.
However, Father Lucas who led the boycott against a 
Korean shopkeeper in Harlem in 1988 had a different idea. 
"None of the boycotts started over 'cultural differences' or 
'language barriers.' Vicious assaults, especially against 
African women and babies, were the last straws after long 
patterns of disrespect and verbal abuse of African people"
2 Many young Blacks said whenever they enter a store they 
find suspicious stares. Some young Blacks stated that they 
have reacted by splitting up to see who the clerks will 
follow, or by pretending to snatch something from a shelf 
and then laughing at a clerk when they reveal an empty hand 
(Washington Post. Oct. 17, 1991).
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(Amsterdam Mews. Oct. 6, 1990). One Black man said he saw a 
Korean chase a Black and beat him with Tae Kwon Do.3 This 
seems true because one Korean shopkeeper said to me that he 
chased shoplifters for many blocks and had sometimes kicked 
them down.
Sonny Carson, one of the founders of the December 12th 
Movement, says,
Some Korean merchants have taken on the attitude 
reminiscent of the slave masters. They have the same 
racist attitude that they are superior. They are 
arrogant and suspicious...
I don't believe black people will ever get a free and 
fair share of anything... The Koreans are beginning 
to attack our people physically. We are prepared to 
fight by any means necessary. I don't think there can 
be any resolution, (quoted in Song 1989)
During the 1990 Church Avenue boycott, a Black nurse
wondered how Korean dare to beat a poor Black woman even
they thought she stole something. "If she had enough money,
she would not steal it. Even though I agree that the person
who stole did a wrong thing, the Koreans who dare beat those
poor people are very bad."
Koreans as Exploiters
Many Blacks think that the Korean shopkeepers are 
concerned only about money. One Black said, "they suspect 
all of us... They just try to make money. They are 
concerned about nothing but money. We boycott those 
merchants. Not good guys. There might be good Korean
3 Korean martial art.
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merchants. We have no problem with them." Reverend Calvin 
Butts succinctly summarized the view. "Because Koreans want 
only to make money, the bad sides of capitalism are in 
between the two groups" (Korean Times of Mew York. Sept. 6, 
1986) .
Black residents in the Church Avenue area in Brooklyn 
said that some Korean shopkeepers overcharge Blacks at the 
cash register and randomly raise prices,. Many shoppers 
complained that some Korean cashiers do not give them 
receipts; their employees sometimes add a few extra dollars 
to large bills, hoping that the shopper will not notice.
When a receipt is requested, the shoppers said, the Korean 
employees retally and rebag the entire purchase, banging and 
bruising the produce (New York Times. May 17, 1990).4
Shoppers also complained about the suddenly escalating 
prices of produce in some Korean stores, especially before 
major holidays. For example, a shopper said that the price
4 During my fieldwork in Harlem, I didn't find any case 
where a Korean cashier intentionally overcharged Blacks at 
the cash register. Sometimes the cashiers made mistakes and 
the customers accused them of rip-off. However, the Korean 
shopkeepers used various tactics to maximize their profits. 
For example, some store owners discussed among them about 
the price of specific items in order to fix it. Certainly 
the store owners wanted to mark the prices as high as 
possible in order to maximize their profits. But because of 
the competition with other stores, they cannot mark the 
price as they want. One Korean grocery store-owner 
regularly checked the price of fruits and vegetables in a 
nearby supermarket. When the prices were high, customers 
often mentioned the prices in other stores and complained. 
Then, the shopkeeper would mark down his/her price because 
of the fear to lose customers. I think, this mechanism of 
marking price is common for any shopkeepers.
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of potatoes in one store went from $1 for five pounds to 
$1.29 for four pounds in one week. Shoppers said that if 
the market owners receive a particularly good shipment of 
produce, they raise prices without informing shoppers, and 
that mangoes and plantains were often sold by size and not 
weight. For example, one complaint was that each mango or 
plantain could be marked with a "O," or an "X,” indicating 
its price to the cashier but not to the shoppers (Mew York 
Times, May 17, 1990).5
When shoppers complained about prices, Korean 
shopkeepers often blames the price charges on wholesalers. 
One Korean grocer explained, when tomatoes jumped from 69 
cents a pound to $1.69 in the 1989 winter, he said, 
incredulous customers asked him point-blank, "Are you 
crazy?" He said hardly anyone understood that the markup 
wasn't his, but the result of freezing weather in Florida 
(New York Times. May 17, 1990). A fish market owner in 
Harlem also frequently changed the price because the 
wholesalers frequently changed the price. However, because 
of the possible resistance and anger from shoppers, the
5 I think this is particularly true for many green grocery 
stores. In order to get better price with better quality 
vegetables, the grocers often go to the wholesale market at 
Hunts Point of New York City at 1 A.M. The earlier he goes 
to the wholesale market, the better vegetables he can get 
with same price. If they get better vegetables or fruits, 
they will mark higher price on them. Any retailers can mark 
as much as they want in America. However, the Customer 
Codes in New York City require that all prices be clearly 
marked.
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owner did not double the price when the wholesalers doubled 
the wholesale price because of a hurricane.6
Another common complaint was that Korean shopkeepers do 
not refund. In fact, most Korean shopkeepers in Harlem did 
not refund. They only allowed the exchange with a similarly 
priced item. This practice particularly made many Black 
shoppers angry. I saw many incidents where a Korean 
shopkeeper and a Black shopper were shouting at each other 
because of this refund policy. Black shoppers usually gave 
up and exchanged with another item because a sign of 'no 
refund' is always attached to a counter or a window inside 
stores. Even though a shopper complained, the police, the 
court, or other formal consumer institutions were not a 
useful help for them because of the inconvenience of using 
those institutions and the lack of information about them.
A letter from a Black succinctly summarized their view
6 The price determination is troublesome for many 
shopkeepers. Korean shopkeepers complained that the 
wholesalers marked up the price too high when the whether 
changed or the harvest was not good. One fish market owner 
always had problems to determine the price of whitings 
whenever the wholesalers doubled the wholesale price (this 
often happened when the whether of seas was not good) 
because of the possible complaints from shoppers. He and 
other Korean fish retailers thought the wholesalers ripped 
off Korean retailers. However, the general rule of thumb 
for the retail price was to double the wholesale price. If 
the wholesale price of an item is very expensive, say 200 
dollars for a leather jacket, a shopkeeper cannot double the 
whole price because only few shoppers will buy. The retail 
price would be determined at about 350 dollars. If the 
wholesale price is very cheap, say 50 cents for a pair of 
ear rings, the retail price would about two dollars (four 
times of the wholesale price).
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about how Korean shopkeepers exploit Blacks. "You are 
selling us poor quality goods, the prices are usually high, 
and you are very reluctant in refunding even those goods 
that have problems. It seems to me that you are harvesting 
a great profit from black neighborhoods" (Korean Times of 
Mew York. Feb. 1, 1991). A resident in Flatbush, where a 
boycott against two Korean stores was going on, expressed a 
similar view. "[T]he Koreans make money and leave the 
neighborhood. They do every night. They drive up in their 
Jaguars, they collect the cash, and then they drive out of 
the community to where they live. And that is wrong."7
Koreans as Outsiders
In the rally for the 65th anniversary of the birth of 
Malcolm X in front of the State Building on 125th Street in 
Harlem in 1990, Sonny Carson appeared and made a speech 
about the general strike. The leaflets about the 1990 
Church Avenue boycott against Korean grocers were 
distributed. About 100 young Blacks gathered. The main 
theme of the rally was to take back "our street, our 
culture." The 1990 Church Avenue boycotters in Brooklyn 
also responded with a shout, "our street," when their leader 
shouted, "whose street ?"
When Korean shopkeepers appeared and established
7 CBS, "48  hours: Simmer in the City," broadcasted on July 
12, 1990.
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considerable business activities on 125th Street in Harlem, 
they were viewed as outsiders by Black residents. The 
coordinator of the 1982 boycott in Harlem said, "the 
Koreans have come into 'our' community, taking millions of 
dollars sout'.... "(New York Times, Sept. 11, 1982, my 
emphasis). Accordingly, one member of the December 12th 
Movement complained about the over-representation of Korean 
shopkeepers on 125th Street. "If you look at 125th Street, 
which is the main microcosm of all the black communities, 
there are 160 stores from river to river... Koreans own 53 
of them. That should seem strange to the leaders of the
community how, in a short time, these people have come in
and grabbed hold of the economic life of the 125th 
street"(New York Voice. Dec. 3, 1988).
A letter from a Black to a Korean newspaper expressed a 
similar feeling.
Even though you open your business in our 
neighborhoods you don't want to be our true neighbors. 
You are not living in our neighborhoods. You don't 
attend community meetings for the improvement of 
neighborhoods and don't like to serve for these 
communities. You excuse yourself because of language 
problem. But I haven't heard that you don't make money
because of your lack of English. And if you come into
this country, you have to learn language and culture of 
this country. Until what time will you excuse yourself 
and hide behind the bullet proof glass ?"(Korea Times 
of New York. Feb. 1, 1990)
Blacks as Generous
Many Blacks think that while only Blacks accept all 
ethnic shopkeepers, other ethnic groups are more exclusive.
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One Black Muslim vendor on 125 Street contended that only 
Blacks are open to other ethnic groups. He explained that 
Blacks cannot open businesses in White areas because Whites 
would not use Black stores, but Blacks use any store here. 
"We are open, but they are not. Only Blacks welcome any 
ethnic merchants. Look around here [in Harlem]. You can 
see all ethnic merchants."8 He implied that Koreans must 
have problems in doing business in White areas because of 
White racism and that Koreans are successful in Harlem 
because of the Blacks' tolerance.
This tolerance is easily transformed a the feeling of 
betrayal when Blacks believe that the reciprocal 
relationship is violated. One speaker during the meeting 
for the 1990 Church Avenue boycotters asserted, "we are a 
generous people. In response to our kindness, the Koreans 
charge us high prices, give us inferior goods, and abuse our 
mothers and sisters"(Kwong 1990:29).
Koreans as Unfair Competitors
While many members of the December 12th Movement think 
that the Korean shopkeepers took economic opportunities away
8 From a similar perspective, the president of the Uptown 
Chamber of Commerce also agreed. "Nowhere are Koreans 
welcomed in greater numbers- or with more open arms- than in 
our communities. Everyone with an open mind knows this to be 
true. ...The issue with the one store being boycotted is one 
of insensitivity, arrogance, ignorance and racism, a fact 
recognized by many Harlem residents- and other Korean 
business persons"(Daily News. July 2, 1989).
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from Blacks, some other Blacks think that the Korean 
shopkeepers filled the vacant spaces and revitalized decayed 
Black streets. It is very difficult to prove whether the 
Korean shopkeepers took economic opportunities away from 
Blacks or not. However, there is some indirect evidence.’ 
While the number of Korean shopkeepers was about three dozen 
and the number of Black shopkeepers was more than 60 on 
125th Street in 1982 (Mew York Times. Sept. 11, 1982), the 
numbers were reversed in 1990. There were about thirty 
Black shopkeepers and sixty six Korean shopkeepers in 1990 
on the same street. Even though the reversal of the numbers 
of shopkeepers of two groups on 125th Street does not 
directly prove that the Korean shopkeepers took businesses 
from Blacks, Black shopkeepers feel the pressure from Korean 
shopkeepers.
Black shopkeepers talk about and fear the 
competitiveness of Korean shopkeepers. Sikulu Shange, a 
Black record shop owner on 125th Street, complains that "the 
Korean businesses are jacking up the prices of real estate 
sky high." He added, "I am furious after hearing that a 
Korean merchant had approached my landlord to buy my lease. 
Why are they working around me to force me out?" Shange 
opened his record shop in 1977, when Harlem was what he 
described as a "disaster area." He built his business, he 
says, through "raw courage and raw power." Now it may all 
be for nothing because Shange says that he cannot compete
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with the offers Koreans have been making to landlords 
(Lombardi 1985).9 Korean shopkeepers are also aware of 
their strength over Black shopkeepers. They often expressed 
the idea that Korean shopkeepers sell the same goods with 
cheaper prices than Black shopkeepers.
Koreans as a Part of Racist America
When Black shoppers feel the suspicion and arrogance of 
Korean shopkeepers, "they are reminded of how they have been 
treated all of their lives and view the Korean 
merchants/employees as just another racist element in 
society and a part of a racist system contributing to the 
perpetuation of discrimination against blacks in general and 
low-income blacks in particular" (Stewart 1989:93). This 
feeling is well expressed in individual complaints as well 
as in boycotts.
The boycotters considered Korean merchants as "tools of 
a general conspiracy by the U.S. Government to keep the 
Black community's economic life in chaos and under outside 
control. The banks finance non-Black merchants, the police 
protect them, and the politicians speak up for them" (from a 
boycott leaflet). Thus, the overrepresentation of Korean
9 It is widely believed among Koreans in New York City that 
the influx of Koreans in small business hiked rent very fast 
during the 1980s. The fierce competition for a same 
business spot among Korean shopkeepers was often reported in 
Korean newspapers. The rent hike is also possibly related 
to the economic boom of New York City during the mid 1980s.
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shopkeepers in Black neighborhoods is not simply the result 
of the efforts of Korean shopkeepers alone. There are more 
general forces in America which limit Black business 
opportunities but encourage the influx of Korean shopkeepers 
into Black communities.
In relation to this issue, the most frequently raised 
question is where Korean shopkeepers get money in 
establishing their businesses in such a short period. One 
Black asked, "Another question is where you got money to 
open a store ? ...You must get special help from Korean or 
American governments. Most of us believe the existence of 
preferential treatment of you and this makes us angry"
(Korea Times of Mew York. Feb. 1, 1990).. This idea is 
shared by many people. One Black college professor, living 
in Central Harlem, also insisted that Korean shopkeepers 
'must' get some help from the American government or the 
Unification Church. For her, the rapid success of Koreans 
is not possible without an external help.
Other agents of racist America are banks and 
landlords. One Black businessman said, "now they [White 
landlords] see Asian merchants where Blacks couldn't get 
in." Father Lucas, the leader of the 1988-89 Harlem boycott 
expressed a similar view, "Koreans get loans from banks and 
other financial institutions, insurance, as well as 
commercial sites from the City and privately owned 
businesses while the same treatment is systematically denied
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in general to Africans located in America" (Amsterdam Mews, 
Oct. 6, 1990).10
Because of this racism, many Blacks think, only Blacks 
are excluded from joining in businesses in their 
neighborhoods. "Why is influence and control of our 
neighborhoods accepted everywhere except in the African- 
American and Latino communities? Many wish to bring control 
of the economics of these communities into African-American 
and Latino hands. That's the way things work in Chinatown, 
Williamsburg, Howard Beach or Little Italy- without a 
whisper of racism being uttered"(Daily News, July 2, 1989). 
Thus, according Sonny Carson, "It's racist that we don't own 
any business." Father Lucas continued the story, "What you 
find in African-American communities is that some else 
controls it. The Koreans happen to be the people now. 
Before, it was the Jews and the Italians"(New York Times Dec 
12, 1988)
From the perspectives of the boycotters and many 
Blacks, their anger against Korean shopkeepers is easily
10 That seems to be partially true in Los Angeles. One 
representative of Shell admitted that they prefer Koreans 
because Koreans work for long hours and use their free 
family labor (Bonacich 1992). This also can be applied to 
the practices of landlords who think that Koreans will not 
be on default. It is also possible that Koreans can get 
loans from banks easier than Blacks. I think this is 
possible because Koreans are expected to be successful in 
their business. Koreans can also get more information about 
small business from the City Hall or other government 
agencies than Blacks because those information are 
circulated through Korean newspapers and ethnic networks.
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related to their anger against the whole society because the 
presence of Korean shopkeepers is the result of the 
pervasive racism against Blacks. Many Blacks felt that they 
were degraded and rejected by the White society in general 
and also by the Korean shopkeepers in their neighborhoods in 
particular. Thus, a leader of the 1990 Church Avenue 
boycott said, "Now they [Koreans] are acting as agents of 
the white racist establishment to control the African- 
American community"(Kwong 1990:29).
In this context, Korean shopkeepers symbolize the total 
social injustice against Blacks. For the members of the 
December 12th Movement and other Blacks, the rejection of 
the Korean shopkeepers is one of the starting points for 
rejecting American racism (Hornung 1990b).
Resistance for Education
Because the boycotters feel that there is a connection 
between racist Koreans and the racist American government, 
the boycott leaders think that the boycotts against Korean 
shopkeepers is an effort not only to punish individual 
racists but also an effort to educate people more about 
pervasive racism of American society and American government 
and an effort to establish and expand the bases of struggles 
against pervasive racism.
One leaflet distributed during the 1988-89 Harlem 
boycott stated, "The purpose of the boycott was to educate
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and organize our people to stand together as one and defend 
ourselves and each other." Chimurenga, one leader of the 
December 12th Movement, says of the boycott, "we are showing 
our own people that we do have power, purchasing power, 
economic power..." (Hornung 1990b).
Through the boycotts against Korean shopkeepers, the 
leaders wanted to show Black people that Blacks can act as 
protagonists, fight for self-determination, and control 
their own neighborhood and its economy. In order to show 
their determination not only to Blacks and but also to power 
elites and the Whites, they tried to shut down the Brooklyn 
Bridge in 1990. "We will take the bridge and shut down the 
subways, stop traffic to show the racists in this city that 
business cannot go on as usual. We have power and we can 
use it, make it grow," Chimurenga continued, "We can act 
before we are acted upon. That's how we want black people 
to think. To think about their right to self-determination, 
to reject the postcolonial mentality and build a life in our 
own neighborhoods" (Hornung 1990b).
Thus, Omo Wale Clay, a leader of the December 12th 
Movement, concluded that the boycott has sparked a 
"cultural" struggle in the community. For one thing, local 
residents are demanding that Church Avenue be renamed after 
Toussaint L'Ouverture, the Black revolutionary who freed 
Haiti from French colonial rule. The boycott has brought 
home the realization that Blacks, who are the overwhelming
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majority in the neighborhood, are underrepresented on 
Community Board 14, where they hold fewer seats than Whites, 
"It has also helped to expose David Dinkins," Clay said, "as 
nothing but the tool of the white establishment" (Kwong 
1991) .n
Thus, the activists hope that through small but active
and determined protest against small 'racist' players and
their protectors, they reveal large 'racist' players in
American society to Black people. Black rage is usually
directed at other Black people, Korean shopkeepers, and
other small players in everyday interactions.
These targeted expressions of black rage, though often 
downright cowardly and petty, signify the social 
invisibility and relative powerlessness of a people 
toward whom American elites have been and are 
indifferent... Most American elites, owing to narrow, 
self-serving notions of freedom and justice, have been 
flabbergasted at the expression of black rage (West 
1990).
Buy Black Movements
"Buy Black" movements are another form of education 
through resistance for Black activists. "Buy Black" posters 
are found on many lamp posts or walls in Harlem. The basic 
messages of "Buy Black" movements include "Pool your 
resources together and create your own business. Buy from 
Black-own business and keep the money in the Black 
community, creating jobs for Black people" (Kwong and Lum
11 The events related to the Community Board 14 will be 
discussed in a later section of this chapter.
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1988:10).
During the 1988 Harlem boycott, the Afrikan Nationalist 
Pioneer Movement distributed a leaflet on the 125th St. In a 
leaflet, George Edward Tait, the administrator of the 
movement, declared that the fact that Buy Black Movement had 
not yet been successfully implemented is both "an indictment 
of our collective intelligence and an insult to the record 
of our race.... For over forty years, we continue to 
witness the economic exploitation and ensuing erosion of 
Harlem by the arrogance and avarice of aliens," he 
continues,
It is highly ludicrous that a campaign must be 
launched to trigger the transference of economic power 
in the black community from non-Black control to black 
control; other ethnic communities automatically 
establish and relentlessly maintain their economic 
sovereignty. But we have allowed Harlem to be made 
into an interracial economic prostitute for Italian, 
jewish, Arab, and Asian pimps who take the money and 
raise their families, build their communities, develop 
institutions, and win their wars.
For him,
“Buy Black7 is not concerned with working for the alien 
business in the community; it is targeted toward 
removing the alien business from the community. It is 
not the private program of any individual, organization 
or institution but rather a family business venture for 
Afrikans from Afrika, the Caribbean, the Americas and 
elsewhere. The 'Buy Black7 campaign solicits the 
strength of community support for the sake of community 
survival."
The 'Buy Black7 movement was started more than 75 years 
ago by Marcus Garvey in Harlem. The "Buy Black" campaign is 
also one of the crying issues for the December 12th 
Movement. Their efforts to place control of economic life
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of the Black community in Black hands haven't had a serious 
impact on the development of Black business.
Self-Critics
Certainly Blacks don't speak with one voice. A Mew 
York Mewsdav (June 15, 1990) poll showed that while 27% of 
Blacks were sympathetic with the Church Avenue boycotters 
only 6% of Whites were sympathetic with the boycotters.
While 37% of Blacks were sympathetic with the store owners, 
68% of whites were sympathetic with the store owners.12 
However, this poll did not say how much of the poor Black 
population has complaints against Korean shopkeepers in poor 
Black neighborhoods where Korean shopkeepers maintain their 
daily interactions with Black shoppers. Supports or 
opposition to the boycott do not tell how those respondents 
actually experienced their contacts with Korean shopkeepers 
and thought about their relationships with Korean 
shopkeepers.
During my fieldwork, some said they objected the 
boycott but also insisted that Korean shopkeepers did not 
treat Blacks well. One Black complained that the boycotters 
were doing too much. Another Black person thought that the
12 This result was affected by the continuous negative 
description of the boycotts by major newspapers in New York 
City and by the denouncement of the boycott by Mayor 
Dinkins. It seems to be true that even though the boycotters 
did not get support from the majority of Blacks, they have 
considerable support among poor Blacks.
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boycotters demonstrated because they wanted to expand their 
political base. However, this did not mean that they had 
positive images of Korean shopkeepers.
There are some Blacks who have more positive views of 
Korean shopkeepers. One retired Black said, "Koreans are 
united and working very hard. We [Blacks] are lazy, 
divided, and consuming drugs. We have to learn from 
Koreans... The professional Blacks try to enter the White 
society. They betray the poor black. We are not united 
like Koreans." The Amsterdam News (Oct.8, 1988) carried 
some criticism of Black boycotts against Korean shopkeepers, 
even though the newspaper is usually supportive of the 
boycotts. One reader pointed out that Koreans did not come 
to exploit Blacks but came to open their business with their 
hard work and money in vacant buildings, that Blacks should 
not attack Koreans from Black chauvinism, and that the 
boycotters were parasites seeking to satisfy themselves 
through so called struggles against racial discrimination. 
Another reader insisted that Blacks cannot revive the area
if Blacks expel all Koreans in Harlem.
Jim Dowdy, a long-time Black business leader and head
of a business organization in Harlem, said, "I absolutely
deplore the harassment of these [Korean] people [by the 
boycotters]... They have the same rights on 125th Street 
that I have on 42nd" (Lombardi 1986:16). He and one Black 
community board member are very popular among Korean
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shopkeepers in Harlem. According to several Korean 
shopkeepers, they are very supportive of Kprean causes.
The Stories of Koreans 
Blacks as Crimogenic13
The robbery and shoplifting by Blacks were very often 
mentioned by Korean shopkeepers. One Korean shopkeeper said 
that when she opened a new green grocery business in Harlem 
all kinds of tramps and shoplifters gathered in her store. 
She thought that the shoplifters tested how the new Korean 
family could handle shoplifting.14 Most Korean shopkeepers 
in Harlem recited very often how they caught shoplifters or 
how Blacks stole in their stores. One time in my presence, 
a Korean fish market employee darted out and came back. He 
said a Blpck took a bunch of red snappers without paying 
money. Thus, even when they have lunch or work at a cash 
register, their eyes usually stare at all corners of their
13 I took this term from Michael Lewis (1978). Many Whites 
believe that minorities have the innate tendency toward 
crime. According to Lewis (1978:76), "our [Whites's] 
interest in crime [in minorities] is a function of a 
culturally induced need to distinguish ourselves from 
criminal deviants so that we may claim a measure of moral 
superiority for ourselves."
14 See her story in chapter five. The most frequent target 
of petty shoplifting was green grocery stores. It seems to 
me that not tramps but poor people stole vegetables and 
fruit because they have no money to buy them. The prices of 
stolen vegetables are usually small. However, the Korean 
shopkeepers believed that if they do not catch petty 
shoplifters, more shoplifters and their friends will come 
back to steal.
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stores.15 It is said that some Korean shopkeepers gave up 
their business because of shoplifters (Sae Gae Ilbo, May 20, 
1989).
One Korean shopkeeper knew some Black thieves who were 
living in the same building where the Korean shopkeeper 
opened her business. She lamented that the thieves stole 
from her store and other stores very often. The members of 
the family who were thieves were arrested and put in jail 
again and again. According to her, when one member of the 
family was released, she gave some money to him as pocket 
money. Because she thought it was better to bribe them than 
to be robbed, she regularly gave the thieves pocket money. 
She mentioned that after her "help" for the family, they did 
not steal from her store again. They also guarded her store 
from other thieves.
For Korean shopkeepers, the fear of burglary was not 
limited to "strange” Blacks. In the store where I worked,
15 According to one policeman, Koreans are extremely 
sensitive to shoplifting. He said He did not understand why 
Korean shopkeepers did not charge ordinary shoppers more.
To charge ordinary shoppers more for stolen goods is a 
general practice of most retail businesses. In fact, Korean 
shopkeepers charge as much as other shopkeepers. But Korean 
shopkeepers want to gain extra profit by limiting 
shoplifting as far as possible. However, more established 
Korean shopkeepers were more tolerant and less sensitive to 
shoplifting. But new and small Korean shopkeepers were most 
sensitive to shoplifting. Because their businesses were 
not established yet, when they found shoplifting they sensed 
the possibility of failure of their businesses. They knew 
that the failure would make them do long hours of labor and 
extreme sacrifice of their family lives again. This thought 
makes them anxious and fearful of shoplifting.
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the wife of the shopkeeper took care of the store when her 
husband visited Korea. She told me not to tell her black 
employees that her husband visited Korea because she feared 
that the Black employees would relate the news to Black 
thieves whom they knew. She thought that the Black 
employees were not unsterustworthy. When a box of leather 
jackets was stolen during one night after her husband had 
come back, she wondered whether there was a connection 
between her employees and the thieves.
Gangs of young Blacks often smash jewelry store windows 
and grab cjold rings and necklaces, especially during 
Halloween days. In one case, young Blacks cracked one 
Korean jewelry store window with a large stone and grabbed 
some gold jewelry. In another case, three Black youths 
successfully robbed a Korean jewelry store with a machine 
gun at about 10 A.M. Because of this and other problems, 
all Korean jewelry stores at 125th Street were covered with 
bullet proof glass. When a bunch of young Blacks passed a 
Korean jewelry store, the Korean store owner said that there 
is nothing to expect from v gumdunovi'r nigger1.16
There was a riot on 145th street in northern Harlem in 
July 7, 1992. The Korean owner of a looted sneaker store 
said, "as many as 10,000 pairs of Nike, Reebok and other
16 In fact, some young Blacks "delighted in descending on a 
small store in a large group and stealing." One young Black 
said "it was the only time he felt happy and 
stimulated."(New York Times. Nov. 19, 1992)
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high-priced sneakers, the entire fall inventory, were stolen 
by looters in the early morning of July 7. A rioter 
swinging a pickax broke through the new metal security 
shutters." Spatters of blood here and there attested to the 
intensity of the shoving and grabbing. A son of the owner 
cried, "they used a demonstration [against the police 
brutality] as an excuse to go out and rob other people of 
their dreams.... " (Mew York Times. July 8, 1992). Another 
shopkeeper described how he was robbed by a Black with a gun 
in his store and how his body had trembled with fury.
One Korean female shopkeeper explained that Blacks were 
originally cursed by God. According to her story, there 
were three sons for Noah. Because Ham, the youngest son, 
saw his father naked and told his brothers the news, he was 
cursed by God. Because Ham was cursed, his descendants are 
always living with difficulty. According to her, Ham's 
descendants are Blacks. Thus, Blacks are always poor and 
commit crime and violence. She concluded, "it is in the 
blood of Blacks."17
Many Korean shopkeepers believed that the conflict 
between Blacks and Koreans started from Blacks' innate
17 See Genesis 9 of the Bible for a related story. Ham's 
son- Canaan, not Ham himself, was cursed not by God but by 
Noah. There is no mention in the Bible that Ham's 
descendants are Blacks. She also mentioned that God gave 
power to Whites, intelligence to Yellows, and physical 
ability to Blacks. Accordingly, Whites got the power of 
this society, Blacks excel in sports, and Yellows excel in 
studies.
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criminality and their jealousy of Korean success. For 
evidence, many Koreans frequently claimed that most Blacks 
tend to steal. One Korean shopkeeper said that it is silly 
that the large conflict between Blacks and Koreans always 
started from a small shoplifting. One Korean salesclerk 
said, "because there are always Blacks who steal, the bad 
relationship between Koreans and Blacks is inevitable."
When boycotters accused Koreans of beating Black women and 
children, the president of the Korean Merchant Association 
stated, "it is deplorable that shoplifting is justified by 
boycotters." Thus, while boycotters emphasized that Korean 
shopkeepers abused Black people, Korean shopkeepers 
emphasized that Blacks were stealing.
Blacks as Haive and Irrational
A drycleaner in Harlem said,
a Black brought a coat with a cut which I didn't check 
when I got the coat. He insisted that I made that cut. 
He demanded compensation. I know I didn't do it 
because there are many Blacks who do same cheating.
His demand drove me crazy. However, I refunded him 
because, if I fight, the image of my store will be 
damaged. If a quarrel starts, Blacks always support a 
Black even though they don't know nothing about why we 
started."
The belief that Blacks always support another Black in a 
dispute with Korean shopkeepers regardless of the cause was 
well shared by most Korean shopkeepers.
Another common belief about Blacks is that Blacks 
cannot succeed in business because they are naive, that is,
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Blacks do not have enough intelligence to manage complex 
business interactions. Some Korean shopkeepers thought that 
Blacks are naive because Blacks do not think of their 
future. They commonly noted that "if Blacks have money they 
do not save it but spend it soon."
Other Korean shopkeepers argued that Blacks are naive 
because many Blacks wanted to get refunded for products even 
though the items were purchased several months before and 
they were sometimes deliberately damaged to get the refund. 
However, "in comparison with Whites," says another Korean 
shopkeeper, "Blacks are not hard to please." He meant that 
Blacks did not pay much attention to quality and neatness of 
vegetables and fruit like Whites and that Blacks did not 
complain like Whites. Thus, for him, it was easier to deal 
with Blacks than with Whites. He interpreted this as 
naivety of Black people.18
Blacks as Lazy and Welfare-Dependent
Several Korean shopkeepers who once employed Blacks 
complained that the Black employees did not work hard. They 
continued, "when they got weekly wage, they didn't come to 
work for several days because they had money to spend."
18 He had had his green grocery store in a White area before 
he opened his business in Harlem. According to him, Whites 
didn't buy if the quality of vegetables were not at their 
expectation and Whites were difficult to satisfy while 
Blacks were easily pleased if he paid "only a little 
attention" to them. He mentioned, however, there were more 
petty shoplifters in Black area than White area.
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Especially, Blacks were not employed for intensive labor. 
Green grocery workers or fish cleaners were required to work 
diligently for twelve hours per day. Because illegal 
Hispanics did not demand high wage and worked very hard, 
such work was usually given to Hispanics. Koreans were also 
employed for hard jobs. When one green grocery store owner 
was asked why she did not give an employ to Blacks, she 
answered, "Blacks cannot do the job." Other Korean 
shopkeepers also shared the idea that Blacks do not work 
hard. Many Koreans considered employing Blacks a waste of 
money. However, this is not true in many other cases. In 
one store where a Black was employed as a cook, the Korean 
store owner said that her employee was an exception to the 
rule.19
One Korean female shopkeeper said, "Blacks from Africa 
or the Caribbean area try to establish their own small 
business. Vendors in this area [they are all Blacks] are 
from foreign countries. But American Blacks are lazy. 
Because of their tradition acquired during the period of 
slavery, they don't work voluntarily. Rather, robbers are
19 When I asked a young Black why he did not work for a 
Korean store, he answered that because the wage was very low 
and Korean owners did not share their profit with Blacks. A 
Black watcher in the store where I worked also complained 
that the pay was too low. He got 180 dollars per week in 
1988. He worked six days per week and eight hours per day.
In fact, he worked more than eight hours a day because the 
store owner kept his store open till late. There was no pay 
for overwork. The Black watcher once told me that he worked 
only as much as he paid. Thus, for him, he worked slow 
because he got low pay.
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more diligent because they have tp plan and execute the plan
by themselves."
Another Korean shopkeeper said, "80-90% of Black who
receive milk, cheese and other things from welfare agencies
or from churches sell them out." Many Korean shopkeepers
believed that Blacks depend on welfare and bear more babies
to receive more welfare money. One fish market owner said,
I work hard for paying tax which support welfare for 
Blacks. Because of the welfare, Blacks are a little 
bit more quiet. If there is no welfare, they will rob 
and steal more. Since they are lazy, they want more 
babies to get more welfare. It is a good world for 
them because the governments give them welfare.
Koreans wouldn't get welfare, because it is shameful.
One jewelry store owner explained that he could not
understand why young Blacks waste their money on gold and
diamonds.20 He lamented that because the Blacks waste
their money they could not establish their own businesses.
Many Korean shopkeepers often mentioned that Blacks do not
know how to save, that Blacks spend everything for the
moment, and that Blacks enjoy now and do not think of the
future.
Blacks Became Jealous
Because many Korean shopkeepers thought that Blacks 
were responsible for their own problems, when they 
experienced the Black boycotts against Koreans, they
20 He excused his jewelry business by saying, "I open a 
jewelry store, because there is a demand. If I don't open, 
other people will open."
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impugned the motives of the boycotters. One Korean 
shopkeeper in Brooklyn said, "Blacks want to disrupt our 
businesses because they cannot do what we have done." Many 
Korean intellectuals have similar views. One Korean 
lecturer at Columbia University said, "Blacks are jealous of 
us because we have done in 15 years what they were unable to 
do.... They are angry because we took away their excuse" 
(quoted in Veneroso 1989:13).
Certainly, the success of Koreans where Blacks have 
failed puzzles many Blacks. Lloyd Williams, a Harlem 
businessman, charges, "I know for a fact that the Korean 
mafia is financing a lot of their businesses" (Veneroso 
1989:13). The rapid expansion of Korean shopkeepers 
throughout New York City continues to confound many New 
Yorkers - particularly Black residents. However, the 
suspicion of the origin of money for the establishment of 
Korean small businesses was often interpreted by many 
Koreans as a result of Black jealousy.
Koreans as Victims of Reverse Racism
According to Sung Soo Kim, the president of the Korean 
American Small Business Service Center of New York, Inc.,
"at the beginning, boycotters demanded jobs, scholarships, 
our participation in community affairs, communication of 
both cultures. In 1984 Harlem boycott, they want to get 
more budget for the development of Harlem by making Koreans
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scapegoats. They seems to appeal to the city and the state 
to distribute more welfare to Harlem by exposing problems"
(Chung Ana Ilbo, Feb. 15, 1985). However, the boycotts were 
eventually organized by more radical Black nationalists who 
demanded that Korean shopkeepers sell the boycotted stores 
to Blacks or close.
When Blacks started their boycotts at Church Avenue and 
in Harlem, other Korean shopkeepers said that they 
recognized that even though the Black activists boycotted 
only one or two stores, their intention was to scare away 
all Korean shopkeepers. Certainly, after the boycotts, many 
un-boycotted Korean shopkeepers also became more careful in 
dealing with Black people. Because the boycotters also 
distributed leaflets which demanded Blacks boycott all 
Korean shopkeepers and described all Koreans as racists, 
many Koreans felt that they were condemned as racists just 
because they were Koreans. Many Koreans believed that the 
Black activists had become reverse racists because of their 
frustration in this society.
Sung Soo Kim, who tried to negotiate resolutions to the 
Harlem and Brooklyn boycotts, angrily called the Black 
boycotts against Korean shopkeepers "obnoxious, outrageous 
and racist"(Song 1989:9). He also demanded "black community 
activists resist the easy temptation to target ^orean 
merchants in venting their justifiable frustrations, using 
us as scapegoats" (Daily News. July 2, 1988). Other Korean
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shopkeepers described Sonny Carson and other protesters as 
racial hate-mongers, The Koreans involved emphasized to 
city officials and the news media that the protesters wanted 
to expel all Korean shopkeepers from Black neighborhoods. 
Even the boycotted store-owner on Church Avenue told the 
news media that he did not know why the boycotters boycotted 
him. Thus, he presented himself as an innocent victim of 
Black racism.
Many Koreans even saw the boycotts as a Black 
conspiracy to destroy Korean business in order to achieve 
the Black self-determination. One group of Korean 
businessmen sent a letter to Mayor Dinkins and complained 
about "a pattern of an overall plan [by Black activists] to 
force us out of New York." An article from the Village 
Voice reported that "their[Koreans'] position was not to 
give in on the demand to close the [boycotted] store, thus 
preventing a vdomino effect.' ...The hard-line Koreans see 
this struggle as their fight for civil rights, which they 
must win, ironically, from the blacks." (Kwong 1991)
Koreans as Victims between Whites and Blacks
Henry Hong, who organized the travel of Black pastors 
in New York City to Korea in 1990, said, "Black nationalists 
try very hard to find any excuse to express their 
discontents and explode the discontents toward Koreans who 
are relatively powerless. Thus, the discontentment of
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Blacks toward Koreans is in fact the discontentment toward
the American government and the Whites"(Korea Times of
Washington. D.C.. Now. 27, 1992).
This feeling was well expressed when many Black looters
targeted Korean stores during the L.A. riot of 1992. During
the riot, many Koreans said that the Los Angeles police gave
up Koreatown while they protected White enclaves like Rodeo
Drive. Because of this racism, many Koreans believed,
Koreatown was set ablaze. One Korean in L.A. said,
[L.A.P.D. chief] Daryl Gates wanted the blacks to let 
out their outburst toward the Koreans, because he knew 
that the blacks didn't feel very good toward the 
Koreans. I do believe thers1'must have been some 
conscious politics, because [the police] just weren't 
there, (quoted in Kim and Yang 1992)
Many New York Korean shopkeepers think that the situation
they see in L.A. is also possible in New York City.
Koreans as Serving Blacks
Many Korean shopkeepers felt anger when the boycotts
against Korean shopkeepers started because they thought that
they had come to serve Black consumers when most of the
other ethnic shopkeepers had left. Korean shopkeepers that
thought they maintained their stores in spite of the dangers
of poor Black neighborhoods. One Korean shopkeeper
responded to a Black boycott,
Blacks make us their target of the anger because we are 
powerless. They cannot stand up against a White store. 
They failed to open their own stores when this area had 
plenty of vacant stores. Now they complain about that 
we are working hard to serve them. If we leave here,
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who want to come to this dangerous place? We made this
street a busy commercial street.
A female Korean shopkeeper also responded,
'Buy Black' movement won't work because Black 
shopkeepers sell lower quality goods with higher prices 
than we do. They [Black activists] talk empty talk
because we serve them [Blacks]. They told us to close
our stores during a [day of outrage] demonstration. We 
didn't close at all. They just try to threaten us.
Koreans as Hard Working People
The Korean shopkeepers are so proud of themselves for 
reviving the community or the streets that they exaggerate 
the difficulties and dangers of the inner city Black 
communities. Here, the important issues is not whether or 
not the Koreans really revived the streets in poor Black 
neighborhoods, but that many Koreans believe that they 
revived "dead" neighborhoods.
One former Korean fish market owner in Harlem 
mentioned, "We came to a 'dead' neighborhood. There were no 
stores, and buildings were vacant. Koreans came here and 
managed their businesses with determination. Eventually the 
businesses became 'alive' and the neighborhoods too. We 
feel proud of what we are doing for this country... I am 
very grateful to God who made hope and joy possible in this 
evil, miserable, and decayed place" (Korea Times of Mew 
York. July 30, 1986, my emphasis added).
Cultural Miscommunication as the Cause of the Conflict
In many cases, cultural and linguistic barriers further
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contributed to escalating tensions between Black shoppers
and Korean shopkeepers. However, the degree to which
cultural differences attributed to the conflict is not
clear. Despite the problem of understanding the role of
cultural differences, many Korean leaders mentioned cultural
differences as a major cause of the tension between Blacks
and Koreans. Ordinary Korean shopkeepers emphasized
language problems more than cultural difference. In fact,
an English language problem is very serious for most Koreans
not because they cannot sell goods but because they often
cannot grasp nuances and meanings of English words. Many
Korean shopkeepers failed to respond to Black shoppers
because the Korean shopkeepers did not understand what the
Black shoppers said.
Sung Soo Kim responded, when many Blacks complained
Koreans are rude,
Confucian teachings dictate that a woman may not touch
a man's hand - that it is deemed unseemly. Many
cashiers often plunk down change on the counter,
avoiding the customer's proffered hand. Some customers 
interpret this as a personal insult when none was 
intended. In addition, the meager grasp of English of 
many Koreans often comes across as 'rudeness' and 
'arrogance.' (Daily News. July 2, 1988)
He also said, "you must understand that in Confucian culture
we don't smile very much..." (New York Times. May 17,
1 A A A  \ 21
21 It seems to me that even though the existence of cultural
and language barriers is certain, the Korean leaders
overemphasized the role of cultural and language 
miscommunication in the conflict between Blacks and Koreans.
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Self-Critics: Koreans as Racists
Certainly Korean shopkeepers do not speak with one 
voice. One Korean shopkeeper in Harlem was very critical of 
other Korean shopkeepers. She said, "We [Koreans] did many 
bad things to Blacks. Some Koreans are really bad. Even 
though I am a Korean, I can tell you that Koreans are 
racists. They consider themselves superior to Blacks. They 
should change their attitudes. They are wrong, not Blacks."
One shopkeeper in Harlem commented on the shopkeeper 
who had been a target of the 1988-89 Harlem boycott. He 
said, "he beat many people. I told him not to beat poor 
Blacks who steal because they are hungry and need food. He 
didn't listen to me. He was notorious in the area. He is 
now much better after the boycott. Blacks didn't boycott 
all Koreans...."
One Korean reader commented on the L.A. riot of 1992, 
"If we can live in a White suburban neighborhood and send 
our children to good schools, we'd better express our thanks 
to Blacks before we despise them.... I feel shameful that 
we feel superior to Blacks. Blacks and Koreans are all 
colored in the eyes of Whites"(Korea Times of Washington.
The cultural miscommunication is a good excuse for the bad 
relations between Blacks and Koreans. However, this emphasis 
cannot explain why some Koreans who cannot command English 
well get maintain a good relationship with Black shoppers. I 
think, the attitudes of Korean shopkeepers are more 
important than the cultural and language barriers for the 
conflict. One Korean shopkeeper in Harlem whose English was 
very poor had a good relationship with her Black customers 
because she showed her sincerity to Black customers.
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D.C.. May 13, 1992).
Ethnic Hews Media 
During the boycotts of Korean shopkeepers in poor Black 
neighborhoods, Black and Korean news media showed almost 
opposite views on the conflict.
Sonny Carson and other boycott supporters appeared on 
WLIB, the most popular Black radio station in New York City, 
and expressed their opposition to the mediation of the 
conflict, their determination to close down two Korean 
stores, and their opposition to Mayor Dinkins's efforts to 
peacefully settle the conflict. During its news hour, WLIB 
frequently reported the opinions of the boycotters but not 
of the boycotted Korean shopkeepers or other Korean 
shopkeepers. WLIB often reported Black residents' anger 
about the beating of Black women by the Korean shopkeepers 
and the pervasive prejudices of Korean shopkeepers against 
Blacks. During the boycotts, they accused the White media 
(television channels and major newspapers in New York City) 
of having biased views against Blacks.
The Korean television and radio stations reported the 
boycotts from an opposite view. They reported only the 
opinions of the boycotted Korean shopkeepers and business 
leaders who emphasized that the Black radicals sought only 
to expel Korean shopkeepers from Black neighborhoods. The 
Korean television reported that Korean shopkeepers and 
leaders considered the Black boycotters to be extortionists
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and extremists without the support of Black residents. In a 
television news program, an anchor woman explained that the 
Korean shopkeeper targeted by the 1988 Brooklyn boycott 
closed his store because of the "absurd” demands from the 
boycotters and the "ill advised" negotiation between Korean 
leaders such as Sung Soo Kim and Black leaders including 
Black assemblyman Albert Vann. The Korean television and 
radio news programs usually concentrated on the "reverse 
racism" and "unreasonable demands" of the boycotters rather 
than on the prejudice of Korean shopkeepers in poor black 
neighborhoods.
In printed news media, the situation was almost the 
same as in the ethnic electronic media. However, newspapers 
printed some opposite views which did not appear in 
electronic news media. The Amsterdam Mews, the leading 
Black newspaper in New York City, usually reported the 
alleged beatings of Black women by Korean shopkeepers as 
facts even though the involved Koreans denied the 
allegations and were later found not guilty.22 While 
Korean newspapers always described the Church Avenue boycott 
as dangerous and threatening, the Amsterdam News described 
the same boycott as successful.
The Amsterdam News carried a story about the Church
22 The decision by a Jury does not mean that the Koreans 
involved did not beat the Black woman. It just mean that 
there is no evidence to prove that the Koreans beat the 
Black woman.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
223
Avenue boycott on the front page on May 19, 1990. "Some 800 
persons marched and rallied... to highlight their 
determination to carry on their boycott against two Korean 
fruit and vegetable stores..." In an editorial article on 
the same day, the Amsterdam Mews accused a Black high school 
teacher who crossed the picket line with his students of 
creating negative ideas about the Black protest in the minds 
of black children. The article also accused the White news 
media of using the boycott breaker to "discredit and vilify 
any black person who stands up for his rights and his 
dignity in this racist land we call America."
Articles in the Black news media usually presented 
Sonny Carson, Father Lucas and the boycotters as determined 
opponents of racial injustice. However, the boycotters were 
also often criticized as too harsh toward Black Mayor 
Dinkins, who tried to mediate the conflict. The Amsterdam 
News also reported opinions of the boycotted Korean owner in 
the case of 1988 Harlem boycott and the views of some Black 
opponents to the Church Avenue boycott. But the number of 
anti-boycott articles was very limited.
Korean newspapers emphasized that the boycotts were a 
political excuse for Black radicals to convey their 
political messages to Black residents. The Sae Gae 
IlbofJan. 25, 1990) reported that the boycott organizers 
fabricated the fact that two Korean shopkeepers beat a Black 
woman. The Chung Ana Ilbo (Sept. 15, 1988) analyzed the
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forces behind Black boycotts against Korean shopkeepers in
1988. It continued,
The boycotts till now were simple protests by local 
hoodlums. But Sonny Carson began to involve when large 
number of hoodlums participated in the boycotts. He 
and other local activists organized local organizations 
to continue the boycotts and the United Africa Business 
Association, a Black muslim organization, also joined. 
They are basically extortionists. They demanded money.
Thus, to Koreans, the boycotters were not ones who
sought justice but ones who disturbed social order with
absurd demands. The "Buy Black" movement was also described
as a racist attempt by Black activists to expel all non-
Black businessmen from Black neighborhoods. Even the
Amsterdam Mews was described by an article in a Korean
newspaper as a radical newspaper that promoted the
enhancement of Black consciousness and enlightenment. (This
implies that black consciousness and enlightenment cause
problems.) The article continued, "accordingly, many
organizations in Harlem influenced by the Amsterdam News
began to support the boycott and other Black newspapers also
reported the boycott." Thus, the Black hostility against
Koreans spread through Black activism and the Black news
media. Prom this point of view, the Korean news media
reported that the boycotts did not have community support
and that the boycotters were outside agitators.
Because of articles in the Korean news media, the
crimogenic theory of Blacks was not limited to individual
Koreans who experienced Black crimes. One article of the
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Korea T im e s  of New York (Mar. 9, 1991) emphasized that 
Koreans have to pay attention to Black robbers. The title 
of the article is "Crime Is Much on the Minds of Manhattan's 
Korean American Merchants." In the article, one Korean 
shopkeeper expressed his thought that police cannot stop 
crime because "nobody knows when it will strike." He 
continued, each businessman has to find a way to protect 
himself, suggesting that a merchant has "to be on guard 
every minute." Another news article was entitled, "The 
Rapid Increase of Robbers Aimed at Koreans in All New York 
City." The Chung Anq Ilbo (Jan. 7, 1989) used "Blacks 
Frequently Threaten Koreans in Harlem" for an article. The 
article reported that Korean shopkeepers closed their eyes 
when Blacks openly shoplifted because the Koreans were 
afraid of possible threats from Black mobs. An article23 
in the Korea Times of New York was entitled "One Out Of Four 
Among Black Men in Their Twenties Are In Jail." Subtitles 
included "Education from Fellow Criminals Rather Than in 
Schools," and "Half the Criminals in Jail Are Black."
While Black newspapers called the "White" news media a 
racist element in society after it continuously called for 
the active intervention of Black Mayor Dinkins in the 
boycotts and described the boycotts as racist provocations. 
Korean newspapers, however hailed pro-Korean news from the 
"main-stream” news media and frequently carried the Korean
23 The date is unclear in my news clip.
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translation of supportive articles. Korean newspapers also 
exaggerated the support of Whites for the boycotted Korean 
by describing active expressions of support from a few 
individual Whites as a support from the majority of Whites. 
For example, when a White sent letters to Mayor Dinkins and 
President Bush in order to complain about the inaction of 
the government, it was reported in an article entitled 
"American Citizens Support Koreans in the Church Avenue 
Incident"(Sae Gae Ilbo. Mar 1, 1990).
However, Korean newspapers also reported dissenting 
views. Many articles in Korean newspapers admitted that 
common problems for Korean shopkeepers include lack of 
respect for the Black residents, failure to greet customers, 
and tendencies to "throw" change to the shoppers (e.g. Chung 
Ang Ilbo. Mar. 27, 80). Through frequent discussions of the 
problems between Koreans and Blacks, the advised Korean 
people on how to behave and how to respond to shoppers. One 
Korean newspaper even proclaimed "Don't Call Them 
vgunidunqyi'." These views were, however, not pro-boycott 
views. While they tried to point out the problems of Korean 
shopkeepers, their main emphasis was on the problems of 
Black grass-root activists and lack of protection of Korean 
shopkeepers by the city government and the police.
Mainstream Mews Media
Hew York City has two daily national newspapers which
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have considerable influence not only on city residents but 
also in the national scene. There are three daily local 
newspapers which have daily circulations totalling hundreds 
of thousands copies in and near New York City. National 
weekly news magazines such as Newsweek. Time, and Money also 
dealt with the conflict. They devoted different amounts of 
attention to the conflict between Koreans and Blacks and had 
different views and analyses of the conflict.
The New York Post had the most anti-boycott views.
They consistently called Sonny Carson and the boycotters 
racists. Some Blacks complained that the New York Post is 
also the most anti-Black news paper in New York City. The 
Wall Street Journal, which also had a fierce anti-^boycott 
view, did not devote much attention to the conflict. The 
New York Times provided very detailed and fair description 
of the discontent of Black residents against Korean 
shopkeepers from the early 1980s.24 However, the New York 
Times also expressed negative views against the Black 
boycotters. The Daily News and the New York Newsdav also 
continuously expressed their anti-boycott views.
However, I will not deal with the individual 
differences among the main stream news media here, because 
they, in fact, expressed considerably similar views and 
analyses of the conflict between Blacks and Koreans. The
24 For example, as early as Sept. 11, 1982, the title of an 
article was "Korean Merchants Face Ire in Harlem."
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several main stream television stations will not be 
differentiated either. Because they are owned by Whites and 
influence the thoughts of many Whites, they were called 
"White news media" by many Blacks. The "White news media" 
or "main stream news media" had tremendous effects on the 
views of the Whites and the directions of the city 
government policy. These influences created the social 
condition where the Black boycotters, their sympathizers, 
and the Korean shopkeepers expressed their ideas and 
contested against each other for media support. Therefore I 
will now focus on how the main stream news media, in 
general, dealt with the conflict.
Koreans as Model Minority
Most main stream newspapers expressed their curiosity 
as to why Koreans were successful in small business even 
though they had immigrated just one or two decades 
beforehand. In the early 1980s, they wondered who provided 
capital for Korean shopkeepers. The Newsdav once reported 
in 1981 that the Korean green grocers were supported by the 
Unification Church. However, the main stream news media 
focused more on the Korean shopkeepers' hard work than the 
external sources of financial support for Koreans, because 
Koreans raised capital themselves rather than receive any 
preferential financial treatment from external sources.
Thus, the success of Korean shopkeepers was described
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as the results of self-help efforts. According to a New 
York Post editorial (June 25, 1990), "the secrets of their 
[Koreans'] success are plains a capacity for hard work; 
loyal families that labor as units and stick together; the 
ability to save small amounts of capital to increase the 
wealth of the entire community. It is a formula for success 
and advancement which other American ethnic groups have 
pursued in the past...." An article about Koreans in the 
New York Times (Sept. 24, 1989) summarized the success story 
of Koreans with its title, "Success and Its Price: The 
Koreans' Big Entry Into Business."
This description of Koreans as a model minority not 
only exposed Korean success but also highlighted the 
failures of other groups, especially poor Blacks. For 
example, an article from Newsweek (May 18, 1992), after 
analyzing the 1992 L.A. riot, rejected the opinion that many 
minorities fail because there are no jobs and money in 
America because Koreans proved that they can succeed without 
money. Thus the Newsweek article insisted that violence, 
crime, and poverty in inner cities cannot be justified. For 
the author of the article, solutions to the problems of the 
inner cities (thus of Black residents there) lay with 
individual responsibility, family values, and respect for 
labor.
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Black Resentment
By contrasting Korean successes with Black failures,
many news reporters described the conflict between Koreans
and Blacks as a result of Black resentment of Korean
success. One article in the Mew York Post (Feb. 9, 1990)
described that, "on one side are immigrants who are
pursuing the American dream, using the time-tested recipe of
saving money and hard work.... On the other side are
professional race-baiters like Sonny Carson, engaging in
group defamation... [T]he underlying issue is who has
economic opportunity and control...." Another article (New
York Times. Sept. 24, 1989) stated, "In Los Angeles as in
New York, the Koreans' success at taking over small
businesses has stirred resentment in black and Hispanic
neighborhoods, and many complain that they disregard
American laws on working conditions and wages."
In the same context, Harris(1983), in his "Making It:
How the Koreans Won the Green-Grocer Wars" in Money. said,
The success of Koreans has stirred resentment in Harlem 
and other run-down neighborhoods. Last summer[1982] 
the Universal Negro Improvement Association, a small 
black-power group, distributed leaflets asking 
residents to boycott Korean merchants on grounds that 
they didn't employ blacks and pushed out other 
minority-run enterprises. (Money, March 1983)
An editorial in the New York Times (Mar. 3, 1992)
described Black boycotts as a result of perceived economic
challenges from Koreans. The editorial implied that the
oversimplication of Asian-Americans as a "model minority"
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caused racial bigotry and violence against Asian-Americans 
by Whites as well as Blacks. Thus, the Black boycotts 
against Korean shopkeepers were also interpreted as 
manifestations of racial hysteria and bigotry caused by the 
stereotypical perception of Asian success in America. 
According to an article in the Wall Street Journal (Oct. 26, 
1SS8), "it is probably that some blacks would respond with 
suspicion and resentment toward a small, readily 
identifiable group that seems to be doing well while 
everyone else is going downhill."
Koreans as Rude
The Mew York Times often investigated the everyday 
tensions between Koreans and Blacks in poor neighborhoods 
while other newspapers and television news programs focused 
more on overt aspects of the conflict.
For example, a long article on May 17, 19S0 in the New 
York Times focused on the stories of Black shoppers at 
Church Avenue, Brooklyn about Korean shopkeepers. Main 
stories in the article included that Korean shopkeepers 
often accused innocent Black shoppers of stealing, cheated 
shoppers, changed prices without apparent reasons, sometimes 
did not mark the prices, and were very rude and arrogant. 
Another article in the New York Times (Dec. 21, 1988) also 
reported that "many blacks said they found the Koreans rude 
but felt they had no choice because most nearby fruit and
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vegetable stands were Korean-owned."
One short article in the Daily News (May 11, 1990) 
emphasized that "Brooklyn boycotts aren't anti-Korean." The 
writer quoted Lloyd Williams. "Koreans work well with the 
white media... To portray this as black against yellow is 
an absolute lie... The December 12th Movement should be 
applauded for keeping these issues in the forefront; 
somebody ought to do it. This is an issue of community 
control and an issue of community respect." According to 
the story in the article, the boycott is only aimed at 
specific Korean stores whose owners showed disrespect to 
Black shoppers.
However, in the New York Times as well as in other 
major news media, the main theme of the articles related to 
the conflict between Koreans and Blacks was the "extremism" 
of the boycotters. Thus, the articles about the problems of 
Korean shopkeepers were buried in the avalanche of anti­
boycott news reports and articles.
Boycotters as Reverse Racists
During the mayoral election of 1989 in New York City, 
the New York Post (Oct. 24, 1989) described Sonny Carson as 
"a Klansman in black face," when the controversy over Sonny 
Carson in connection to Dinkins' campaign for Mayor erupted. 
At the time, Sonny Carson professed to be anti-White. His 
fierce anti-White ideology and activities became a campaign
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controversy during the mayoral election campaign. At the 
time, major main stream news media described Carson very 
negatively and caused trouble for Dinkins' campaign.
However, Democratic Candidate Dinkins defeated Republican 
Candidate Giuliani.
Former Mayor Koch of New York City harshly criticized 
Mayor Dinkins during the Church Avenue boycott in 1990.
Koch complained that Mayor Dinkins did not condemn the 
racist tones of the boycotters, that some city officials had 
defended the demonstrators' free speech, and that the police 
did not enforce the injunction order to move the boycott 
fifty feet away from the target stores. Mr. Koch frequently 
expressed similar views, as a guest editor, in the New York 
Post and also appeared in several television news programs. 
The New York Times' article (July 30, 1990) accepted Mr. 
Koch's message as morally correct even though the article 
said Koch was not an ideal messenger.
The New York Times (May 8, 1990) described Sonny Carson 
as a racist provocateur in an editorial article. ,s[T]here is 
nothing ambiguous about the behavior of Robert (Sonny) 
Carson, the convicted kidnapper and racial provocateur who 
is leading the boycott.... The boycott... recalls 
inflammatory efforts by Mr. Carson and others against Korean 
merchants in Harlem, the Bedford-Stuyvesant section of 
Brooklyn and Jamaica, Queens. NIn the future,' Mr. Carson 
says crudely, 'there'll be funerals, not boycotts.' ...Race
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fires are alight." After the Church Avenue boycott started,
an editorial of the New York PostI Feb. 9, 1990) maintained,
"that [boycott] campaign is as ugly as anything we've seen
in New York economic life. Indeed, it is all too
reminiscent of the early stages of Nazi rabble-rousing
against Jewish shopkeepers- the constant group slanders...."
In an editorial article in Time (July 23, 1990),
Krauthammer accused Black radical activists of being
rejectionists.
For them mainstream American values are inherently 
oppressive and racist, to be rejected at root.... The 
rejectionists have nothing to offer the black community 
beyond the momentary satisfactions of articulated rage. 
To the whites they shake a fist at, they are a mere 
nuisance. But for blacks to whom they promise the 
world but offer nothing, they are a cruel deception.
In the same context, an article in the Wall Street
Journal (Oct. 16, 1988) was titled, "Black Neighborhoods'
Self-Defeating War Against Koreans." It said, "by driving
Asians out of business, neighborhood activists will wind up
making things harder for black consumers while doing nothing
to create jobs for black workers." Thus, the Black boycotts
were described not only as pursuing "the expulsion of all
Koreans" but also as being counter-productive for Black
welfare. Because of their "reverse racism," the boycotters
were "probed for criminal violations," as a title of a news
article indicated (Newsday, May 15, 1990). The article
reported that the FBI opened its investigation of the
boycott for possible violations of federal civil rights laws.
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Blacks are Divided
Many news articles described the boycotts as acts of 
racial hate by Black extremists. The White public, which is 
certainly influenced by the main stream news media, resented 
Black boycotts against Korean shopkeepers. Because of the 
anti-boycott views of the White new media and public, some 
Blacks who opposed the boycotts against Korean shopkeepers 
became celebrities in the White news media.
When the president of the Congress of Racial Equality 
brought 14 local women to sue the boycotters at Church 
Avenue in May 1990, their stories were carried by most White 
news media. Their stories recounted how the boycotters 
threatened the local shoppers with insults and abuse.
Claims that the Black boycotters often threatened and 
hassled Black shoppers were frequently carried in major news 
papers. The implication of such reports was that the 
boycotters maintained their success with threats rather than 
voluntary participation of local residents.
Thus, after Mr. McCray, a Black high school teacher, 
crossed the picket line with his students in May 1990, he 
was hailed as a hero and became an immediate celebrity in 
the main stream news media. He appeared in major television 
news programs and talk shows, and newspapers put his story 
on the front pages. He was described as a brave, 
courageous, decent citizen seeking racial harmony. Along 
with him, many others who condemned the boycotters were
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interviewed and featured in news articles.
Because of the pressure from main stream news media, 
politicians, White and Asian New Yorkers, Mayor Dinkins also 
crossed the picket line in September, 1990. His espousal of 
racial harmony, his condemnation of the Church Avenue 
boycott, and his crossing the picket line provided steady 
headlines for the mainstream news media. This development 
further eroded moral support for the boycotters among the 
Black population.
Efforts to Influence the Views of Main Stream News Media
Korean community leaders and the targeted shopkeepers 
tried hard to persuade the mainstream news media to describe 
Koreans as victims of radical Black nationalism. When the 
targeted store-owner in the 1990 Church Avenue boycott was 
asked whether he knew why his store became a target of the 
boycott in an interview with a television reporter, he 
answered "I don't know, I don't know, I want to know." Thus, 
he could present himself as an innocent victim. Other 
Koreans interviewed by main stream news media and letters 
sent by Koreans to the main stream news papers insisted that 
the causes of the conflict were Black jealousy, cultural 
misunderstanding, black shoplifting, or Black nationalism. 
One Korean leader emphasized that Koreans should be careful 
when they expressed their views to the mainstream news media 
and that the focus should be on the problems of the
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boycotters.
Black boycotters and their sympathizers also tried to 
reach the main stream news media. They continuously pointed 
out that the target of the boycotts were specific Korean 
stores whose owners abused or beat specific Black shoppers. 
They also pointed out that the Korean shopkeepers in general 
had been rude and did not contribute to local affairs, and 
that Blacks were victims of pervasive racism. However, they 
had a difficult time finding friendly ears in the main 
stream news media.
Responses to the Main Stream News Media
The focus on the 1990 Church Avenue boycott in the 
mainstream news media coincided with the time when Al 
Sharpton and other Blacks marched into Bensonhurst to 
condemn the racist killing of Yusef Hawkins by White youths 
and the reluctance of a hidden eyewitness to the killing to 
come forward. It also coincided with the extreme Black 
anxieties over the sentences that would be given to the 
White youths in New York City. Some Blacks complained that 
the sudden, overblown reports of the Black boycotts by the 
"White" news media intended to appease the moral anger of 
Blacks by showing that Blacks were not only racial victims 
but also racists. According to the complaints, the boycott 
was used to demoralize the legitimate anger of Blacks over 
the racist killing of a Black by the White youths.
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It will never be known whether the main stream news 
media really wanted to defuse the overblown racial tension, 
especially Black anger, by focusing on the Black boycott. 
However, coverage of the boycott in main stream news media, 
especially television, suddenly increased when the Black and 
White tension over the killing of Yusef Hawkins was at the 
highest in May 1990. This was possibly and partially a 
result of the sensationalization of the racial tension by 
the news media to draw more viewers and readers which would 
draw more advertising revenue. When other events such as 
Nelson Mendela's visit to New York City drew attentions from 
New Yorkers, the spotlight on to the boycott eventually 
faded from the mainstream news media.
Some Black activists thought that Koreans had a strong 
influence on the main stream news media, and thus they 
reported the conflict between Blacks and Koreans from the 
perspective of Korean shopkeepers. Others considered the 
main stream news media as dividing minorities to conquer 
them. For example, "once again, it's 'divide and conquer' - 
- with people of color pitted against each other. Many 
Koreans and other immigrants are programmed prior to coming 
to the U.S. to look with disdain on black and Hispanic 
customers" (News Day. July 2, 1989). Other Blacks accused 
the mainstream news media to try to divide Blacks.
Some Korean leaders also considered the mainstream news 
media as dividing minorities for a different reason. One
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Korean business leader said that the mainstream news media 
divided Blacks and Koreans by describing Koreans as a model 
minority and chiding Blacks failing to do same thing that 
Koreans did in this country. But most Korean leaders and 
news media focused on the contents of the mainstream news 
reports and carried Korean perceptions on the same events in 
their news media. When the mainstream news media focused on 
the negative aspects of the Black boycotts against Korean 
shopkeepers, Koreans in New York City were somewhat 
relieved. Koreans were very afraid of the possibility that 
Whites, mainstream news media, and the city government could 
make Koreans scapegoats in order to please the Black 
population.
Korean Efforts to Expand Their Moral Base 
Korean shopkeepers and leaders understood that they 
needed some allies and support from the Black population in 
order to overcome the discontents of the poor Black 
population after the 1982 and 1985 Harlem boycotts against 
Korean shopkeepers. They also tried to establish 
connections with Black politicians and local leaders. They 
also sought to participate more in local affairs in order to 
persuade poor Blacks that Koreans were also concerned about 
the problems of Black communities. Here I will focus on the 
Korean shopkeepers' effort to expand positive relationships 
with poor Blacks. The efforts to establish connections with
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Black leaders will be dealt in another section in this 
chapter.
After the boycotts of 1984, 1988 in Harlem and of 1988, 
1990 in Brooklyn, Korean leaders intensified their efforts 
to participate in local cultural activities with Korean 
dances or martial art groups. Through cultural exchanges 
and participation in local affairs, the Korean leaders tried 
to appease Blacks and also, in some cases, to persuade Black 
people to consider the cultural differences to be the cause 
of the conflict between the Korean shopkeepers and poor 
Blacks.
Harlem Week
Since 1988, the Korean Merchant Association in Harlem 
has participated in the annual Harlem Week Festival which 
draws several thousand spectators from all over New York 
City. The Harlem Week is the biggest annual festival in 
Harlem and most participants of the festival are Black.
Lloyd Williams, one of the organizers of Harlem Week, 
invited the Korean Merchant Association in Harlem to join 
the festival. For the International Carnival program of the 
festival, the Korean shopkeepers in Harlem paid their own 
money to bring a traditional Korean dance troupe which 
performed various traditional Korean dances.25
25 These traditional Korean dances are not performed any 
more in everyday life in Korea. Thus, the dances are called 
"classic dances" in Korea. While they are performed as
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In the 1989 Harlem Week, the Korean shopkeepers joined 
the festival again with the traditional Korean dance troupe. 
At the time, a boycott was continued two blocks away from 
the place where the International Carnival program was held. 
The Korean dance performances assumed new meanings after the 
boycott did start. In 1989, Korean shopkeepers worried 
about the possibility that the Black spectators might boo 
the performance because of the boycott against a Korean 
shopkeeper. When the spectators did not boo, one Korean 
shopkeeper said that she was very relieved. She recognized 
the possibility that the Korean dance performance symbolized 
not only Korean culture but also Korean shopkeepers.
This is one of the reasons why Korean shopkeepers 
brought a very colorful and exotic Korean dance troupe to 
Black neighborhoods. Through the performance of very exotic 
dances, the Korean shopkeepers could give the impression to 
Black spectators that Korean culture is very different from 
American culture. This implies that if Korean shopkeepers 
behave differently from Americans, that might be the result 
of the unique Korean culture. On another dimension, the
symbol of the tradition in Korea, they are performed as 
symbol of the uniqueness of Korean culture in America. 
Because of its colorfulness and exotic flavor, those dances 
were adopted for the symbol of Korea in America even though 
most Koreans in Korea do not perform the dances. Nowadays, 
most Koreans except the elderly population enjoy Western 
style dances. In short, Korean dances are 'Korean' dances 
only for foreigners while those dances are 'classic' dances 
for Koreans. That is, the 'Korean' dances are reproduced in 
a different context with different meanings.
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presence of colorful Korean culture in the Black festival 
may lend legitimacy to the presence of Korean shopkeepers in 
Black areas. The president of the Korean Merchant 
Association in Harlem explained that the reason why they 
participated in the festival was to enhance the friendship 
between Koreans and Blacks. Thus, the performances of 
Korean dances are culturally mediating the social 
relationship between the two groups.
The Korean shopkeepers also participated in other 
programs during Harlem Week. They donated 500 dollars to 
fund programs for the elderly. They also donated money to 
the president of the Uptown Chamber of Commerce for the cost 
of the festival.
Other Black Festivals and Parties
Koreans participated in the Brooklyn festival held in 
Prospect Park in June 1990. Two Korean dance troupes 
performed for spectators of different races. The motto of 
the festival was racial harmony and the banner behind a 
Korean food table proclaimed "We Are One." Koreans provided 
free food and the Korean Produce Association donated fruits 
and snacks for the festival. Howard Golden, Brooklyn 
Borough President, attended the festival and spoke about 
racial harmony.
A Korean-African-Caribbean festival was also held in 
September 1991 in northern Brooklyn. An NAACP chapter
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director, presidents of Korean shopkeeper associations in 
Brooklyn, and the president of the New York Korean 
Association also attended. Koreans provided food. A Korean 
dance troupe performed Korean dances and a Tae Kwon Do group 
demonstrated Korean martial art.
The Korean Produce Association held a cultural event in 
April 1990 near Church Avenue where Blacks were boycotting 
Korean shopkeepers. The event included programs which 
explained Korean culture, Black culture, the civil rights 
movements, Koreans' view on Blacks, and so on. The 
intention of the event was to increase cultural 
understanding of each other. The organizer expected that 
through cultural understanding, the two groups could 
decrease the misunderstanding and conflict between Blacks 
and Koreans.
In order to establish friendly relations with some 
Black leaders, about thirty Korean leaders in New York City 
participated in an annual party given by a small Black 
newspaper, the New York Voice, which had been relatively 
friendly to Korean shopkeepers in 1988. The newspaper 
remained relatively a friendly to Korean shopkeepers during 
the Black boycott on Church Avenue in 1990.
Donations to Black People
Fourteen Korean church members distributed about one 
thousand and five hundred blankets to homeless people,
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mostly black, in Manhattan. They distributed them through 
the nights of December 22nd, 24th, and 25th in 1990. The 
blankets were called "Blanket of Love." This name certainly 
indicates that Korean people "love" Black homeless. It was 
reported that Black homeless repeated "Nice Korean" or 
"Thank you." This event was organized by the Korean Afro- 
American Friendship Group (its president was the first 
president of the Korean Merchant Association in Harlem) and 
the Pastors' Association for Peace (Korea Times of New York. 
Dec. 27, 1990).
The Amsterdam News carried two photos on August 27, 
1990, which showed that the Korean Merchant Association in 
Harlem sponsored an end-of-program party for the kids of 
Phipps Day Care Center of the 28th Police Precinct. The 
Korean Merchant Association also donated to other activities 
of the police precinct, such as the police athletic league. 
The Korean Merchant Association donated food for the annual 
party for the elders in Harlem. They also donated to 
various other groups and events. For example, one fish 
market owner was asked to donate for a cultural program of 
the National Alliance Party. Even though he did not know 
about the party and the cultural program, he donated 75 
dollars without question.
The Korean Drycleaners' Association in New York 
collected and donated about ten thousand articles of 
clothing every year to New York City government which
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
245
distributed them to poor residents. The Korean Produce 
Association donated thirteen thousand pounds of fruits and 
vegetables to the homeless in 1990. The Korean Produce 
Association also donated enough food to feed 400 homeless 
persons to the Council of Brooklyn Churches for Thanksgiving 
Day in 1990. At the ceremony, the president of the Produce 
Association said that the food was sending the love of 
Koreans to their neighbors in Brooklyn. Brooklyn Borough 
President Howard Golden said that charitable efforts of the 
Korean Association could break down walls between ethnic 
groups and promote harmony (Korea Times of New York. Nov.
26, 1990).
Black History Month Celebration
The Korean Produce Association of New York and the 
Uptown Chamber of Commerce organized an evening of culture 
exchange in February, 1990 at the Schomburg Center for 
Research in Black Culture. This was also sponsored by the 
New York Daily News. The theme was "hands across the 
water." Korean shopkeepers in Harlem, members of the Korean 
Produce Association, Black members of the Uptown Chamber of 
Commerce, and a few Black politicians participated in the 
cultural exchange. The number of the participants was 
around seventy. The expense was paid by the Korean Produce 
Association. There were various performances of traditional 
Korean dances by a Korean dance troupe and a jazz
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performance by a Black jazz trio. David Paterson, a New
York State Senator, Sung Hwan Kim, a former president of the
Korean Produce Association, Won Duk Kim, a former president
of the Korean Merchant Association of Harlem, and Gerobin
Gilbert, a Vice President of Program Development in WNBC-TV,
received awards from both organizations.
The president of the Korean Produce Association
announced scholarships for two Black students chosen by the
Uptown Chamber of Commerce. He said,
The event, this evening, during Black History Month,
NAn Evening of Cultural Exchange' is a further 
demonstration of the various ethnic groups in our 
community working together to share our cultural 
differences, and learn from one another. We are 
pleased tonight to honor several persons in the Black 
and Korean communities who have demonstrated their 
commitment to ethnic groups working together to achieve 
positive goals.
At the end of the celebration, Lloyd Williams, president of 
the Uptown Chamber of Commerce said that even if he tried 
hard to work for the unity of Blacks, there would still be 
those who said bad things against him. He emphasized, "We, 
Blacks, have to unite." He implied that Blacks had to unite 
in order to deal with Whites and Koreans effectively.
In fact, the meeting was a celebration for Lloyd 
Williams. The meeting gave an opportunity to Lloyd Williams 
to show his influence to Koreans and to Blacks. Koreans 
seemed to beg help from Lloyd Williams by offering him to 
choose the scholarship recipients. Lloyd Williams invited 
Black dignitaries to the program to demonstrate his
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
247
influence in the Black community to Korean shopkeepers. He 
organized the cultural exchange program at the expense of 
the Korean Produce Association. Koreans used this cultural 
exchange program during the Black History Month Celebration 
as an excuse to meet with Black leaders.
Code of Ethics for Korean Shopkeepers
In order to avoid further deterioration of the 
relationship between Korean shopkeepers and Black residents, 
Korean business leaders, especially the Korean American 
Business Center organized hearings to draft an ethical code 
for Korean shopkeepers in New York City. At one hearing in 
a Korean church in Queens, a panelist suggested that Korean 
shopkeepers should understand the three hundred year history 
of Blacks in America and establish an impartial and 
cooperative relationship with other ethnic groups. However, 
this effort to make a code of ethic failed, because there 
was no enthusiasm among ordinary Korean shopkeepers.
Local Korean newspapers also campaigned for a better 
relationship with Blacks. One Korean newspaper devised a 
code of ten rules for Korean shopkeepers (Korean Times of 
New York. Sept. 28, 1991). The rules include "1) do not use 
the term, aumdunqvi [nigger], 2)do not shout and do not 
point your finger to shoppers, 3)do not behave like a rich 
person, 4)participate actively in local affairs, 5)do not 
chase shoplifters out of the store, 6)restrain the use of a
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gun, 7)study English and Spanish, 8)do not answer with no,
9)always think that Black is beautiful, and 10)do not think 
that Blacks are naive."
Other Efforts
The Korean shopkeepers of the Korean Merchant 
Association in Harlem advertised their association in the 
Amsterdam Hews. The contents included "The Korean Merchants 
Association of 125th Street extend their[Koreans'] best 
wishes to our[The Amsterdam News'] numerous friends and 
customers for a happy Thanksgiving and look forward to your 
continued support in the future (Nov. 19, 1983)" or "we 
[Korean shopkeepers in Harlem] too are a part of the Harlem 
Community and join in the celebration of Black History Month 
(Feb. 11, 1984; Feb. 16, 1985)." Kim Won Duck, president of 
the Korean Merchant Association at the time, explained that 
if he had advertised more in the newspaper, the newspaper 
would have written friendlier articles about Korean 
shopkeepers. He believed that if Korean shopkeepers want to 
construct a good relationship in Black communities, "we 
[Koreans] have to make Black newspapers report even when we 
contribute a very small thing to Black communities."
However, the advertisements of the Korean Merchant 
Association in the Amsterdam News did not continue.
The Korean shopkeepers, on several occasion, in Harlem 
also attended a Black church, one of whose pastors was
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Korean. When they attended they presented small donations 
to the church. They also joined in the celebration of one 
hundred years of the Central Hospital of Harlem in 1988.
The president of the Korean Merchant Association said, "even 
though we don't use the hospital, the party is a good 
opportunity to communicate with Black community" (Sae_Gae 
Ilbo, Apr. 20, 1988). Reverend Jesse Jackson and 
Representative William Gray also attended.
Many Korean shopkeepers in Harlem tried to appease 
Black shoppers by displaying their photos with Black 
dignitaries such as Jesse Jackson and David Dinkins or 
photos of Martin Luther King, Jr. or other Blacks. One 
store was decorated with photographs which showed that the 
owner participated in many local affairs and donated several 
things to local organizations and parties. In another 
store, the Korean owner was photographed with Jesse Jackson 
and David Dinkins. Other stores also have drawings of Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr. or Black mothers and children. 
However, no Korean stores displayed photographs or drawings 
of Malcolm X. On the street, however, posters and tapes of 
Malcolm X and his autobiography were sold by several Black 
vendors.
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Local Police, the Courts, and Law 
Police and District Attorneys
Local police are supposed to maintain social order in 
everyday life. However, their abilities are limited. They 
have to follow laws and codes and are influenced by local 
politics. For Korean shopkeepers, the police are a major 
ally even though Korean shopkeepers hesitate to report petty 
crimes to the police because of various nuisances.26 
However, local policemen are the only people who physically 
protect Korean shopkeepers from criminal or angered Blacks. 
In Harlem, community policemen continuously patrolled on 
foot and by car on 125th Street. The policemen sometimes 
visited stores and asked the store owners if there were any 
problems.
Local policemen are also supposed to protect local 
residents. However, their protection is limited to criminal 
matters. In civil matters, policemen cannot intervene. 
During my work in a Korean store, two black customers came 
in a store and asked the Korean store-*owner for a refund.
The Korean store owner refused. The two women finally
26 Most Korean shopkeepers did not want to close their store 
for the appearance to the court or the police as eyewitness 
(it will take several hours or one day. It means he/she 
cannot make money for the time). They were also afraid of 
retaliation from those who commit crime. They also thought, 
once commodities were stolen or mischief happened, there is 
no way to recover in the case of petty crimes. Even when 
they reported, they complained, the police did not concern 
about petty crimes and policemen were not kind to Koreans 
either because of racism or because of language barriers of 
Korean shopkeepers.
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summoned two policemen and complained that the Korean 
shopkeeper refused to give them a refund. One policeman 
told her, "I can't do anything for you. You can bring this 
matter to a small claims court." She and her friend left in 
a rage. Although the two women sensed the moral injustice 
in the store owner's refusal to refunding, the policemen 
considered it a civil matter.
Whenever there were Black boycotts' against Korean 
shopkeepers, local police were deployed. In the 1988-89 
Harlem boycott, two or three policemen were always standing 
near the store and a police car was always parked near the
i
store. They came from a nearby police precinct, two blocks 
away from the store. During the 1990 Church Avenue boycott, 
about a dozen officers from the Brooklyn South Task Force 
patrolled outside the stores; about six hundred police 
officers were mobilized during the peak of boycott. Dozens 
of police cars filled the street. Police officers stood 
guard atop nearby roofs. In the 1988 Harlem boycott, about 
50 police officers patrolled the vicinity of the boycotted 
store.
The police presence minimized physical confrontation 
between the boycotted store owners and the boycotters. When 
physical contact between them occurred, the police officers 
intervened and often arrested perpetrators if there was any 
damage to body or property. Thus, the boycotters were 
limited to a certain area and could only shout slogans.
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When boycotters shouted outside of a designated area or 
resisted the police, they were arrested on charges of 
criminal contempt, disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, or 
other misdemeanors.
The police protected the rights of both sides: the 
right of free speech for the boycotters and the right to do 
business in any place for the Korean shopkeepers. They also 
protected shoppers who wanted to shop at the boycotted 
store. In June 1990, when the president of the Congress of 
Racial Equality led about twenty shoppers to the two stores, 
police officers escorted them as the protesters, who 
numbered about fifty, were shouting.
Thus, the dominant confrontation form in everyday 
boycotts was limited to shouting matches or the enchanting 
of slogans such as "boycott, boycott." Sometimes, the 
boycotters insulted the shoppers who tried to use the 
boycotted stores. The boycotters also begged, persuaded, or 
threatened the customers to dissuade them from using the 
stores. Often the boycotters, the shoppers, and the 
targeted shopkeepers exchanged foul languages and ridiculed 
each other. Some boycotters called the shoppers "house 
nigger," or "Uncle Tom"; the Black boycotters complained 
that the Korean shopkeepers called them "niggers" and told 
them "go back to Africa." The Korean shopkeepers complained 
that the boycotters called them "yellow monkeys," 
"bloodsuckers", and that some boycotters made lewd gestures,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
253
and shouted, 'G.I., two dollars.'27
The police tried to mediate the conflict through 
informal meetings and connections. On many occasions, the 
police advised targeted Korean store owners to close their 
stores for several days to cool down the angry mood of 
boycotters, or they invited both sides to compromise. 
Brooklyn District Attorney Charles Hynes once conferred with 
lawyers of both parties in the Church Avenue boycott. That 
meeting focused on efforts to resolve two criminal 
complaints as a step toward ending the boycott of two Korean 
stores. The first complaint involved the Haitian woman's 
assertion that she had been assaulted in the Red Apple 
grocery store on Church Avenue. The second complaint 
involved the wife of the owner of a boycotted store who 
asserted that a demonstrator punched her on February 1, 1990 
( Mew York. Times. May 17, 1990). Both had filed criminal 
and civil complaints to seek several millions of dollars in 
compensation for damages.
The police also tried to find out who had organized the 
boycotts and to investigate the involved organizations.
Some members of the December 12th Movement were allegedly be
27 The wife of a boycotted store owner explained that the 
"two dollars, G.I." implies that Korean women sold their 
body cheap to American soldiers during the Korean War. That 
meant, said she, that she is a product of the cheap sexual 
intercourse, or that she would sell her body cheap to the 
boycotters.
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shadowed by detectives.28 Even though the police denied 
it, the Village Voice reported that one member of the 
December 12th Movement was shadowed by two detectives. The 
police also possibly have the files for Black nationalists 
(Hornung 1990b).
When the boycotts against Koreans continued in Brooklyn 
and Harlem, federal investigators stepped in. In the 1990 
Church Avenue boycott, the Department of Justice inspected 
the possibility of racial discrimination by the boycotters 
in March 1990. U.S. Attorney General, Dick Thornburgh, 
instructed Brooklyn U.S. Attorney, Andrew Maloney, to 
investigate the boycott for the violation of federal civil 
rights law. Andrew Maloney directed the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation to investigate the boycott.29 The F.B.I. in 
Manhattan opened a preliminary inquiry into possible civil 
rights violations in the boycott in May, 1990 (Newsday. May 
15, 1990), They conducted a similar investigation in the 
1984, 1988-89 Harlem boycotts. In the case of the 1988 
Brooklyn boycott, the F.B.I. was said to have investigated a
28 The December 12th Movement organized many protests 
against the police brutality over Blacks in New York area. 
In Harlem, the Movement once organized a protest against an 
alleged police beating of two Black youths in front of the 
precinct which deployed police officers in front of the 
boycotted Korean store. Members of the Movement considered 
the police as an occupied force of Black neighborhoods.
29 According to Attorney Maloney, the federal civil rights 
law applies to any two or more people who conspire to 
deprive someone of any federally protected right, such as 
conducting business in inter-state commerce.
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possible extortion charge against Sonny Carson. However, 
federal prosecutors have not yet charged anyone in relation 
to the Black boycotts against Korean shopkeepers.
The views of district and federal law enforcement 
concerning the December 12th Movement were well expressed by 
federal attorney Giuliani in the early 1980s. "Throughout 
Giuliani's early years as New York's top federal prosecutor 
he painted Chimurenga30 as Public Enemy No.1"(Hornung 
1990b:27). Top city officials and federal prosecutors 
characterized the Church Avenue boycott as an illegal act 
masterminded by the December 12th Movement. The F.B.I. and 
police reports described the group as "a para-military-style 
group that poses a serious threat to public safety" 
(ibid.:28). One police officer considered the 1990 Church 
Avenue boycott to be a mountain made from a mole-hill. He 
thought there were no beatings at all from the beginning, 
and that the boycott organizers used the incident as an 
excuse to mount their nationalist political campaign. The 
December 12th Movement, whose members included boycott 
leaders such as Sonny Carson and Father Lucas, may be under 
surveillance by the New York City Police Department and the 
F.B.I. (ibid.)'.31
30 Chimurenga is an ideological leader of the December 12th 
Movement.
31 In fact, FBI and NYPD had various surveillance units and 
files in the past. The present existence of those units 
were denied by them. The wording of what follows is from 
Churchill and Wall (1988) where no other reference is cited.
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The members of the December 12th Movement responded by 
impugning the motives of law enforcement officials. Sonny 
Carson accused the F.B.I. of intervening in a peaceful 
boycott. "The police will always use something to portray us 
as violent criminals or terrorists," said Chimurenga. He 
continued,
They will move to stifle dissent and shut down our 
voices, tell us we don't have rights. But the boycott 
will continue.... The police know that. They know
that we don't commit crimes, that we present a point of 
view that threatens them and their power.... Our 
message is rooted in the neglect and anger experienced
COINTELPROs: FBI domestic Counterintelligence Programs 
designed to destroy individuals and organizations the FBI 
considers to be politically objectionable. Tactics included 
all manner of official lying and media disinformation, 
systematically levying false charges against those targeted, 
manufacturing evidence to obtain their convictions, 
withholding evidence which might exonerate them, and 
occasionally assassinating "key leaders." The FBI says 
COINTELPRO ended in 1971; all reasonable interpretations of 
FBI performance indicate it continues today, albeit under 
other code-names.
JTTF: The Joint Terrorist Task Force, created in the late 
1970s as an interlock between the FBI and New York city red 
squad to engage in COINTELPRO-type activities.
Key Agitator Index: The list of FBI files devoted to 
individuals considered so politically objectionable by the 
Bureau that they must be "neutralized" for "internal 
security."
Racial Matters Sections: The COINTELPRO components of FBI 
Field Offices aimed at black political organizations.
Security Index: The listing of all FBI files devoted to 
individuals considered politically objectionable by the 
Bureau.
Black Desk:a section of the NYPD to gather information 
about "radical" Black activists. The existence was revealed 
in 1988.
Unusual Occurrence Addendum files: secret files on crimes 
and crime victims used by Brooklyn and Manhattan Borough 
Command offices (Amsterdam News. June 9, 1990). They are 
not official files. The existence of the files was revealed 
by Newsdav in May, 1990.
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by black people. They want to make us look like 
crazies for expressing that anger. They say we're 
criminals because we want what's rightfully ours, not 
the promises of puppet politicians.... We want the 
political and economic power to run our communities and 
run our live. We won't be intimidated. (Hornung 
1990b:35)
Court and Law
The court does not help Blacks with everyday 
humiliation because it is difficult to build up enough 
evidence of discrimination from everyday humiliation and 
harassment to produce a guild verdict. The constitution 
guarantees the right of free speech for all Americans. When 
the boycotted store owner in Harlem brought the boycott 
matter to a court in order to stop it, a judge decided that 
boycotters have the right to express their ideas. The judge 
also said that the boycotters could not bother the store 
owner and individual shoppers. Thus, the boycotters have 
the legal rights to boycott and the store owners have the 
legal right to do business.
In the 1990 Church Avenue boycott, the owner of the 
targeted store sought an injunction from the court in order 
to stop the boycott. New York State Supreme Court Judge 
Held gave the store owner a restraining order which did not 
stop the boycott but kept the boycotters fifty feet away 
from the store in May 1990. The judge also directed police 
to enforce the order. When the judge chided the boycotters 
for refusing to negotiate and awarded an restraining order
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to the Korean shopkeeper, Sonny Carson, who sat in the 
courtroom, shouted to the judge, "why don't you have those 
men [the involved Koreans] arrested?" When the judge 
ordered him removed from the chamber, he again shouted to 
the judge, "you're a racist." Outside of the court, one 
Black, not related to the boycotters, burned an American 
flag.
However, the police did not enforce the restraining 
order because, according to the police, the police are not 
obliged to follow civil court decisions like the restraining 
order. The boycotters affirmed that they would continue 
their boycott no matter what happened to them. Thus, the 
intensity of the boycott was not influenced by the court 
decision. The Korean shopkeepers sued the New York City 
police department because the police did not enforce the 
restraining order in June 1990. Judge Held of the State 
Supreme Court ordered the New York Police Department to 
enforce the restraining order he had imposed in a civil suit 
by the store owners.
In appealing, the city argued that the police were not 
obligated to enforce court orders in civil cases between 
private parties. But the Appellate Division of the New York 
State Court affirmed, in September 1990, Judge Held's order 
on the reason that the executive branch is obliged to 
enforce a court order by the constitution. Top city 
officials (possibly Mayor Dinkins) decided not to appeal any
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more and to execute the restraining order. At the time, 
Mayor Dinkins was about to cross the picket line himself and 
decided to take the side of the boycotted Korean shopkeepers 
under pressure from the mainstream nev/s media, the White 
majority, and the Korean shopkeepers. From September of 
1990, the boycotters who shouted "boycott" or distributed 
fliers within fifty feet distance of the targeted stores 
were arrested by police officers on misdemeanor charges such 
as criminal contempt or disorderly conduct.
During the Church Avenue boycott of 1990, an increasing 
number of Blacks insisted that they fell down in Korean 
stores and brought the incidents to the court. However, 
these suits did not achieve their goals because no judge 
ordered any Korean shopkeeper to compensate for damages.
The Korean who was accused of beating a Haitian woman in the 
Church Avenue boycott was also acquitted in January, 1991.
In a response to the Judge's holding on the restraining 
order, one demonstrator shouted through a bullhorn on the 
following day, "they tell us we can't protest, what they 
fail to understand is they can't tell us what we can do and 
can't do... We'll be here everyday..." After the Appellate 
Court upheld the order to the police to enforce the 
restraining order, one Black man said, "this court decision 
is no different than the court decision that said we are 
three-fifths of a person, or the decision that said we are 
separate but not equal" (Daily News. Sept. 19, 1990).
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Father Lucas also commented, "Blacks can't get justice from 
this system.... And we don't want the court decision to 
encourage the Koreans to think they can go back to doing the 
same thing. So the boycott has to continue, until the store 
closed down"(Kwong, 1991).
In 1991, the New York State legislature passed a law 
supported by Governor Cuomo and Mayor Dinkins which 
prescribed heavier sentences for collective hate crimes. 
Thus, the politicians created another law in order to 
control collective hate crimes. Certainly the law was 
phrased in general terms and intended to regulate any 
violent racist crimes; the bill could be used to regulate 
not only White "racist" attacks on Blacks but also Black 
"racist" attack on other groups. The problem lies with the 
definition of "racist." In general, law, law enforcement 
institutions, and the court limited the actions each party 
could take. However, the shopkeepers' private rights of 
property and their rights to do business were protected 
while the demonstration of the boycotters was regulated.
Koreans' Efforts for Connection with the Police
The police are important power in relation to 
shoplifting and robbery, because they protect shopkeepers 
from any physical violence or property damage and limit the 
range of expression of anger from the discontented shoppers. 
Therefore* Korean shopkeepers tried very hard to make the
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police their friends. Because the police also needed 
friends in local areas, the police, especially the section 
for community affairs, also tried to reach out to Korean 
shopkeepers. Because the police are obliged to protect 
various rights of individuals which include private rights 
of property and freedom to pursue legitimate business,
Korean shopkeepers considered their close relationships with 
the police beneficial to their business activities.
The Korean Merchant Association in Harlem donated money 
and T-shirts to the Police Athletic League (PAL) where the 
police organized athletic events for young Blacks in the 
area. According to a Korean shopkeeper., some young Blacks 
who joined the PAL told the Korean shopkeepers that they 
would protect Korean stores and teach a lesson to the 
boycotters. The Korean Merchant Association in Harlem also 
donated to the small community services' of the nearby police 
precinct.
The New York City police has a Community Patrol Officer 
Program. Police officers of the Harlem precincts patrolled 
on 125th Street and visited stores. They often entered 
stores and asked about problems. These visits decreased the 
anxiety of Korean shopkeepers in "alien" areas with 
relatively high crime rates. During th,e 1988-89 Harlem 
boycott, the president of the Korean Merchant Association in 
Harlem often met police officers from a nearby precinct to 
discuss the boycott and get advice from them.
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However, there seems to be no special working 
relationship between the Korean shopkeepers and the police 
officers of the nearby precinct. They maintained their 
relationship as ordinary police officers and ordinary 
businessmen. The police protection given to the Korean 
shopkeepers during the boycott was a necessary police 
activity to protect legal social transactions. Because the 
police are more oppressive to the groups which try to break 
laws or to disrupt social order, the police officers were 
hostile to the boycotters. Police activities focused on 
regulating the activities of the boycotters during the 
boycott.
Local Korean news papers encouraged Korean shopkeepers 
to join advisory committees of local police precincts. In 
order to get advice from local community leaders, police 
precincts organized advisory committees consisting of 
various community and ethnic leaders. This provides the 
police with access to the local and ethnic communities and 
to solve problems and tensions through the advisory members. 
In the case of Flushing, Queens and Jamaica, Queens, Korean 
shopkeepers joined the advisory committees of respective 
police precincts.
At the city level, the relationship with high ranking 
officers of the police department was more important because 
police responses to irregular incidents such as black 
boycotts against Korean shopkeepers depends on the decisions
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of high ranking police officers. The relationship with high 
ranking police officers is also important because they 
decide which complaints they will investigate.
There are several Korean members in the advisory 
council for the New York Police Department. The executive 
director of the Asian American Advisory Council of NYPD is a 
Korean.32 He also participated in 1982 efforts to solve 
the conflict between Korean shopkeepers and Blacks in 
Harlem. He helped to organize the Asian-Black Association 
and suggested to Korean shopkeepers that the employment of 
blacks, the use of black banks, and the donation to black 
organizations might help solve the conflict. Under his 
leadership, the Korean Advisory Council was created in the 
NYPD. The Korean advisory council members, according to 
themselves, tried to achieve some objects: the
establishment of hot lines in police stations for Koreans; 
scholarships for model students; and friendship with local 
police officers(Cho Sun Ilbo, June 9, 1989). They wanted to 
create an active connection between the Korean community and 
the police department. The president of the Korean Merchant 
Association in Harlem was also a member of the standing 
committee of the Korean advisory council of the NYPD in
32 He was also selected as a person of the year by the 
Congress in 1990. He worked as a chairman for the Asian 
Coalition for Bush in the East in 1988. He is also a vice 
chairman for the Asian American National Republican Assembly 
(Korea Times of New York. Mar. 15, 1991). Thus, he has a 
considerable influence in political arena, more than any 
other Korean in New York City.
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1990.
The Asian-American council of the NYPD organized a 
meeting between city police leaders and Korean leaders in 
July 1990 at the peak of the Church Avenue boycott. The 
president of the Korean Merchant Association in Harlem, the 
commissioner, and vice commissioners of the NYPD attended 
the meeting. Deputy Commissioner Holliday, who was in 
charge of community affairs at the NYPD, actively 
participated in many meetings with Korean leaders; she 
received several awards from various Korean organizations. 
She organized meetings between city police officers, local 
police officers and Korean leaders and related Korean issues 
and problems to the NYPD. In one meeting, she promised to 
continue supporting Korean community activities.
Local and Federal Governments and Politicians 
In the 1984 Harlem boycott, then City Clerk David 
Dinkins tried to mediate the conflict. The presidents of 
the Korean Association of New York, the Korean Produce 
Association, and the Korean Merchant Association in Harlem 
attended a meeting with David Dinkins and City Comptroller 
Golden in November 26, 1984. The president of the Uptown 
Chamber of Commerce also attended a later meeting. Dinkins 
suggested that the boycott was not helpful to the 
revitalization of Harlem. However, the boycott continued 
through 1985 and attracted wide attention from the news
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media and politicians.
When the boycott continued, demands included the 
selling of the boycotted stores to Blacks and support of the 
"Buy Black" campaign. Some politicians, especially White 
politicians, were very critical of the boycotts. State 
Senator Franz Leichter33 (D, Manhattan) asserted in a news 
conference that pickets at Korean green grocers in Harlem 
were pointing "an economic dagger at the hearts" of the 
Korean shopkeepers. He stated, "we34 firmly believe that 
shopkeepers are entitled to locate anywhere in the city 
without regard to race, religion, country of origin or sex. 
We deplore the picketing of shopkeepers if the aim is to 
prevent them from carrying on a lawful business. We believe 
that the picketing of certain Korean greengrocers on 125th 
St. is not a proper way to deal with the various problems 
that have arisen" (Daily Mews. Jan. 31, 1985).
Leichter called for the involvement of the Institute 
for Mediation and Conflict Resolution in the dispute, even 
though the representatives from that group were already 
holding talks with Harlem politicians and civic leaders. 
Because the Korean Merchants Association in Harlem had 
already agreed to sit down with the boycotters while the
33 State Senator Leichter was mentioned as a possible 
candidate for City Comptroller at the time. The protests on 
125th Street was conducted outside the boundaries of his 
district.
34 He represented several politicians in the news conference.
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boycotters refused, the blame was put heavily on the 
boycotters by politicians. For a White politician who 
aspired to a city-wide political position, this was a good 
opportunity to get attention from news media and also from 
the White voters who resented Black nationalism.
During a 1988 Brooklyn boycott, then Mayor Koch invited 
Korean leaders including the president of the Korean 
Merchant Association in Harlem to a meeting with city 
officials. The Human Rights Commissioner, and Police 
Commissioner and other related officials also participated. 
They agreed that the boycotters exaggerated the altercation 
between a Korean shopkeeper and two black women and that the 
boycotters might be acting illegally.
Black Assemblyman Albert Vann, whose district 
encompassed the area, was negotiating with Korean leaders 
during the boycott. Sonny Carson, who led the boycott in 
1988, departed from the Black negotiating team because of a 
difference in opinion. Even though Albert Vann accused 
Koreans of being hostile and discriminatory, he wanted to 
negotiate. Assemblyman Albert Vann met Sung Soo Kim, who 
represented the Korean merchants of the area, and both 
declared the conflict a local incident. Albert Vann agreed 
with the boycotters that the Koreans should change their 
attitudes. He once agreed that the boycott leaders tried to 
enhance the Black political power by changing the passive 
attitudes of Blacks through the boycott fSae Gae Ilbo.
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Sept. 30, 1988). After several meetings, Albert Vann and 
Black business and religious leaders reached an agreement 
with Korean business leaders. After the agreement, the 
boycott dissipated.
Black politicians usually agreed that Korean 
shopkeepers mistreat and are rude to Black customers. 
However, White politicians thought that the problems should 
be peacefully resolved through mediation or court action? 
they believed the protests to be unnecessary. The lawyer 
for the targeted Korean shopkeeper was a White assemblyman 
who volunteered his help and opposed the boycott. He said 
that he would bring the matter to court if the boycotters 
insisted on boycotting Korean shopkeepers rather than a 
single individual because that kind of boycott clearly 
violated civil rights law.
In the 1988-89 Harlem boycott, then Manhattan Borough 
President David Dinkins invited Korean representatives to 
his office. The president of the Korean Merchant 
Association, a boycotted fish market owner, and the 
presidents of various Korean organizations participated in 
the meeting. They discussed the possibilities of peaceful 
resolution. City Hall also organized a meeting that a 
targeted store owner and other local shopkeepers attended 
along with city-wide Korean leaders. The city officials 
said that they warned the boycott organizers that if the 
boycotters violated the law, the authorities would react
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forcefully to enforce the law.
Mayor Koch, on November 1st, 1988, announced his 
position on the boycotts against Koreans in Harlem and 
Brooklyn. He thought that the boycotters boycotted all 
Korean stores and that those activities were illegal and 
violated the human rights of Koreans. He said that the 
boycott in Brooklyn clearly violated the law. The Human 
Rights Commissioner of the city government declared that he 
would bring the boycotters to court. Benjamin Ward, Police 
Commissioner, said that it is illegal to obstruct the 
business activities of Koreans. The Police Commissioner 
also said that he would enforce regulation of the police 
line very strictly to protect customers (Chung Anq Ilbo.
Nov. 3, 1988, and Sae Gae ilbo. Nov. 2, 1988).
However, the boycott in Harlem continued until the 
mayoral election in 1989. During that period, as a mayoral 
candidate and Manhattan Borough President, David Dinkins 
tried to mediate the boycott. Although the boycotters 
rejected any mediation, they disappeared about two weeks 
before the mayoral election. Mayor Dinkins said later that 
he had influenced the boycotters to stop the boycott.
Another Black boycott against Korean shopkeepers on 
Church Avenue, Brooklyn in 1990 presented a difficult 
challenge to the newly-elected Mayor David Dinkins. 
Councilwoman Susan Alter(D-Brooklyn) first attempted to 
bring the boycotters and Korean shopkeepers together;
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Brooklyn Borough President Howard Golden brought 
representatives of both sides together. However, both 
mediation efforts fell through. Deputy Mayor Bill Lynch, 
the Mayor's Community Assistance Unit, and the City's Human 
Rights Commission worked to bring about a resolution. In 
April, Dinkins set up a fact-finding committee to 
investigate the boycott, and in the weeks after the incident 
letters were sent to Dinkins by Korean leaders, attorney 
Colins Moore, Alvin Berk, the Chairman of Community Board 
14, and board member Ollie McClean asking the Mayor to help 
resolve the problem (Newsday, May 15, 1990).
However, Mayor Dinkins and city officials tried to 
mediate the conflict from a neutral position at the 
beginning. This position reflected Mayor Dinkins' narrow 
victory over Republican candidate Giuliani in the 1989 
mayoral election. His narrow victory stemmed from 
overwhelming support from Blacks and Hispanics and 
considerable support from Whites in New York City? he 
couldn't afford to alienate any group.35 This made his
35 While 91% of Blacks and 65% of Hispanics voted for him,
29% of Whites voted for him (Windhoff-Hertier, 1992:50). 
About 54% of Asians voted for him. According to an informal 
statistics, Koreans were equally split between Giuliani and 
Dinkins. In a victory speech after the election, Dinkins 
emphasized the contribution of Jewish votes for his win. 
Dinkins later said, "What helped me win was a coalition," 
including about a third of the white vote, "most of which 
was Jewish, although in the general election, more Jews 
voted for my opponent than voted for me."(The New York 
Times. Feb. 21, 1990)
It is known that Black grassroots activists such as 
Sonny Carson have considerable followers in Brooklyn.
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position difficult. On May 11, 1990, he condemned the Black 
boycott in a broadcasted speech. But days later, Mayor 
Dinkins also said, "I'm confident that this [boycott] is a 
legitimate dispute," and "I believe the boycott has gone on 
too long, but it's important to remember that a picket is as 
American as apple pie" (New York Times. May 16, 1990).
At the time, the racial tension was very high because 
of the trial for the Bensonhurst killing of a Black by White 
youths, the aftermath of the Central Park jogger case(a 
White jogger was raped and beaten to almost death, allegedly 
by young Blacks), and a physical attack on three Vietnamese 
by Blacks in Flatbush (they might have misidentified the 
Vietnamese as Koreans). Al Sharpton marched into White 
Bensonhurst with several hundred Blacks and several hundred 
other Blacks marched to boycott two Korean stores on Church 
Avenue. In these circumstances, mainstream news media, 
Whites, and Koreans were mounting their pressure on Mayor 
Dinkins to take a firm opposition to the boycotts and other
Because of the influence of Sonny Carson among poor Blacks, 
Dinkins paid 9,800 dollars to Sonny Carson and his 
organization for a mayoral campaign for Dinkins in 1989. 
However, Giuliani and his adviser described the payments as 
"a payoff" to Sonny Carson. Dinkins's campaign manager, 
Bill Lynch, said that he had paid them to produce a large 
turnout of Black voters in housing projects in Bedford- 
Stuyvesant. He said, "I was hiring an organization that has 
roots in the community. The New York Times. Oct. 18, 1989) 
Those Black politicians who were elected by Black 
majority tended to have relatively more pro-boycott 
positions. For example, Assemblywoman Rhoda Jacobs of East 
Flatbush said that because of injustice done by Koreans, 
Black people responded to the boycott.(WABC-TV, 'Like It 
Is,' Oct. 21, 1990)
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"racial" demonstrations.
While some of the demands (i.e., community control over 
Black neighborhood economy and the closure of the targeted 
stores) of the Black boycotters were beyond the accepted 
ideas of American capitalism, some other demands (i.e., the 
intimidation of clients by protesters in front of the 
stores) were considered by state agents as illegal. The 
boycott was painted as a threat to Koreans' civil rights and 
public order by mainstream news media. Finally the 
increasing number of crimes and racial tensions caused 
Dinkins' approval rate to plummet by 20% among Whites,
Queens residents, people making more than $50,000 a year, 
and college graduates during his first nine months. One 
Bensonhurst White female responded, "the thing with the 
Korean market was a disgrace. He [Mayor Dinkins] should 
have gotten in there and done something" (Newsdav. Sept. 28, 
1990).
The Koreans in New York City also rallied near City 
Hall on September 18, 1990, urging an end of the Black 
boycott against two Korean stores and the active 
intervention of the mayor. Many Koreans brought signs 
reading, "Our Seoul brothers are your soul brothers," 
"Boycott Bigotry," and "racial harmony." When Mayor Dinkins 
arrived, the Koreans booed him. Dinkins said the city 
police would enforce a court order keeping boycotters fifty 
feet away from the target stores. Maxine Paige, a Black
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singer, sang "The Star-Spangled Banner" and "We Shall 
Overcome." After the rally, Deputy Mayor Bill Lynch had a 
meeting with a delegation of Korean- and Chinese- 
Americans.36
Because of the mounting pressure, Mayor Dinkins
declared in September 1990,
It was appropriate that mediation be given a full 
opportunity here. This protest, however, has proved to 
be different... They wish only to beat these store 
owners into submission and to force them out of 
business.
Whatever may have happened here in January to 
touch off the boycott... forcing these shopkeepers out 
of business amounts to cruel and unusual punishment, 
(quoted in Hornung 1990a)
The police also started to enforce the restraining 
order and Mayor Dinkins crossed the picket line by himself. 
This infuriated the black boycotters and their supporters. 
Father Lucas said, "after the earlier goof of branding the 
boycott racist, Dinkins made the latest ill-advised gaff of 
going to the Red Apple and Church Street markets making some 
small purchases with lots of press coverage and gigantic 
symbolism to the African community. It is perceived as a 
response to the challenge of the likes of Mel Miller
36 Chinese leaders in New York City actively supported 
Koreans during the boycott. Many Chinese crossed the picket 
line in order to show their support for the boycotted 
Koreans. Chinese and other Asian Americans seemed to 
perceive the boycott as anti-Asian. However, a few Chinese 
criticized the boycotted Korean shopkeepers as rude and 
expressed their sympathy toward poor Blacks.
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(majority leader of the State Assembly)37 which was in fact 
a challenge to show how removed the Mayor is from the 
thinking, behavior, and wishes of Black folks" (Amsterdam 
News, Oct. 6, 1990).
As one of Mayor Dinkins's advisors admitted, "They [the 
boycotters] have enough support in the community to stand up 
to the police, the courts, and the mayor" (quoted by Hornung 
1990a:31). Thus, the boycotters could withstand mounting 
pressures not only from "White" media and White politicians 
but also from Black politicians such as Mayor Dinkins.
When Korean-American leaders visited President Bush in 
June 1990, the president of the Korean Association of 
Greater New York explained Black boycott at the Church 
Avenue to President Bush and asked his consideration of the 
matter. However, there was no intervention from the White 
House in the boycott.
Efforts to Establish Connections with Politicians
Because of the continuing tension between Korean
37 He blasted the inaction of Mayor Dinkins in a hearing of 
City Council. City council members, a Congressman in 
Brooklyn, and other politicians also criticized Mayor 
Dinkins because Mayor Dinkins did not try to solve the 
conflict. The Korean consular general in New York City also 
visited Mayor Dinkins on June 26, 1990 and suggested Mayor 
Dinkins intervene in the conflict. Governor Cuomo didn't 
take a side on the boycott. When Gov. Cuomo visited 
Flushing, Queens for his informal re-election campaign, he 
urged Asian shopkeepers to understand the unique history of 
Blacks in America. He also visited Korean stores in 
Flushing.
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shopkeepers and poor Black residents, Korean shopkeepers 
needed support from politicians during the crisis. In order 
to achieve that, Korean shopkeepers and business leaders 
tried to establish various connections with politicians. 
Korean leaders and shopkeepers in Harlem and in New York 
City tried very hard to establish good relationships with 
Black politicians. One Korean leader said, "we have to 
learn by heart that a group without political power will be 
victimized even though that group has big money," and "we 
have to meet politicians again and again in order to 
establish political connections."
In the 1988 democratic primary for the American 
presidency, Koreans organized a fund-raiser for Jesse 
Jackson in April. 1988. Koreans also organized fund-raisers 
for Dukakis and Bush. However, the organizer of the fund­
raiser for Jesse Jackson was the Korean-Americans for Better 
Racial Relations,38 which promoted unity and mutual 
understanding between Koreans and other ethnic groups, 
especially Blacks, in New York City. Their leaflet stated, 
"the reasons why we support Reverend Jesse Jackson are that 
he has paid attention to Korean problems and that he will be 
a very important source for us to solve the problems 
confronting Korean-Americans [the Black-Korean conflict]."
38 The president of the Korean Merchant Association in 
Harlem also joined the group as an executive committee 
member. Presidents of various merchant associations were 
the backbone of the organization.
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They collected about twenty thousand dollars for Jesse 
Jackson.
The president of the Korean Merchant Association in 
Harlem joined in the Asian-American Coalition for David 
Dinkins for Mayor as one of nineteen chair members. Mine of 
19 chair members were Koreans. Koreans also organized their 
own independent campaign organization for David Dinkins.
The Asian-American Coalition for David Dinkins was dominated 
by Chinese and had a close relationship with the Korean- 
Americans for Dinkins.
The Korean-Americans for David Dinkins group was 
organized in April, 1989, when then-Mayor Koch and then- 
Manhattan Borough President Dinkins ran against one another 
in the democratic primary for Mayor. It was the first time 
that Koreans organized an independent organization to 
actively participate in an election campaign for a White or 
Black politician.39 They mobilized Korean traditional 
dance troupe to campaign in poor black neighborhoods and
39 Because of the Black boycotts in 1988 and 1989, Koreans 
wanted to have more close relationship with Black 
politicians. That was the reason why Koreans actively 
participated in the campaign for David Dinkins. One 
participant in the Koreans for David Dinkins said, "The 
reasons why we support David Dinkins are to impress Blacks 
with our active campaign for David Dinkins and to mitigate 
the hostility of Blacks against Koreans. The conflict 
between Koreans and Blacks just started and will be worse.
We need more fundamental strategy and one of them is to 
support Black politicians such as David Dinkins."(Sae Gae 
Ilbo, Oct. 13, 1989). The president of the organization also 
said that the purposes of the campaign were to enhance the 
civil right of minorities in his Harlem campaign.
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Asian neighborhoods for Dinkins. Their campaigns were held 
in Harlem, Jamaica, Bronx, and Flushing.
The Koreans for Dinkins and local Korean shopkeepers 
organized a campaign in Harlem in May 1989. Five local 
Korean shopkeepers and about twenty other Koreans 
participated in the campaign. A traditional Korean dance 
troupe came to Harlem and performed at several locations for 
about two hours. The Korean shopkeepers distributed 
leaflets to blacks on the street. Blacks on the streets 
expressed their curiosity and thanks when the exotic dance 
troupe campaigned for David Dinkins. However, two 
Blacks40 said to the Koreans during the campaign, "get out 
of here" and "God damn." The Korean shopkeepers attached 
campaign posters supporting Dinkins on walls and windows in 
all Korean stores. They also collected registration cards 
for the election from Black shoppers.
After the exotic campaign in Jamaica, Queens, the 
president of the Korean Merchant Association in Jamaica 
said, "I couldn't achieve any real communication with Blacks 
for the last fourteen years. But when I talked about 
Dinkins and campaigned for him, we [he and Blacks] feel very 
close." He expressed that campaigns for Dinkins were a good 
opportunity for Koreans to communicate with Blacks. He 
guessed that about 90% of Blacks supported Dinkins (Sae Gae
40 They wore shabby clothes. I got the impression at the 
time that poorer blacks might be more hostile toward 
Korean(or toward Asian or aliens) presence in Harlem.
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Ilbo. June 17, 1989). Even though the Korean shopkeepers in 
Harlem did not express the same excitement, they smiled and 
expressed their pride when they campaigned for Dinkins. The 
efforts of Koreans to support David Dinkins, thought many 
Koreans, were appreciated in Black communities (Chung Ana 
Ilbo. Nov. 6, 1989).
The campaign for Dinkins was, in fact, a public 
relation effort in the Black-Korean relationship. The 
Korean shopkeepers did not sincerely believe that Dinkins 
could bring peace for the troublesome relationship between 
Black residents and Korean shopkeepers. However, all Korean 
shopkeepers but three on 125th Street between Saint Nicholas 
Avenue and Lenox Avenue displayed various campaign posters 
for Dinkins inside and outside of their stores. One 
shopkeeper said, "because the sure majority of Black 
residents support David Dinkins, it[to carry campaign 
posters for David Dinkins] is a sure sign that we are on the 
side of Blacks." At the bottom of most campaign posters, 
vthe Korean- Americans for David Dinkins' was clearly 
printed. The Korean shopkeepers also wanted friendly 
politicians in the City Hall. The president of the Koreans 
for Dinkins said, "he [David Dinkins] believes that Koreans 
revived the local economy in poor black neighborhoods." 
However, there were different voices too. One Korean 
shopkeeper in Harlem was worried about the possibility that 
the election of David Dinkins would embolden Blacks to
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demand more.
The Korean-Americans for David Dinkins for Mayor also 
organized two fund raisers to support David Dinkins. One 
was held on August 31, 1989, in a Korean restaurant in 
Queens. More than two hundred Koreans attended the party and 
most Korean leaders in New York City also attended. Several 
Korean shopkeepers in Harlem attended. Black politicians 
such as Mayoral candidate David Dinkins, Representative 
Charles Rangel from Harlem, and several state legislators 
also attended. David Dinkins emphasized that he would try 
hard to abolish all racial discrimination, protect small 
business, increase security on the street, and so on. He 
asked for active support from Korean community. Other Black 
politicians also addressed similar themes at the party. An 
earlier fund raiser with Korean supporters on May 12, 1991, 
in a Korean restaurant, David Dinkins had said that he would 
do his best to solve ethnic conflicts and end racial 
discrimination. He also promised Koreans that he would hire 
more Asians and Koreans in the city government.
After the election, Koreans pushed Mayor Dinkins to 
appoint more Koreans in the city government. Because of the 
lack of qualified people and also the lack of a potent 
lobby, only a few Koreans were appointed in the mid-echelon 
positions of the city government. Many higher and better 
positions were given to Chinese. This was possibly because 
more Chinese people voted for Dinkins than Korean people in
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New York City, both in terms of numbers and rates.
The Korean Produce Association honored David Dinkins 
for his support of Koreans in 1989. In the annual party of 
the Korean American Small Business Service Center which 
included most Korean business leaders as its members, David 
Dinkins proclaimed December 1st as "Korean-American Small 
Business Day." In a proclamation, read in his absence by 
Deputy Mayor Sally Hernandez Pinero, Mayor Dinkins declared, 
"Korean American entrepreneurs make important contributions 
to our city's economy and to the health and well-being of 
their fellow New Yorkers." Several City officials and 
council members were also honored for their support for 
Korean small businessmen. In the case of the 1990 annual 
party, the Korean Produce Association awarded the woman of 
the year award to New York City Comptroller Holtzman and 
other awards to Brooklyn Borough President Golden,
Manhattan Borough President Messenger, President Williams of 
the Uptown Chamber of Commerce in Harlem, and other city and 
state officials. The Korean Seafood [fish retailer] 
Association, the Korean Drycleaners' Asisociation, the Korean 
Nail Salon Association, and other business association of 
Koreans invited and honored city officials, local leaders, 
city and state politicians in their annual parties.41
41 However, prominent politicians usually sent their 
representatives. For example, Mayor Dinkins did not attend 
any annual parties of Korean associations in person in 1989 
and 1990.
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However, Korean shopkeepers soon discovered that they 
were disappointed, for example, after the 1990 Brooklyn 
boycott because the Mayor Dinkins did not forcefully 
intervene in the boycott. The Sae Gae Ilbo (Apr. 6, 1990) 
titled a story about David Dinkins, "Dinkins Treats Korean 
Community Coldly." The article reported that Dinkins did 
not appoint Koreans to city government posts and did not pay 
enough attention to the Church Avenue boycott. In a rally 
Koreans organized for 'racial harmony' near the city hall in 
Sept. 1990, Mayor Dinkins was booed. Right after the rally, 
he personally condemned the Black boycott as a racist 
boycott and crossed the picket line as an expression of his 
support for the boycotted Korean stores on Church Avenue. 
After this event, he was enthusiastically welcomed by 
thousands of Koreans in a Korean folk festival organized by 
the Korean Produce Association of New York.
Korean shopkeepers also tried to build a productive 
relationship with less powerful local politicians. There 
was a call from the office of a Black assemblywoman in the 
area to the president of the Korean Merchant Association in 
Harlem in May 1990. The president called Korean shopkeepers 
in the area and told them to bring soft drinks and fruit to 
the office of the assembly-woman. They delivered five boxes 
of coke, two boxes of apples, and two boxes of oranges for 
free. The secretary of the assemblywoman receive^ the 
presents and expressed her appreciation. The beverage and
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foods were used for the excursion of elderly constituents of 
the assembly-woman. The Korean Merchant Association in 
Harlem also donated fruit and beverages to other politicians 
such as city council members and state legislators in the 
area.
Because of lack of support from other politicians and 
because Koreans needed their own representatives in local 
governments, at few Korean persons ran for elective 
positions. One Korean who ran for City Council in 1991 said 
that the boycott of Church Avenue could have been resolved 
immediately had political power been available to Koreans. 
His campaign promises included resolving racial disputes, 
especially between Koreans and Blacks. However, he and 
another Korean council candidate were defeated. No Korean 
politicians have been elected in New York City or New York 
State yet.
Local Leaders
One Korean leader in Harlem said that the best way to 
solve the tensions between Blacks and Koreans is to meet 
with community leaders frequently. One Korean business 
leader recommended as early as in 1985, "Black people 
respect their local organization, church leaders, doctors^ 
artists, and politicians and community leaders. We need to 
communicate with them in order to prevent the escalation of 
the problems and to solve the problems. We need to
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establish good relationships with them rather than starting 
contacts after a conflict occurs" (Chung Ana Ilbo, Feb. 15, 
1985).
A similar view was also expressed three years later. 
After the 1988 Brooklyn boycott, Korean shopkeepers near the 
boycotted store organized their own formal association in 
September, 1988. The temporary president of the Association 
said, "all thirty-two Korean shopkeepers in this area should 
become diplomats to overcome this difficult time... One of 
the reasons of the escalation [of a trivial altercation into 
a big boycott] is that we didn't establish frequent 
contacts with community organizations" (Sae Gae Ilbo. Sept. 
23, 1988).
Korean Trip of Black Local Leaders
During the Church Avenue boycott, Korean business 
leaders led by a Korean shopkeeper in Harlem and Korean 
ministers led by the Cross-Cultural Pastors Association for 
Peace organized the Korean Afro-American Friendship Group in 
order to communicate with Black community leaders. The 
first work of the Friendship Group was to send Black 
community leaders, mostly ministers of various Black 
churches in New York City, to Korea. The Korean leaders 
expected that the Black leaders who visited Korea would have 
a good impression about Korea and Koreans and thus would 
mitigate the Black hostility toward Korean shopkeepers in
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poor Black neighborhoods.
The Friendship Group was established by the former 
president of the Korean Merchant Association of Harlem who 
also gave a liberal financial support for the visit of Black 
church leaders to Korea. One chairman of the board of the 
Korean Merchant Association in Harlem also donated two 
thousand dollars, and the president and other members of the 
Korean Merchant Association in Harlem donated another two 
thousand thirty dollars for the event.
Thirty-nine Black leaders visited Korea during Oct.22 - 
Oct. 29, 1990. They were greeted by the Mayor of Seoul, top 
leaders of the ruling party in Korea, Korean ministers in 
Seoul, and bureaucrats. The ministers said in a departing 
news conference at Kimpo international airport in Seoul that 
they would inform their parishioners of the Korean tradition 
and its culture. "Koreans are not used to smiling at a 
person they don't really know, especially women don't 
contact other people with hand" said one minister. "We will 
tell our church members that the Korean character is not 
directed against Blacks." Another visitor also said that 
"we'll be the peace-promoters between New York's Korean and 
Black communities" (Korea Times of New York. Oct. 31, and 
Nov. 2, 1990).
The former president of the Korean Merchant Association 
in Harlem who organized the visit said, "the Korean-Black 
relationship worsened by the Church Avenue boycott will be
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somewhat relieved by this visit... When there was a trouble 
between Korean merchants and Black peddlers in Harlem, a 
Black minister who visited Korea mediated and solved the 
trouble." He concluded by emphasizing that a good 
relationship with the Black community and Black ministers 
was very important for Korean shopkeepers. Having evaluated 
of the visit, the former president announced that the Group 
would solidify good relation between the Korean and Black 
communities through cultural and sport exchanges and more 
visits of Black leaders to Korea.
Sonny Carson, a leader of the Church Avenue bpycott, 
criticized the visit of Black ministers to Korea as a 
ridiculous gesture. In response to a Korean university's 
offer to provide a one and half million dollar scholarship 
fund for Black students who want to study in Korea, Carson 
said that Blacks do not beg anything from Koreans but demand 
respect fNewsdav. Oct. 26, 1990).42
The Cross-Cultural Pastors' Association for Peace
Those who visited South Korea for nine days in October 
1990 were from the Cross-Cultural Pastors' Association for 
Peace, an inter-racial group of Protestant pastors from the 
New York metropolitan area, founded in 1988 after a Black 
boycott of Korean grocers in Brooklyn. The Association's
42 Four Black students were invited by a Korean university and 
they began to study in Korea from 1993.
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president was the Korean-born Reverend Henry H. Hong and its 
120 members are mostly Black pastors.
Rev. Hong ministers to a Black congregation and heads 
Black churches in Queens and the Bronx. He is working with 
several religious leaders to bridge the cultural chasm 
between Koreans shopkeepers and the Black communities they 
serve. Rev. Hong urged Korean shopkeepers to hire Blacks.
He said, "because you make money here, you better hire 
here." He also received a Korean Dr. King title from the 
Amsterdam News (Aug.2, 1992).
When he organized the Korean trip of Black pastors in 
1990, he said that Black pastors would play a major role in 
bridging the gap between New York City's Korean and African- 
American communities and in dispelling misunderstanding. "I 
don't know what's going to come out of it, but at least 
we're going to make a try [at easing racial friction], and 
that's what it's all about," said Rev. William Price, pastor 
of Mount Sinai Helping Hand Church in Harlem and a member of 
the Association. In the spring of 1990, the Association 
held an interracial church service and prayer rallies in 
front of the boycotted Korean grocery stores on Church 
Avenue (Korea Times of New York. Aug. 8, 1990).
A Korean pastor in a Black church in Central Harlem 
often visited the president of the loca,l Korean Merchant 
Association to solicit attendance and donations for special 
services from the Korean shopkeepers in the area. The
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Korean Merchant Association also donated food and other 
things to the homeless through Black churches. However, 
Korean shopkeepers in Harlem did not establish any stable 
relationship with Black religious leaders.
Community Boards
Alvin M. Berk, the White chairman of Community Board 14 
in Brooklyn commented in a letter to Mayor Dinkins that 
Mayor Dinkins' silence about the boycott raised questions 
about City Hall's commitment to racial harmony in February 
1990. He distributed the letter to all community board 
members and to local residents. Black community board 
members returned his letter with anger; one local Black 
leader responded that Blacks demonstrated for justice and 
human rights.
With anger, some people who supported the Church Avenue 
boycott disrupted the activities of the Community Board 14. 
The protesters demanded more Black members in the Board.43 
Only eleven of the 50 members were Blacks even though the 
Black population comprised 46% of the district's population 
in 1990. The protesters charged that the board had too few 
Black members and could not represent the interests of the 
Black population. The protests became embroiled in the 
boycott of two Korean grocery stores in the district. Some
43 The members are recommended by City Council members and 
appointed by the Brooklyn Borough President.
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of the same people who led the boycott were involved in the 
protests. The organizer of this protest was Mr. Foster, the 
chairman of the African People's Political Club of Flatbush.
The disruption continued well into 1992 as the protests 
of Black community activists caused racial controversy in 
the area. The board's district manager said, "Their agenda 
is to obstruct and perpetuate a deep racial mistrust in this 
community." But the protesters said, "Right now I see 
Flatbush just like South Africa. The majority are [Blacks] 
here, but we have no power, economically or politically."
The chairman of the Community Board responded that "This 
board is not about race. This board is about delivering 
services to the community without regard to race. Service 
delivery is not racial." While the protesters disrupted 
several board meetings, accusations of racism, racial slurs, 
and anti-Semitic remarks were exchanged. The police 
arrested several protesters, but Mr.Foster vowed that 
protests would continue until Blacks were given an adequate 
representation on the board [New York Times. Feb. 10, 1992).
In Harlem, the Black dominated Community Board 10 held 
a hearing about a Black boycott against a Korean store in 
February 1, 1989. About one hundred Blacks and several 
Korean shopkeepers attended. The hearing was dominated by 
the boycotters and their leader, Father Lucas. When one 
Korean shopkeeper explained cultural differences, and the 
resulting misunderstandings as the causes of the problems,
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the Blacks at the hearing booed her and demanded that the 
Koreans leave Harlem. Father Lucas drew enthusiastic 
applause from the audience by emphasizing that many Korean 
shopkeepers were rude and racist, that Korean shopkeepers 
took economic opportunities from Blacks, and that Black 
communities needed Black business.
The Korean shopkeepers did not have many friends on the 
Community Board. However, one Black female board member had 
a very close relationship with Korean leaders in the area. 
Some Korean shopkeepers said that she supported "capitalist 
ideology" and supported the presence of Korean shopkeepers 
in Harlem as beneficial for Blacks in the area. After 
talking to the board member on the street, a female Korean 
shopkeeper told me, "she is on our side." The board member 
also had a close relationship with a Black business leader 
who maintained frequent contacts with Korean shopkeepers and 
opposed the 1988 boycott.
Efforts for Local Organizations
The president of the Korean Merchants Association in 
Harlem and some other Korean shopkeepers joined local 
business organizations whose members were mostly Black. For 
example, the Korean shopkeepers joined the Uptown Chamber of 
Commerce and the 125th Street Local Development Corporation, 
both led by Black businessmen, in order to establish good 
relationships with Black business leaders. Even though the 
Korean shopkeepers did not participate in the Chamber of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
289
Commerce meetings, the president of the Korean Merchants 
Association pushed Korean shopkeepers to join the Chamber 
and pay dues as a gestuire of friendship. About a dozen of 
Korean shopkeepers paid a $ 200 membership fee to join the 
Uptown of Chamber of Commerce without attending any of the 
organization's meeting.
The Korean Produce Association of New York City, which 
represented the boycotted store in Harlem, also tried to 
garner the friendship of Black leaders. The organization 
twice awarded the president of the Uptown Chamber of 
Commerce in order to get his support. However, as I 
mentioned earlier, Lloyd William, President of the Chamber, 
remained ambivalent towards the Korean shopkeepers in 
Harlem. The president of the 125th Street Local Development 
Corporation was well known for his pro-Korean and pro­
capitalist position among the Korean shopkeepers in Harlem.
As I already mentioned, the Korean Merchant Association 
bought space from a Black newspaper for advertisement. By 
advertising in a Black newspaper, the president of the 
Korean Association not only tried to persuade Black readers 
to accept the presence of Korean shopkeepers in Harlem but 
also made some connections with local Black journalists.
The president of the Korean Merchant As.sociation expected 
the newspaper to dilute the bad image and to enhance the 
good image of Koreans in Harlem. However, the relationships 
were soon severed, and new president of the Korean Merchant
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Association did not try to buy any influence.
Black Politicians vs. Grass-Roots Activists
The Black boycotts against Korean shopkeepers revealed 
not only the chasms between poor Black residents and Korean 
shopkeepers and between Blacks and Whites but also between 
Black grassroots activists and established Black 
politicians. For example, the switchboard of most popular 
Black radio station, WLIB, lit up with complaints after 
Mayor Dinkins's widely broadcasted speech44 on May 11,
1990, in which he said the boycott of two Korean stores by 
blacks was based on race (Mew York Times. May 17, 1990).
This shows that the Black grassroots activists garnered 
considerable support for the boycott from Black population 
of New York City. Different approaches by Black politicians 
and Black activists toward Korean shopkeepers in Black 
neighborhoods also symbolized the division among Black 
population about Black boycotts against Korean shopkeepers.
When David Dinkins first as City Clerk and later as 
Manhattan Borough President tried to mediate the 1984 and 
1988-89 boycotts in Harlem, the boycotters resisted 
mediation and demanded the expulsion of targeted store 
owners. A similar situation emerged in the 1988 Brooklyn 
boycott; while Assemblyman Albert Vann and his associates
44 All but one of the major television channels in New York 
City broadcasted his speech for racial harmony.
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pursued negotiations, the boycotters accused Albert Vann of 
selling out.
When Albert Vann and local leaders met with Korean 
shopkeepers during the 1988 Brooklyn boycott, Sonny Carson 
warned that "blacks are disgusted with bourgeoisie who sold 
blacks out. Whenever blacks try to achieve any thing, they 
divided blacks... They are Uncle Tom, betrayers of the 
black community..." Vann responded, "I am aware that there 
are other people in the black community who are opposed to 
an amicable resolution in this matter. But they don't 
represent the majority of the opinion in our community. The 
point is that what we're doing is a starting point in a road 
to control commerce in our own neighborhood."
Even though Albert Vann and Sonny Carson shared the 
view that the Korean shopkeepers elicited the deep 
resentment of Black residents through their conduct, Vann 
and Black activists have opposite views about the meaning of 
the presence of Korean shopkeepers in Black neighborhoods. 
Elombe Brath, a member of the December 12th Movement said,
"I find it curious that these alleged black leaders are 
trying to build a relationship with the Koreans without ever 
coming to investigate what has happened in regard to the 
African community in regard to the Korean merchants." In 
contrast, Albert Vann disputed the notion that Koreans took 
business opportunities away from Blacks. "The Koreans did 
not run blacks out of business. They filled a vacuum. There
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are reasons why blacks have not filled that vacuum; some of 
them are racial, and some are economic" (New York Voice,
Dec. 3, 1988).
The gulf between Albert Vann and Sonny Carson 
symbolizes the distance between Black grassroots activists 
and established politicians in New York City. Albert Vann 
started his political career as a grassroots activist with 
Sonny Carson and Jitu Weusi45 who, as members of the 
Congress of Racial Equality, fought together for community 
control of local schools in the 1960s. However, Albert Vann 
eventually became one of the most powerful assemblymen while 
the others remained grassroots activists.46 Sonny Carson 
believes that Al Vann had sold out (Sampson 1990). Sonny 
Carson and hi3 colleagues believe that other Black 
politicians had also sold out.
For example, during the 1990 Brooklyn boycott, many 
Black grassroots activists said that David Dinkins was a 
tool of the White establishment, especially Jews, and that 
his comments on episodes like the Black-led boycott of two
45 He once ran for Governor of New York City on a ticket of
a small third party. He supported the Church Avenue boycott 
in 1990 and he also presented a speech for the supporters of 
the boycott in a rally. He is one of the most influential 
Black activists in Brooklyn.
46 Albert Vann is Chairman of the Black and Puerto Rican 
Legislative Caucus in New York State Legislature. He is 
said to talk regularly with Gov. Cuomo. He was "considered 
as one of the power elite of black politicians nationwide" 
during the mid 1980s. (Sampson 1990)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
293
Korean groceries in Brooklyn were an affront to Blacks.47
Chimurenga, a leader of the December 12th Movement, charged
that Dinkins turned a blind eye on the depth of Black
discontent and dissatisfaction in New York by refusing to
treat the protesters as a group agitating for respect and
power. To Chimurenga, "the city's first black mayor becomes
an Ed Koch in black face, a political minstrel show for the
1990s" (Hornung 1990b:35).
Father Lucas, a member of December 12th Movement and
the boycott leader in Harlem expressed a similar view.
After the earlier goof of branding the boycott racist, 
Dinkins made the latest ill-advised gaff of going to 
the Red Apple and Church Street markets making some 
small purchases with lots of press coverage and 
gigantic symbolism to the African community. It is 
perceived as a response to the 'challenge' of the likes 
of Mel Miller (majority leader of the State Assembly) 
which was in fact a challenge to show how removed the 
Mayor is from the thinking, behavior, and wishes of 
Black folks. All that the mayor's action will do is to 
strengthen the determination of the boycotters and make 
Black folks more distrustful of the present 
administration. (Amsterdam News. Oct. 6, 1990)
Sonny Carson echoed this opinion on a Black radio talk show. 
Infuriated by attacks on Mayor Dinkins, Percy Sutton, a 
former Manhattan Borough President, the owner of WLIB, and a 
close personal advisor to Mayor Dinkins, declared that he 
would close his station if Blacks continued to attack Mayor
47 A conversation between a poorly dressed young Black and a 
Korean shopkeeper in a Korean store in Harlem during the 
mayoral campaign of New York City in 1989 is very symbolic. 
When the Korean shopkeeper urged him to register, he 
replied, "He [Dinkins] is like Ice Cream. He has no 
backbone... [Registration] no make any sense."
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David Dinkins through his station (Mew York Times, May 19,
1990).
Black politicians and Black grassroots activists such 
as Sonny Carson and Chimurenga have very different 
strategies for establishing black movements. The activists 
try to establish their leadership not from the ballot box 
but from the street by galvanizing Black dissatisfaction. 
Chimurenga said, "Our message is rooted in the neglect and 
anger experienced by black people" (Hornung 1990b: 35). He 
continued,
[T]he real task is to organize and build a movement 
from the grassroots, from the people up. There is 
resistance all over. The question is how to organize 
it" (Hornung 1990b:28). "We see ourselves as the 
vanguard, the leadership of what will become a large 
movement to free the people.... We can't rely on City 
Hall [where the mayor is a black]. We can rely on 
going to our streets, where our people live.... We 
will take the bridge and shut down the subways, stop 
traffic to show the racists in this city that business 
cannot go on as usual. We have power and we can use 
it, make it grow. We can act before we are acted upon. 
That's how we want black people to think. To think 
about their right to self-determination, to reject the 
postcolonial mentality and build a life in our own 
neighborhoods. (ibid.:35)
The December 12th Movement led the protests against 
Columbia University which planned to replace the Audubon 
Ballroom, where Malcolm X was assassinated, with a new 
science research building. The Movement's members often 
carried photos of Malcolm X in their rallies and cited "the 
spirit of Malcolm X" in boycott leaflets against Korean 
shopkeepers. Father Lucas, a leader of the Movement, also 
spoke about Malcolm X for students in City College in
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February 21, 1990. On the same day, the December 12th 
Movement organized a rally to commemorate the 25th 
anniversary of Malcolm X death in Harlem. When one of the 
leaflets, distributed by the Movement, explained a speech 
delivered by Roger Wareham, a member of the December 12th 
Movement to the United Nations,48 the title of the leaflet 
was "From Harlem to Geneva, Carrying on the Legacy of 
Malcolm X." The leaflet states, "the December 12th Movement 
is fighting to uphold his [Malcolm X's] legacy in words and 
deeds"(underline, original).
While Sonny Carson and his colleagues emphasized the 
legacy of Malcolm X and steadfastly opposed elected Black 
politicians who preferred peaceful compromises through the 
legal political process, some other grassroots activists 
emulated Martin Luther King Jr. and partially cooperated 
with elected Black politicians. For example, A1 
Sharpton,49 who led marches into Bensonhurst to protest a 
racial killing of a black in the neighborhood was critical
48 According to a leaflet of the December 12th Movement,
Roger Wareham, Esq., Center for Law and Social Justice at 
Medgar Evers College, and Representative of the December 
12th Movement, delivered to the 46th Session of the United 
Nations' Commission on Human Rights at Geneva on Feb. 6, 
1990, a speech which explained racist injustice in the 
United States and demanded the Commission on Human Rights to 
investigate U.S. violations of human rights.
49 According to Representative Owens in Brooklyn, A1 
Sharpton is "able to mobilize a segment of the community who 
cannot be mobilized any other way" (New York Times. Jan. 21,
1991).
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about Mayor Dinkins. He commented after Mayor Dinkins's
speech for 'racial harmony' in May 1990, "I think his coming
out against the Korean boycott is an insult.... It was like
a James Brown record - talking loud and saying nothing"
(Daily News. May 12, 1990). In another interview, Al
Sharpton said,
...the so-called good times in New York are over. In 
hard economic times, black people will turn away from 
the leaders who tell us to be patient and wait. You 
know David Dinkins, Doug Wilder, even Jesse Jackson, 
they can't appeal to the black middle class when the 
black middle class is vanishing... I don't know if 
they can cross back to the roots of their power... I'm 
not the issue, the issue is leadership and black people 
need it badly. (Village Voice. Jan. 1, 1991)
However, he eventually established a closer relationship
with established Black politicians.
On Jan. 21, 1991, Al Sharpton was greeted on the steps
of City Hall by Mayor Dinkins after he led a march across
the Brooklyn Bridge to celebrate the birthday of Martin
Luther King Jr. Al Sharpton reiterated his belief that
nonviolent civil disobedience is the vehicle for Black
Americans to achieve justice in this country - Dr. King's
philosophy. About Mayor Dinkins, he stated, "I don't excuse
him for not being aggressive enough on some racial issues,
but he's not responsible for the fiscal condition this city
in." He finally emphasized that he was ready to "meet white
New York halfway-not on their terms, but on fair terms."50
50 New York Times. Jan. 21, 1991. He also ran for United 
State Senator in New York state Democratic primary in 1992. 
He received more votes than a White mainstream candidate,
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Because Al Sharpton and his group have different strategies 
in establishing Black grassroots leadership, Chimurenga 
said, "we consider Sharpton an enemy of the people." As for 
Farrakhan, a Black Muslim leader, he also considered 
Farrakhan "as a traitor for his condemnations of Malcolm X" 
(Hornung 1990b:27).51
The chasm between Black politicians and Black 
grassroots activists is wide in New York City. When Sonny 
Carson organized several rallies against police brutality, 
racial killings, and attacks on Blacks in 1987, Black 
politicians, including the then Manhattan Borough President 
David Dinkins, City Police Commissioner Benjamin Ward, 
Representative Flake, and Representative Owens in Brooklyn 
all avoided commenting publicly on Sonny Carson.52 This
New York City Comptroller Holtzman. He got votes mostly 
from New York City Blacks.
51 The basic difference between Martin Luther King Jr. and 
Malcolm X was well summarized by Hornung (1990b:29). "King 
pressed for progress through a series of moral 
confrontations tempered by compromise, while Malcolm X urged 
replacing white institutions and values with black 
organizations that serve as the first step toward self- 
determination." Another story of Dr. King and Malcolm X in 
Harlem showed the distance between the followers of them, 
"...they [Blacks] sensed that he [Dr.King] was essentially a 
white choice. This feeling surfaced in New York at the time 
when the city council changed Harlem's 125th Street to 
Martin Luther King, Jr., Boulevard. Soon afterward, local 
residents aired their own sentiments by renaming Lenox 
Avenue [a major avenue in Harlem] after Malcolm X" (Hacker 
1992:63).
52 New York Times. June 1987 (the date is unclear in my news 
clipping). It is very difficult for Black politicians to 
criticize Sonny Carson or other influential Black activists, 
because "a lack of support, especially by Carson, of a black
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silence symbolized the difficulty Black politicians have in 
dealing with grassroots activists and also the distance 
between Black politicians and grass-roots activists such as 
Sonny Carson and his colleagues.
However, there are also divisions between Black 
politicians. After Mayor Dinkins criticized the Church 
Avenue boycott as race-based, a number of mainstream Black 
leaders, including Dinkins's supporters, joined grassroots 
activists like the Rev. Al Sharpton, Sonny Carson and Father 
Lucas in publicly chiding Dinkins for being overly cautious, 
slow to speak up for Black concerns and quick to appease 
Whites and Jews53 at "the expense of a time-honored 
tradition [boycott] of the civil rights movements" (Newsday, 
June 6, 1990; New York Times. Sept. 22, 1990).
Conclusion
The opposing views in the stories by Black boycotters 
and their sympathizers on the one side and by Korean 
shopkeepers on the other, reflect the difference in their 
social positions. While the boycotters and poor Blacks 
expressed their discontent over the presence as well as the
politician in Brooklyn can be seriously detrimental" 
(Sampson 1990).
53 Because Dinkins did not want alienate White supporters 
(especially Jewish voters who voted more for Dinkins than 
Protestant or Catholic Whites), he could not speak out for 
Black causes. Without a considerable support from Whites, 
he cannot win the mayoral election in 1993.
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attitudes of the Korean shopkeepers, the Korean shopkeepers 
described the discontent as the result of jealousy, cultural 
misunderstanding, or misdirected resentment which should be 
targeted toward White American society. The Korean 
shopkeepers have a vested interest in maintaining the 
present Korean shopkeeper/Black consumer relationship in 
order to guarantee their profits in small business.
However, the Black boycotters and poor Blacks, as an 
economically and politically deprived group, have an 
interest not only in achieving better treatment from Korean 
shopkeepers but also in enhancing their political and 
economic status through their staunch resistance to the 
present power and economic relationships with Korean 
shopkeepers in particular and with American society in 
general.
Korean shopkeepers, by contrasting themselves as hard­
working against an image of Blacks as crimogenic and 
irrational, thereby attempted to justify their success in 
small businesses and their inconsiderate behavior toward 
Blacks. This contrast of images also allowed their 
description of the Black discontent as an irrational 
response. Because Korean shopkeepers considered Blacks to 
be inferior arid also wanted to make money quickly, 
shopkeepers paid more attention to the problems caused by 
Blacks such as shoplifting, burglary, robbery, looting, 
"irrational" complaints, and laziness than to the welfare of
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Blacks. For Korean shopkeepers, community participation or 
concern for shoppers was not thought to be a job requirement 
of shopkeepers in a capitalist country.
The boycotters and their sympathizers tried to present 
Korean shopkeepers as bloodless merchants who do not care 
about Black communities and focus only on making money 
through prejudice toward Black people. They saw, through 
their unequal relationship with Korean shopkeepers, an 
expression of a racist society which always rewarded groups 
other than Blacks. They saw not only White power but also 
Black politicians supporting Korean shopkeepers. Thus, the 
boycotters aimed not only at particular Korean shopkeepers 
who "beat" Blacks, but also at Korean, and furthermore 
alien, shopkeepers who, the boycotters thought, 
discriminated against Blacks, deprived them of opportunity. 
They also aimed at the power structure which keeps Blacks in 
the bottom rank of a social order.
Thus, Korean shopkeepers and Black boycotters expressed 
their ideas in the context of American economic and 
political relationships. Because the American economic and 
political relationships are primarily represented in terms 
of race relationships through its history, the meanings 
expressed not only by those two groups but also by White 
media and politicians dwelled more on race relationships 
rather than the shopkeeper/consumer relationship. By 
representing the Korean shopkeeper/Black consumer
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relationship as a race relationship between Blacks and 
Koreans, the discourse produced by the conflict between two 
groups became a discourse to reanalyze American race 
relationships rather than class relationships.
Blacks as well as Koreans and Whites were active 
participants in this representation. The December 12th 
Movement, which maintained socialist ideas as its ultimate 
goal and despised the inactivity of the Black middle class, 
mobilized Black people to boycott Korean shopkeepers by 
stating "Korean shopkeepers beat Black women and children." 
In their leaflets, they often targeted all Korean 
shopkeepers and launched "Buy Black" movements. Korean 
shopkeepers reported the boycott as a "Korean-Black" 
conflict to the Korean-American community and to the 
mainstream news media. The news media and politicians also 
referred the conflict as a "Black-Korean" conflict. Thus, 
the conflict between Korean shopkeepers and Black residents 
in inner-cities became, in fact, a conflict between Blacks 
and Koreans. This representation of the conflict not only 
expresses the reality but also redefines reality. This 
redefinition of reality is partially intentional because the 
involved parties try to mobilize their own ethnic groups and 
to resist other racially-defined groups such as Blacks, 
Whites, or Koreans. Yet the redefinition is partially 
unintentional because the involved groups merely adopted the 
prevalent and familiar mode of thought in America.
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However, displayed meanings and the redefinition of 
reality are part of the social practices of the involved 
groups. Cultural symbols and catch-phrases such as African 
tri-color flag, Malcolm X, vampires, racial injustice, 
racial harmony, minorities, White media,, capitalism, reverse 
racism, "qumdunqvi." and "Japanese Jew," not only express 
feelings but also create feelings. Through the expression 
and creation of feelings and meanings, social relationships 
are expressed, redefined, recreated, and readjusted.
However, the recreation and readjustment of social 
relationships are interconnected with existing power 
relationships. Various power relationships between Blacks 
and Koreans; between the federal and local governments, 
Korean shopkeepers, and the boycotters; between the news 
media and the involved groups; and between Blacks, Whites, 
and Koreans, are all intermingled in the expression and 
imposition of ideas in an attempt to reshape reality.
One of the fundamental issues in this interconnection 
was the social responsibility of Korean shopkeepers in poor 
Black neighborhoods. The boycotters emphasized that Korean 
shopkeepers neglected their community responsibility by 
extracting profit without returning anything to the Black 
community and by mistreating Black residents. Korean 
shopkeepers rejected the idea of social responsibility for 
saying that Korean shopkeepers are not responsible to the 
problems of Black communities and that, in a free capitalist
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country, anyone can do business any place and can live in 
any place. The irreconcilable clash over morality between 
the Korean shopkeepers and the boycotters, as well as many 
Black residents, was expressed in their clash of power. As 
a clash of power Whites and state agents were drawn onto the 
side of Koreans against many poor Blacks and Black activists 
on the other side. The clashes of meanings and power 
rippled through various fields of society.
By proposing Black nationalism (e.g."Buy Black") rather 
than socialism (e.g. abolition of private property), the 
December 12th Movement tried to garner support from poor 
Blacks. Poor Blacks and some members of this Movement were 
more readily responding to "nationalist claims" than to 
socialist claims. While most Blacks whom I met clearly 
expressed opposition to White-domination, they did not speak 
about capitalist domination. Instead, they aspired for a 
"fair share" or "equal participation" in power and economy 
in terms of race. In fact, a "fair share" can be either a 
nationalist or a socialist claim. Because different claims 
would attract different alignments of social groups, the 
prevalence of "nationalist" claims means that many Blacks 
interpret American history and society in terms of racial 
relationships rather than class relationships. This is also 
true among "Whites" or "Koreans."
However, the nationalist claims of poor Blacks are also 
directed against some aspects of "American" capitalism: a
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needed social responsibility of Korean shopkeepers in poor 
Black neighborhoods, the expulsion of Korean shopkeepers, a 
forced increase of Black business, etc. These assertions 
directly stimulated local and federal governments to 
intervene into the conflict between Korean shopkeepers and 
Black boycotters, and the state agents tried to enforce the 
American capitalist social order. Mayor Dinkins as a part 
of the state system which should enforce its laws could not 
but condemn the nationalist claims of the boycotters and 
enforced American capitalist order with the police. This 
was a reluctant move for Mayor Dinkins. Because he needs 
votes from both Whites and Blacks to be reelected, he could
not alienate both segments of his constituency. A
condemnation of the boycott would alienate a considerable 
number of poor Blacks; his continued inaction would alienate
many Whites. This was his dilemma. His eventual
condemnation of the boycott also increased the moral dilemma 
of many Blacks too.
To the FBI, the NYPD, and those White politicians 
dependent on White votes, the members of the December 12th 
Movement were violators of the law not only because they 
tried to impose nationalist claims but because they tried to 
fundamentally change the existing social order. For law 
enforcement officers, they were not petty criminals but 
major instigators of social unrest. By bashing Sonny Carson 
and other Black activists, White politicians can stimulate
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White nationalism and garner votes from them. Judges at the 
courts responded negatively to Black activists, because 
Black activists did not respect the order of law which,
Black activists thought, function to perpetuate racism 
against Blacks in America.
The clashes of meanings and power were not separated in 
the conflict between poor Blacks and Korean shopkeepers 
because meanings required actions, and actions required 
meanings. These meanings and actions rippled through 
various parts of society because many meanings and actions 
in the conflict were evaluated, regulated, and influenced by 
those groups who became involved. In order to limit and 
mitigate the spread of negative meanings towards Korean 
shopkeepers, Korean shopkeepers tried to expand their moral 
base, and to build various connections to Black leaders, 
local residents, state agents, and White politicians. The 
Black boycotters used nationalist appeals and confrontations 
to spread their ideas and to make their power grow.
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SOCIAL ORDERS
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CONCLUSION: DISCUSSION
[A steel worker's complaint about his boss]: This 
one foreman I've got, he's a kid. He's a college 
graduate. He thinks he's better than everybody 
else. He was chewing me out and I was saying, 
"Yeah, yeah, yeah." He said, "What do you mean, 
yeah, yeah, yeah. Yes, Sir." I told him, "who 
the hell are you, Hitler? What is this sYes sir' 
bullshit? I came here to work, I didn't come to 
here to crawl." (Terkel X974:xxxiii)
[A general foreman's way to control linemen]: When 
you get familiarity [with linemen] it causes- the 
more you get to know some body, it's hard to 
distinguish between boss and friend. This isn't 
good for my profession. (Terkel 1974:183)
"Honesty," in sum, was a code phrase not just for 
an absence of the deception but also for the 
centrality of control over the producers in this 
form[truck system] of merchant capital. (Sider 
1986:70)
Social Orders 
Private Ownership of Property and Class Order
Property is "the material crystallization of a set of 
social relationships" (Sider 1986:110). Only when one 
person can exclude others, does the ownership of property 
meaningful. Thus, we are dealing with "the rights between 
persons to a material object,"(Goody 1962:287, quoted in 
Sider 1986:110), when we deal with the ownership of 
property. In capitalist societies, the private ownership of 
property is more exclusive than in any other type of 
society. Non-owners are, in legal terms, excluded from the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
308
use, consumption, and exchange of private property.
The accumulation of capital is the result of a social 
relationship where a capital accumulator can amass a sum of 
money or credit through a set of social relationships, 
specifically the capital-labor relationship. Shopkeepers 
also have a set of socio-economic relationships. A 
shopkeeper buys goods from wholesalers and sells them to 
consumers. Through relationships with wholesalers and 
consumers,1 shopkeepers can realize their profit.
A shopkeeper has an exclusive property ownership of 
goods after taking the goods from wholesalers by paying with 
money or credit. The shopkeeper can, in legal terms, place 
any price on it and sell to consumers in American 
capitalism. The difference between the amount he/she pays 
for goods to wholesalers and the price he/she puts on the 
goods for consumers is the source of his/her profit. Thus, 
the profit for shopkeepers comes from his/her mediation of 
wholesalers and consumers. The appropriation of profit for 
shopkeepers is the materialized results of the mediation of 
specific social relationships. The moment of the exchange
1 Wholesalers are connected to other wholesalers, industrial 
capitalists, or, in some cases, small producers.
Shopkeepers are located at the front of capitalist 
distribution. In other words, shopkeepers realize "surplus 
value" for capital in the distributional fronts. Consumers 
are mostly wage-earners who reproduce their labor power 
through consumption. Most wage-earners work for 
capitalists, petty capitalists, or state systems. This 
capitalist circulation of labor and commodities conditions 
the social position of shopkeepers.
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between a shopkeeper and a shopper, in general, is the 
moment of the appropriation of profit. After exchange, the 
shopkeeper has private ownership of the money which the 
shopper hands over to the shopkeeper; the shopper also has 
private ownership over the goods she/he purchased and will 
eventually consume. This exchange act is habituated in our 
daily interactions and can be called a "habitus" (Bourdieu 
1977) .
Capitalist law sanctifies the exclusive private 
ownership which guarantees profit for shopkeepers in 
general. Through repeated everyday interactions, we are 
accustomed to the exchange relationship. Most people accept 
this relationship as natural. We do not raise questions 
about the exchange relationship itself. The exchange 
relationship is already hegemonized. Consumers have 
accepted this relationship of exchange. However, it does 
not mean that the reproduction of this habituated 
relationship is beyond contest. These relationships can be 
partially doubted, contested, disputed, or rejected in 
certain circumstances.2
2 Bourdieu's (1977; 1984) scheme over the reproduction of 
society through classificatory practices poorly explain how 
and when the reproduction of social relationships can be 
collapsed, especially in relation to the centralized 
apparatus of power, that is, state system. Even though the 
habituated exchange relationship itself is not a target of 
Black boycotts against Korean shopkeepers, their protests 
over the certain dimensions of the exchange relationship 
also include, directly and indirectly the critiques of the 
exchange relationship itself. For example, the "Buy Black" 
campaign criticizes not only the presence of "alien"
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Derogatory terms such as theft, robbery, shoplifting, 
and burglary which describe behaviors violating private 
ownership show the legal sanctity of the exchange 
relationship to be based on the exclusive private rights of 
property. Terms such as theft or shoplifting already 
presuppose that the behaviors in violation of the exclusive 
private rights of property are immoral. This again 
presuppose the ideas that the exclusive private rights over 
property should not be violated. Theft is not simply 
behavior to steal an object, it is a violation of a certain 
rule of social relationship. (If there is no ownership, 
there is no theft.) The moral feelings invested in "theft" 
and its wide acceptance by most people already reveal the 
leadership of anti-"theft" forces, that is, the private 
property owners and the supporters for private ownership of 
property.
Shopkeepers and consumers, in most cases, make contact 
casually. Consumers can change their shopping route any 
time. These casual contacts create the myth that they are 
equal.3 However, shopkeepers are dealing with several
shopkeepers but also the "unjust" (i.e. free and racist 
competition) element of the exchange relationship itself 
with some ambiguity. This ambiguous and partial critique 
can be transformed into a frontal critique on the habituated 
exchange relationship under certain circumstances.
3 This relationship is quite different from the relationship 
between an employer and an employee or a boss and his/her 
subordinate. The latter relationships are, relatively, more 
formally structured into a stable, unequal relationship even 
though the employees or subordinates can quit any time.
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dozens or hundreds of consumers each day who need goods for 
individual consumption. Shopkeepers have more knowledge 
about how to manipulate consumers than vice versa and 
individual complaints from some consumers do not cause a big 
problem for shopkeepers. If consumers do not have enough 
knowledge about stores, prices, and goods, their choices of 
stores and goods will be limited. When a consumer has an 
individual complaint and a shopkeeper refuses to solve the 
problem, it is also difficult for that consumer to fight 
against the shopkeeper because the fight would require a lot 
of energy and time from a consumer. The legal system also 
requires some energy, time, and money. It is difficult to 
mobilize other shoppers to protest against the shopkeeper 
because consumers, in general, have only casual and 
individual contacts with the shopkeeper. There are, in 
general, no communal experience and social relationships 
among consumers. If any collective memory or appeal among 
them can be invoked in mobilizing consumers, the collective 
memory can become a good rallying point for the complaints.4
4 The power relationship between shopkeepers and area 
residents is not equal. However, the relationship is not 
predetermined by economic position. One Korean professor 
sent a letter to a Korean newspaper (Korea Times of Mew 
York. Sept. 17, 1991). In it, he related a story from the 
Deep South. When a Black shopkeeper caught a White 
shoplifter, the shopkeeper called the police to arrest him. 
Two days after the incident, the store was burned down by 
Whites and the Black shopkeeper was injured very seriously 
by a shooting. When a Korean grocer shot a White to death 
in his store in a White area of Bay Ridge, Queens, some 
Whites tried on three occasions to bomb the store. The 
store-owner sold his store and left the area immediately
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The generalization and habitualization of the exchange 
relationship and the general acceptance of them limit the 
possibility of the criticism of the role of shopkeepers by 
the Black boycotters (or by any other boycotters).5 The 
limitation of protest by the Black boycotters to the 
excessiveness of Korean shopkeepers in treating Black 
residents is also evidence that commodity fetishism is 
widely accepted by most of the American population. The 
commodity is not seen as a medium for surplus value, nor is 
the exchange seen as the point of realization of surplus 
value. Because any critique of the private ownership of 
property will stimulate the feelings of poor Black residents 
in inner cities, the boycotters focus on retrieving Black 
rage regarding racial injustice by emphasizing mistreatment 
at the hands of Korean shopkeepers.6 The boycotters also
fSae Gae Ilbo. Feb. 8, 1990). As I already said, many 
Korean shopkeepers complained about White shoppers because 
they, explicitly and implicitly, demand racial deference.
5 Most boycotts in America focus on specific aspects of 
business. For example, the tuna industry was boycotted 
because the ships which caught tuna also killed dolphins. 
(For other boycotts, see Rodkin 1991.) Korean green grocers 
and fish market owners also boycotted wholesalers in New 
York City. They focused on the disrespectful acts of one or 
two specific White wholesalers. Even though the Koreans 
boycotted only one or two White wholesalers, they knew it 
would have a ripple effect on all other White wholesalers 
(See afterword).
6 Because major members of the December 12th Movement are 
socialists, they may oppose the capitalist exchange 
relationship. Yet they did not make the capitalist 
relationship itself an issue. They emphasized the racist 
element of the relationship (mistreatment and the under­
representation of Blacks) because of social conditions in
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raise questions about the price and quality of commodities 
being sold by "alien" shopkeepers. On another side, they 
organize their campaigns around issues such as self- 
determination and the "Buy Black" movement. By paraphrasing 
the conflict between Korean shopkeepers and Black consumers 
in terms of racial relationships, the boycotters and their 
leaders want to show the possibility of economic and 
political impact through Black power, the determination to 
resist racial injustice, and racial pride to poor Black 
residents. That is, they want to change the mentality of 
defeatism widespread in Black communities.
Racial Order
Skin color or perceptions over skin color have multiple 
and sometimes contradictory meanings for many people. Skin 
colors have been socially constructed7 (partially based on 
the various spectrum of definite skin colors) and socially 
imputed with meanings through history and social relations. 
Any construction of racial names is simultaneously a process 
of the culture and politics of homogenization and
which they must appeal to the Black population, and possibly 
to the moral feelings of other populations. Socialist 
phrases might derail moral appeals not only to Blacks but 
also to most Americans. This should be understood in the 
context of American history where "Blacks" have been the 
target of brutal racism for centuries. Race is a 
fundamental and "real" category for most Americans.
7 In fact, very few people have any pure black; white, red, 
or yellow color on their skins.
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differentiation. The process of differentiation and 
separation creates artificial boundaries and homogenizes the 
divided and bounded space as racial units. Under this 
construction, those units are rearranged, reshuffled, 
expanded, reconstructed, and reproduced through history and 
social relations. Through this process, people are put into 
racialized units.8 This process is also the process of the 
social construction of social order in terms of race 
relationships.
Because unequal social relationships run also through 
racialized social relationships, skin color or racial 
identity is socially evaluated, and has various implications 
in daily interactions between differently racialized 
individuals and groups in American life. The fundamental 
unequal relationship in racialized units in America is 
between Whites and Blacks. "America is inherently a 'white' 
country: in character, in structure, in culture" (Hacker 
1992:4).9 "White" people consider "Blacks" as "inferior." 
Even though Whites absorb new Middle Eastern immigrants and
8 As Field(1990:118) states, "Nothing handed down from 
the past could keep race alive if we did not constantly 
reinvent and re-ritualize to fit our own terrain."
9 Even though Wilson (1978; 1987) declared that the 
significance of race is declining, not only poor Blacks but 
also middle class Blacks still experience significant racial 
discrimination and harassment (e.g. Feagin 1991).
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Asian immigrants,10 thsy are particularly reluctant to 
absorb Blacks as full citizens (ibid.)* Through the 
inferiorization of Blacks, "[a]11 white Americans realize 
that their skin comprises an inestimatible asset.... It 
serves as a shield from insult and harassment.... What it 
does ensure is that you will not be regarded as black, a 
security which is worth so much that no one who has it has 
ever given it away"(Hacker 1992:60, emphasis original).
At the beginning of the Korean influx, the boundary 
between Black residents and Korean shopkeepers was not 
clearly defined because the Koreans were not visible, and 
they did not fit into the Black vs. White model. Thus, some 
residents considered Korean shopkeepers as fellow colored 
people. However, the newly-arrived Koreans already had a 
sense of different social status from that of poor Black 
residents. The Korean shopkeepers further developed the 
inferior images of Blacks in America. Black residents soon 
realized that the Koreans were not different from other, 
White shopkeepers. However, many Black residents still 
consider Koreans as a neutral third party while they 
consider Whites as the prime negative force for Blacks.
10 Loewen(1971) shows an interesting example. In his book, 
Mississippi Chinese who were considered Blacks when they 
entered the Mississippi Delta were eventually accepted as 
Whites. A conversation v/ith a White Baptist minister is 
revealing. "You're either a white man or a nigger, here. 
Now, that's the whole story. When I first came to the 
Delta, the Chinese were classed as nigras." ["And now they 
are called whites?" (question by Loewen)] "That's right 1."
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Most Korean shopkeepers consider Whites as the owner of 
this society. Korean shopkeepers experience racial 
humiliation when they deal with White wholesalers at Hunts 
Point (the fruit and vegetable wholesale market of New York 
City) or at Fulton Fish Market (the wholesale fish market in 
New York City).11 They also realize that White shoppers 
often demand racial deference. Their attitudes are very 
assertive and demanding. Whites are very difficult to deal 
with, according to Korean shopkeepers. That is the reason 
why many Korean shopkeepers prefer poor Black neighborhoods 
and stay there even after they accumulate enough capital to 
open stores in White areas. However, in the political 
dimension, Korean shopkeepers are very ambivalent about 
"White" power. Many Koreans are worried about the 
possibility that the White majority and politicians will 
make Koreans a scapegoat in the conflict between Blacks and 
Whites and/or Blacks and Koreans. Most Koreans thought that 
Koreatown was deliberately abandoned by the "White" police 
in L.A. riot in April, 1992. But, in another sense, many 
Koreans also believe they cannot but depend on White power 
to contain Black rage against Korean shopkeepers.
Racial Order and Spatial Order
The rigid racialization in America is also expressed in 
the racialization of space. For example, the Black
11 See afterword.
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population is highly segregated from Whites. As the change
of Black residential areas in New York City shows,
Americans have extraordinarily sensitive antennae for 
the colorations of neighborhoods. In virtually every 
metropolitan area, white householders can rank each 
enclave by the racial makeup of the residents. Given 
this knowledge, where a family lives becomes an index 
of its social standing. While this is largely an 
economic matter, proximity to blacks compounds this 
assessment. For a white family to be seen as living in 
a mixed - or changing - neighborhood can be construed 
as a symptom of surrender, indeed as evidence that they 
are on a downward spiral. (Hacker 1992:38, emphasis 
added).
These White reactions might be considered the same as 
branding Blacks as carriers of contamination. Blacks might 
be seen as infecting a neighborhood simply because they are 
Black. The feelings in the term of "infection" includes not 
only fear of racial "contamination" but also fears of crime 
and the downturn of property values. This process produces 
inner cities with high minority concentrations. This 
spatial order raises a question about which shopkeepers will 
work in "contaminated" inner cities. From the point of view 
of the Whites or those who buy the view of "contamination," 
some minorities such as Jews in inner cities, Chinese in the 
Mississippi Delta, or Koreans in inner cities have risked 
the danger of not only Black crime but also Black 
"contamination*"
The segregation of territory gives claims of exclusive 
rights over space to the occupants. Hispanics do not have 
as much territorial exclusivism in comparison with Blacks 
because they are new to their territory. They are
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exclusive territorial rights.12 Whites claim exclusive 
territory rights in, for example, Carnarsie, Bensonhurst, or 
most suburban areas in New York area. When Whites claim 
territorial exclusivism, they may rely on terror (arson, 
physical attack, and ansence of patronage) to exclude Blacks 
and frequently other minorities.13 However, Whites are 
more permissive regarding the entry of Asians to their 
neighborhoods than to the entry of Blacks. Thus, "[s]urveys 
of neighborhoods and schools show that Black Americans spend 
more of their lives in segregated settings than even recent 
immigrants" (Hacker 1992:146).
Blacks have also mobilized territorial claims on 
commercial strips of Black neighborhoods rather than 
residential areas14. The commercial strips of Black
12 Among Asians, only Chinese have an visible and 
exclusive territory known as Chinatown. In fact, like Black 
inner-cities, Chinatowns are also a product of the White 
exclusion of Chinese. Chinese who migrated during the 19th 
century were confined in ghetto-like areas.
13 A White Italian in Carnarsie described his violence 
against Black families. "We got them out of Carnarsie. We 
ran into the house and kicked the shit out of every one of 
them" (Massey and Denton 1993:91).
14 Because Whites and Asians avoid Black residential areas, 
Black territorial claims on residential areas are not so 
meaningful. This does not mean that there are no other 
racial groups in Black neighborhoods. In the census track 
which includes the boycotted Korean stores in Harlem, 157 
Whites, 18 Asian, 47 Native Americans, and 277 others were 
living among 3,503 Blacks (1990 Census of Population and 
Housing). On 125th Street in Harlem, the number of Black 
shopkeepers is only about 30 among about 160 shopkeepers.
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residential areas are used by Blacks but primarily occupied 
by White or Asian shopkeepers, while the commercial strips 
in other racial residential areas, according to many Blacks, 
are not allowed to Blacks. They note a racial injustice in 
the racial and spatial distribution of shopkeepers.
Social Order. Humiliation, and Discontents
In capitalist societies, there exist a tension between 
two ideas: 1) people are equal; and 2) there are differences 
of prestige, wealth, and power among different groups. How 
can people negotiate this tension in everyday life? In pre­
capitalist societies, the cultural construction of unequal 
social relationships were sanctioned by cosmological order. 
In capitalist societies, the difference in wealth and power 
is explained in terms of individual differences in 
intelligence, work, competitiveness, and/or other virtues.
In this context, lower-class people are considered to 
be those who lack certain individual virtues and values 
(Wolf 1982:afterward). Antonio Gramsci once concluded, "for 
a social elite the features of subordinate groups always 
display something barbaric and pathological"(quoted in 
Gutman 1977:73). For example, throughout the Reform and 
Depression eras, "[p]opular representations of Irish, 
Italians, Poles, Jews, and others as mentally deficient, 
diseased, and/or innately criminal were wide spread" (di 
Leonardo 1991:236). Bourdieu (1977b; 1984) also finds the
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distinctions among different classes.
The hierarchical differentiation in virtues, values, 
and tastes is one of the important aspects of capitalist 
differentiation in class and status, thus in wealth, power, 
and prestige. The hierarchical differentiation in virtues 
and values is an important element in the relationship 
between Korean shopkeepers and poor Black residents. This 
hierarchization in virtues, values, and tastes justify the 
social inequality as a matter of course. Most Korean 
shopkeepers in my research area thought they deserve wealth 
for their hard-working and Blacks deserve the poverty for 
their laziness and immorality. However, while some Blacks 
blamed their poverty as their fault, most Blacks blamed the 
racism. Thus, it can be said that the hierachization of 
virtues and values among different groups is often 
accompanied by discontents, complaints, resistance, and 
organized boycotts.
Everyday interactions are an important locus where the 
manipulation of hierarchization in virtues, values, and 
status occurs. Whether the relationship is between a male 
and a female; between a boss and a subordinate; between a 
White and a Black, or a White and a Yellow; or between a 
merchant and a fisherman, there are often some symbolic 
interactions which connote and express, implicitly and 
explicitly, the difference in social classes or positions. 
This symbolic interaction is contingent not only upon the
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difference in class, race, gender but also on individual 
ability, determination, willingness, social customs, and 
available symbols.
Through these symbolic interactions for the 
hierarchization in virtues and values, domination/ 
acceptance/ resistance between or among persons and groups 
are partially renegotiated and restructured in everyday 
interactions. One important aspect of hierarchization in 
virtues and values is humiliation. "[Domination] always 
entails attempts to humiliate the dominated. So crucial are 
the insults and the slander that they must themselves be 
seen as an attempt to situate domination in time - to 
present reasons and justifications for its current 
existence, and to make claims against the future" (Sider 
1987:21). These insults and slanders also produce counter­
insults and slanders from the dominated. However, because 
of the power difference, and because of fear of discipline 
and terror from the dominant, the dominated often develop 
delicate, multivocal, or "back stage" (Scott 1985; 1990) 
counter-claims and insults. The relationship between claims 
and counter-claims, insults and counter-insults already 
presupposes the influence of state power, past physical 
confrontations, and the present and future possibility of 
symbolic and physical violence, customs, and cultural
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norms.15
Social Order and Everyday Humiliation
Socially superior groups in economy and power try to 
create and expand their cultural distance from lower groups 
in order to legitimate their social wealth and status. 
However, superior groups cannot distance themselves too far 
because they also need to incorporate lower groups into an 
"imagined community" (Anderson 1983), or they may need to 
create a myth of "imagined reciprocity." By making the 
distance too wide, superior groups will risk greater 
discontent and efforts by the lower groups to become 
independent, to change, or to overthrow. The tantalizing 
efforts by superior groups to maintain certain cultural 
distance, while nevertheless incorporating lower groups, are 
multi-faceted and ambiguous.
Through cultural manipulation, superior groups spread 
cultural trenches and nets which persuade people to believe 
that there is a difference between superior and lower groups 
and that a cultural difference justifies differences in 
power and economy. Cultural trenches and nets are also 
deployed to persuade people that all share some communal 
identities. Attitudes, gestures, hair, clothes, language
15 James Scott(1985; 1990) paid insufficient attention 
to the implication of state power in his dealing with the 
weapons of the weak. When the weak sense the possibility of 
disorganization of the state and the ruling class, their 
resistance often becomes explosive.
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(ideas, intonation, pronunciation, words...)# postures, 
paraphernalia (watches, rings, jewelry, ties, shoes...), 
decoration of a location, location of each individual, 
arrangements of place, customs, rituals, supernatural 
beings, and the human body are possible cultural trenches to 
be manipulated in order to reproduce and recreate the 
unequal and ambivalent interactions. The fluid, 
interactional cultural relationship (as well as economic and 
political fluidity) creates endless dynamics of social 
relationships.
One of those cultural trenches is the "crimogenic" 
image of certain minorities. "To many white Americans, not 
only are blacks poor by their own volition and incompetence; 
they also fail to exercise sufficient self-control and as a 
result are wanton in their disregard of common decency and 
the law which protects it" (Lewis 1978:77). This myth16
16 Relatively more Blacks than Whites are in jail. This 
does not imply that Whites seldom commit crime. Many Whites 
who may commit rape, assaults, or theft are not arrested 
because they can defend themselves and usually draw better 
treatment from the police, prosecutors, the court, and jury 
(e.g. a nephew of Senator Kennedy in Palm Beach). If we 
consider white-collar crime, the reality is much more 
opaque. If a Black is caught two times for illegally 
passing subway turnstiles (the loss to the city is only 
about three dollars), he could be put in jail for three 
months. However, several inside or junk bond traders of the 
New York Stock Exchange were on probation or in jail for 
short terms (e.g. Michael Milken) even though the damage by 
them to numerous people was several hundred million dollars. 
The range of white-collar "theft" is considered widespread. 
The social cost for white-collar crime and tax evasion is 
much higher than that for violent crime (Monteiro 1991). 
Those who commit white-collar crime and tax evasion are 
seldom put in jail, and seldom described as "criminal."
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makes Whites believe that Blacks fail partially because of 
their immorality. In this context, Blacks are easily 
recognized as a negative reference group. This accusation 
is a part of a pattern of discrimination and humiliation 
that affects Blacks, especially poor Blacks, in everyday 
interactions. One Black university professor stated after 
being accused as a shoplifter, "What it does to our 
collective psyche is that it makes sure you never forget 
that you are black and not welcomed" (New York Times. April. 
30, 1991).
Whenever new immigrants arrive, the construction of a 
adjusted racial order is a locus of struggle. To input new 
(racial or ethnic) names17 into American racial conception 
requires a reshuffling or readjustment of the existing order 
of names in order to incorporate and differentiate new 
names. Despite numerous and readily available identities, 
the fact that ethnic or racial categories becomes the 
criteria for incorporation into the American order implies 
that racial and ethnic conceptions are prominent in the 
American mind. Research into ethnic status in New York City 
revealed that the status of Koreans was 43rd among 50 ethnic 
categories in New York City and that the status of Blacks
17 The names, Black, Irish, or Korean, do not show the 
multiple complexities inside Blacks, Irish, or Koreans. A 
name often makes us ignore the complexity inside the named. 
Homogenizing effects of a name also cause us often minimize 
the complex relationships between or among "names" (Wolf 
1982:18-19).
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was 42nd /Korea Times of Washington, D.C.. Nov. 27, 1992). 
This ranking demonstrates that generally accepted ethnic 
status of Koreans and Blacks is similar. Despite these 
similar positions, Koreans try to insert themselves above 
Blacks within the American racial order through the 
practices of humiliation and mistreatment.
The "crimogenic" idea of Blacks is shared by both 
Korean shopkeepers and by Whites. This idea is serving in 
justifying the wealth and status of Korean shopkeepers. 
Korean shopkeepers have some other means to manipulate Black 
residents in everyday interactions because their business 
put them in direct contact with Black people everyday.
Korean shopkeepers frequently use the word, qumdunovi 
[nigger] in their private discourse but also sometimes in 
front of Black shoppers. As Hacker (1992:42) writes, 
"nigger" reminds Blacks that "Blacks are still perceived as 
a degraded species of humanity, a level to which whites can 
never descend." By using qumdunovi. Korean shopkeepers 
imply that not only Whites but also Koreans cannot descend 
into the position of "nigger."
Korean shopkeepers also relate to Black shoppers with a 
negative attitude because they think many Blacks are 
inferior and criminal. Through humiliation and 
mistreatment, Korean shopkeepers want to undermine the 
assertions of poor Blacks for fair treatment and for better 
prices. By driving down the claims and assertions of poor
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Blacks inside the store, some Korean shopkeepers may sell 
low-quality goods at a high price. All the boycotted Korean 
shopkeepers had only a short period of business experience. 
This implies that they had not worked out "compromised" 
attitudes toward poor Blacks or that they may have tried to 
extract maximum profit with harsh mistreatment in order to 
quickly establish their business. Thus, they are highly 
suspicious of any Blacks and treat ordinary shoppers and 
shoplifting suspects badly in order to minimize their 
losses, as well as minimize complaints from Blacks regarding 
quality and price of goods. Many Korean shopkeepers who are 
"well-established," are more tolerant of Blacks and Black 
suspects and expressed less severe judgements towards poor 
Blacks. They have already compromised their behavior and 
ideas through various conflicts and confrontations with 
Blacks. They do not need to worry as much about Black 
shoplifting and other problems because they have produced 
steady profit, or have already made enough money to provide 
some peace and tolerance regarding property loss.
In an experimental study of car dealers in Chicago, 
Ayers (1991) found that females paid about $150 more than 
males and Blacks paid about $400 more than Whites for the 
exact same car.18 In the article, one car dealer says,
18 It is difficult to prove whether Korean shopkeepers 
sell their goods for higher prices. According to Korean 
shopkeepers, their prices are certainly higher than big 
discount stores because of the difference in purchasing 
power. (However, big discount stores are rare in inner
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"You know, sometimes it seems like the people that can least 
afford it have to pay the most" (Ayer 1991:872). This 
article did not inquire why car salespersons or car dealers 
want more money from females or Blacks. However, the 
results show that status difference is often transferred 
into ability to negotiate a favorable price. Individual 
transactions in a store are not free from the hierarchical 
difference in social status. Domination of shopkeepers over 
Blacks within stores creates a condition where Blacks are 
limited in expressing their full claims and assertions as 
consumers. Through humiliation or hierarchical 
differentiation in social status in terms of race, Black 
consumers encounter discrimination and frustration. By 
using hierarchical differentiation, shopkeepers do not give 
full information and fair treatment to low-status consumers.
Humiliation and ridicule remind subaltern groups of 
their subordinate position and creates anxiety. Humiliation
cities.) They also believe that their prices are lower than 
that of Black shopkeepers because Korean shopkeepers have 
greater purchasing power (more capital) or have cheaper and 
hard-working labor. But, the difference in brands and 
quality makes the comparison more difficult. However, it is 
true that Korean as well as other shopkeepers generally sell 
low- priced and low quality goods in inner-cities, 
commanding a higher margin of profit. In comparison with 
invested capital, many Koreans believe that Korean 
shopkeepers in inner cities can harvest higher rates of 
profit than those in White neighborhoods or downtown where 
more capital investment is required for space and higher 
quality goods.
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and ridicule are a form of "symbolic violence"19 to keep a 
subaltern group in order. Symbolic violence is partially an 
expression of the superiority complex of the victimizers and 
is partially intended to generate feelings of inferiority 
from the victims. In the relationship between Korean 
shopkeepers and poor Black consumers, Korean shopkeepers try 
to put the double burdens of "inferior" race and lower class 
positions on the shoulders of poor Black consumers. As 
Fields (1990:106) says, "[p]eople are more readily perceived 
as inferior by nature when they are already seen as 
oppressed." Korean shopkeepers want to fix the inferior 
image of poor Blacks through everyday interactions. If poor 
Blacks already accept their image of inferiority, they will 
resist less. When poor Blacks think the inferior-superior 
relationship between Korean shopkeepers and poor Black 
residents is absurd, and Korean shopkeepers continue their 
insistence on an inferior-superior relationship through 
symbolic manipulation, tensions and confrontations result in
19 Bourdieu (1977a;1990) explains symbolic violence as 
a means of domination through, for example, gift giving in 
small scale societies. Thus, he describes symbolic violence 
as "gentle, invisible violence, unrecognized as such, chosen 
as much as undergone, that of trust, obligation, personal 
loyalty, hospitality, gifts, debts, piety, in a word, of all 
the virtues honored by the ethic of honor" (Bourdieu 
1990:127, for the better discussion of symbolic power, see 
Bourdieu 1991:163-120). I use "symbolic violence" as a more 
negative term than Bourdieu. In my sense, symbolic violence 
is an effort, with symbolic manipulation, to create psychic 
injury, self-doubt, self-feeling of worthlessness, or 
negative subjectivity in the victims. Insults, degradation, 
humiliation, devaluation, and unfair criticism can be 
considered as symbolic violence in this sense.
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due course. However, because symbols are usually vague and 
ambiguous, these tensions and confrontations are also 
ambiguous.
Both crimogenic idea and the practice of humiliation 
are both explanations and a justifications for Korean 
shopkeepers regarding the differences of social status and 
social meanings between Korean shopkeepers and poor Black 
residents. These practices put the responsibility of Black 
problems such as poverty upon the shoulder of Blacks. 
According to Korean shopkeepers and mainstream news media, 
Blacks have the same chances as Koreans, but they fail 
because of a lack of "something" among poor Blacks. 
"Something" may be intelligence, hard working ethics, or 
some other individual virtues. In contrast to Blacks,
Korean shopkeepers think of themselves as "smart," "hard­
working," and "law-abiding."20 Thus, the differences of 
social status and wealth are natural for Korean shopkeepers. 
In fact, it is a post factum justification of the 
differences in status and wealth. The causes of the 
differences, understood post factum by Korean shopkeepers 
and the boycotters, are respectively, the "laziness," 
"criminality," or "inferiority" of Blacks and "racism" of 
Koreans and White America. Whether either claim is true is 
not the point here. The point here is the implication of
20 However, some Korean shopkeepers note that Blacks have 
better physical body. Thus, they excel in sports and dance.
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those claims in the reproduction of social relationships.
The failure of poor Blacks is also criticized in
relation to the success of middle class Blacks. A newspaper
editorial stated,
But to blame race for all poverty is to demean those 
many millions of black Americans who have refused to be 
victims, who do not wallow in self-pity, who do not 
whine or make excuses but choose instead to live proud 
and productive lives." (Mew York Post. May 17, 1990, 
emphasis original)
Thus, the poor Black residents in inner cities are blamed
regardless, due to the success of either Koreans or middle
class Blacks.
This ideological attack, symbolic violence, and
everyday humiliation may persuade many poor Blacks to accept
their problems and low status as their own fault. However,
the opposite is also true. Symbolic violence and everyday
humiliation can ignite anger and rage. If space for more
open discourse for poor Blacks can be acquired, the rage and
anger can be contagious because of deep-seated feelings of
injustice and frustration. Through the emphasis of an
independent identity (that is, Black), more autonomous space
to express anger, rage, and feelings of injustice is
acquired. In the open public and private spaces of streets,
parks, subways, stores, etc., the victimizers can often feel
the mood of vengeance in the expressions of the victims.
Through various means, subaltern classes or groups may try
to discipline themselves, and to revenge the dominant.
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Discontents and Confrontation
As I explained previously, the relationship between 
shopkeepers and shoppers is usually unequal. However, the 
hierarchical nature of the two is not predetermined. The 
relationship is continuously negotiated and compromised 
through various interactions and contentions. The "newness" 
of Korean shopkeepers is especially important because there 
is no given criteria or accepted norm around which Korean 
shopkeepers and poor Black customers can negotiate or 
compromise in their social relationships. The lack of 
accepted criteria and the determination of Korean 
shopkeepers to insert themselves above Blacks creates 
"[extra/] ordinary contentions and episodic confrontations" 
(Sider 1986:72) between the two groups. This contention is 
not only about struggle over ethnic status but also about 
struggle over the appropriation of profit.
Theft, shoplifting, and burglary can be considered not 
only as a crime but also as a political act. Korean 
shopkeepers complain that Black shoplifters do not feel 
shame when they are caught. This "lack of morality" could 
be a political statement because, according to Bruce Wright, 
a Black New York City judge, they are simply breaking "a 
social contract that was not of their making in the first 
place" (quoted in Hacker 1992:187).21 Thus, it is a joy
21 In fact, young Blacks developed various anti-White, 
"anti-social," from the White perspective, culture. "If 
whites speak Standard American English, succeed in school,
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for some young Blacks to disrupt the rules. In one style of 
disruption is a group of young Blacks may enter a store, 
disrupt business, grab anything at random, and run away.
This "wilding" is described as "joyful" by some young 
Blacks.22
However, everyday individual contentions and 
confrontations do not produce visible effects on the way 
Korean shopkeepers treat poor Blacks and extract profits. 
Korean shopkeepers ignore individual contentions and 
confrontations because they know there are several hundred 
other consumers each day. Some individual Blacks often try 
to boycott Korean stores, but they fail because they do not 
have the manpower, resources, and determination.
Occasionally local looting and riots destroy some Korean 
businesses. However, looting and riots draw heavy moral 
attacks from news media, politicians, and the White 
majority. Successful or long-term boycotts had been 
organized only by Black activist organizations.
Black activist and nationalist organizations try to
work hard at routine jobs, marry, and support their 
children, then to be 'black' requires one to speak black 
English, do poorly in school, denigrate conventional 
employment, shun marriage, and raise children outside of 
marriage. To do otherwise would be to 'act white'" (Massey 
and Denton 1993:168). This oppositional culture is a way to 
protect their Black identity and a means to express that 
they are not a subordinate part of White America, at least 
culturally. Thus, the ideals in White America are often 
ridiculed and rejected by young Blacks.
22 For Whites and Koreans, these kinds of acts are another 
proof of the immorality of young Blacks.
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organize Black people in order to pursue an independent 
"Black interest." By collectivizing the power of "a sack of 
potatoes," these organizations want to form an effective 
class or "race-class."23 The December 12th Movement 
created manifold interactions among poor and young Blacks 
through various rallies (e.g. city-wide "Day of Outrage" 
demonstrations, demonstrations against police brutality and 
drug dealers, and boycotts of Korean shopkeepers).
Continuous collective confrontations can increase the size 
of the collectivity by allowing Blacks to experience the 
possibility of "Black Power". The confrontations also 
increase the opportunity for the collective experience of 
"Blackness" by Black participants and residents. These 
confrontations are, for Black activists, forward-looking 
confrontations which are construct, solidify, and expand the 
consciousness, networks, and linkages in and between Blacks.
23 Mot only small peasants but also the urban poor (the 
unemployed, part-timers, and small-business workers) are 
often "potatoes in a sack," because they don't enter "into 
manifold relationships with each other" (Marx 1967:123-124). 
However, poor Blacks often form communal but fractured 
discursive fields through their concentration in a separate 
living space, their shared experience of racism, the shared 
aspiration for justice, and the shared memory of the past. 
Modern transportation and information systems extend the 
discursive field. Thus, the beating of Rodney King by L.A. 
policemen was not only an event for L.A. but also an event 
for the U.S. and the world. The image of the beating and 
the consequent acquittal of the policemen creates a temporal 
manifold relationships with among Blacks. Black activist 
groups try to strengthen those manifold relationships 
through confrontations and organizations. By doing so and 
putting their interest hostile to the interest of dominant 
groups, "they form a class" (Marx 1967:124) or a "race- 
class."
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However, for state agents and many Whites, the same 
confrontations are considered as dangerous, criminal, and 
disruptive activities and an expression of moral disorder.
For Black activists, "Korean bashing" is, in a sense, 
an issue with the kind of emotional appeal needed to unite 
the Black community behind its radical leaders (Kwong 
1990:29). They might think that anger over the mystery24 
of the rapid success of Korean shopkeepers and individual 
discontents and sporadic confrontations against Korean 
shopkeepers can be absorbed into collective confrontations. 
Korean bashing could have more powerful appeals to the 
concrete thoughts and experience of Black residents because 
they contact Korean shopkeepers everyday. Korean bashing 
could provide poor Blacks a rallying point against injustice 
in America by highlighting the Korean case in the context of 
American racism.
If the Korean question provides a contemporary issue, 
the life of Malcolm X provides a historical repertoire of 
actions and expressions for many Blacks. Martin Luther
24 This mystery is accompanied with an idea of 
"irregularity" or something "uncommon." For many people, 
the rapid success of Korean immigrants was difficult to 
comprehend through common sense, especially compared to the 
failure of Black business in general. Thus, the existence 
of the "uncommon" or irregularity behind the success story 
of Koreans received wide-acceptance and created curiosity. 
The suspicious "uncommon" entity also ignites curiosity for 
some people and anger for others who suspect the nature of 
that "uncommon" entity. The "uncommon" entity could be 
racist assistance to Koreans from the government, and banks 
(for many Blacks) or an exceptional hard work of Koreans 
(for many news media).
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King, Jr. also provides a repertoire for other Blacks. For 
the December 12th Movement, however, which focuses on inner 
city Blacks, the repertoire of Dr. King does not represent 
the interest of poor Blacks. For them, the strategy of Dr. 
King fails. The peaceful marches which intend to appeal to 
the morality of liberal Whites failed to achieve any real 
change for poor Blacks. The direct confrontations which 
intend to threaten the stability of "racist" society are 
considered more relevant to achieving fundamental social 
equity for the December 12th Movement. Not by begging for 
morality, but through "Black Power" which can disrupt the 
existing order, they believe they canobtain an equal share 
and respect. Their symbol, frequently expressed in their 
leaflets for the boycotts against Korean shopkeepers or for 
general strikes, displays their feelings very well. In it, a 
muscular Black hand grabs and breaks something very 
powerfully.
However, individual discontent and symbolic 
manipulation is not the same as participation in collective 
confrontations are not the same. The December 12th Movement 
has its own networks and chapters in New York City. Its 
members as well as other boycott participants distribute 
leaflets on streets, organize rallies, send and make
opinions to newspapers, radio stations, and television news
programs to stimulate the moral indignation of Blacks, to
persuade Blacks to join the boycotts or demonstrations, or
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to build manifold interactions among Blacks. This does not 
mean that the confrontations can create a homogeneity of 
Blacks or poor Elacks. Elected Black officials complain 
about the tactics of "radical" confrontation used by the 
boycotters, and some Black leaders and poor Blacks complain 
about the political intention of the radical activists.
The process of confrontation is also a process of 
constructing images of the self as victim and of others as 
victimizers. Being victims, they can command moral 
superiority, at least among those who accept these images. 
The images of morality are invoked "to debate the present" 
(Roseberry 1989:223), the past, and the future, whatever its 
historical veracity is. These images are partially accepted 
by some liberal Whites (Hacker 1992) and by some state 
agents. Black activists also include a partial image of the 
present in their immediate alternative image. In this 
alternative image, the capitalist social relationships are 
expressed with a human face, that is, with a demand for a 
"fair share" for Blacks. In fact, various groups share 
parts of the images or readings of the past and the present 
of the others. This partial sharing is well-expressed in 
the ambivalence of members of the December 12th Movement 
toward capitalism, of liberal Whites toward Black 
nationalism, and of some Korean shopkeepers toward Black 
contentions. They often express contradictory, fragmented 
ideas. Their positions are fluid, to some degree, and
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conjoin with social contexts.
However, there are certain disjunctions between images
and actions. The acceptance of a particular reading of
others about the past and the present does not mean that 
emerging actions will recruit full participation. The 
acceptance of images or readings is different from the 
concessions or compromise in political and economic 
practices. That is, even though the confrontations in 
images and readings conjoin with the physical and political 
confrontations, there are also disjunctions between them. 
Thus, seeking minor or major changes in social order 
requires not only "cultural war" but also organizations.
Black boycotts are acts in defiance of American racial
order and also of the racial order in Korean minds. The
boycotts are also in defiance of the capitalist social 
order, particularly in the realm of the distribution of 
goods for individual consumption. That is, discontent and 
boycotts are multivocal. They aim not only at the attitudes 
of Korean shopkeepers and other shopkeepers, they are also 
partially directed at the existence of these shopkeepers, 
Black politicians, American racism, and capitalism. 
Connections between these targets are played in a fluid 
manner because of the fluctuation of situations and the 
change of discursive space and context.
Korean shopkeepers also know that the claims and 
targets of the boycotts are multivocal. When a neighboring
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Korean shopkeeper is boycotted, all other Korean shopkeepers 
in the area, and for that matter in the city talk about it 
and complain that the boycott, in fact, is aimed at each of 
them. By mere show, or "threat" of physical confrontations 
against a few Korean shopkeepers, Black boycotters 
successfully, but only partially, change the attitudes of 
Korean shopkeepers. Korean shopkeepers lessen their 
insults, lower their watchful eyes, and momentarily lessen 
their profits, and instead, tighten their etiquette and 
their supervision of each other.
Through these concrete, minor changes, physical and 
economic confrontations can provide partial claims and hopes 
for the future to some Blacks. Certainly, the failure of 
the confrontations can also provide partial self-denial and 
hopelessness for the future. However, by reclaiming the 
focus on the victimization of Blacks, the boycotters hope to 
augment the sense of injustice among Blacks and to increase 
the desire of Black Power to retake "what should be 
rightfully owned by Blacks." Through this process, the 
members of the December 12th Movement want to establish 
their hegemony (moral and political leadership) among Blacks 
in order to counter White domination.
Developmental Process of the Conflict
Although there was some Black resentment of Korean 
shopkeepers, such discontents did not erupt into collective
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confrontations in the late 1970s when there were few Korean 
shopkeepers in Harlem. Initially, the presence of Korean 
shopkeepers was not readily visible; the Black residents' 
ideas about Korean shopkeepers remained vague. Some Blacks 
even expressed their curiosity and asked the Korean 
shopkeepers whether they were Chinese or Japanese. Some 
other Blacks welcomed Korean shopkeepers since they 
considered that "Koreans are not Whites." Because the 
number of Korean shopkeepers was very small, Korean 
shopkeepers behaved carefully despite belief in their 
superiority to poor Blacks.
After the massive influx of Korean shopkeepers 
beginning in 1980, Black residents expressed their 
increasing anger at their mistreatment by Korean 
shopkeepers, especially by new Korean shopkeepers, and at 
the occupation of business strips by new 'alien' shopkeepers 
while Black were excluded. The rapid increase of Korean 
shopkeepers also increased the suspicion and anger of Blacks 
rapidly. This anger and suspicion was often expressed by 
individual Blacks. This anger was also sporadically 
expressed through collective complaints and boycotts led by 
various groups beginning in 1982. Through these complaints 
and boycotts, the two groups became more conscious about the 
presence and acts of each other.
Korean shopkeepers responded to these boycotts by 
organizing their own association, by intensifying efforts to
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expand their moral base for Black residents, and by 
strengthening their connections to state agents and Black 
leaders. However, Korean shopkeepers' increasing visibility 
and their mistreatment of local Blacks promoted the 
involvement of more determined and well-organized Black 
nationalist groups. These nationalist groups also tried to 
expand the moral base for their "Buy Black" campaigns in 
Black neighborhoods by targeting the Korean shopkeepers who 
became the most visible shopkeepers in poor Black 
neighborhoods during the 1980s. This collectivization of 
the tension between two groups increased both the 
involvement of various state agents and the attention of the 
news media.
Through this process, the conflicts between poor Black 
residents and Korean shopkeepers symbolize not only the 
relationship between the two groups but also the positions 
of the two groups in the context of American society. While 
Black boycotters understand the presence of Korean 
shopkeepers as an expression of the White domination over 
Blacks, Koreans and the White news media interpret the Black 
boycotts as a 'reverse racism' for new immigrants. Thus, 
the tension between the two groups became more collectivized 
through the last decade. This tension has also been 
increasingly presented by Koreans and the White news media 
as a symbol of the inability of Blacks to excel through 
their own self-help and by many Blacks as a symbol of the
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pervasive racism against Blacks in America, where only 
Blacks are systematically excluded.
Ripple Implication and Effects
During the process of the conflict, both groups tried 
very hard to establish their moral superiority and to 
enhance their moral appeals to mainstream news media and to 
the general public. These moral battles included not only 
interpretations of the cause of conflicts and of the past, 
present, and future relationships between the conflicting 
groups but also interpretations of the justness of American 
society and the capitalist social relationships, especially 
exclusive property rights. Black boycotters and Korean 
shopkeepers also interpret the conflict in American 
contexts, while news media, Whites, and state agents 
interpret the conflict in the context of American society.
For Korean shopkeepers and state agents who have to 
deal with any illegality in the conflict, "Black activist 
bashing," especially, "Carson bashing" is an issue with the 
kind of emotional appeal needed to attract support from the 
White community and news media, to divide Black support for 
the boycotts, and to turn the tide against the nationalist 
demands of the Black boycotters. These connections which 
cross over racial, ethnic, and class lines provide a moment 
to reshuffle racial connections in New York City. By 
bashing the "reverse racism" of Black boycotters against
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Koreans as a member of "Asians," Asians were presented as 
new victims of "new racism." The category of Asians 
suddenly became a visible racial umbrella which connected 
hitherto discrete ethnic units such as Koreans, Chinese, 
Filipinos, and Vietnamese into one category. Especially 
after some Vietnamese were misrecognized as Koreans and 
beaten by Black youths, Asians felt that they cannot but 
live under the common umbrella of "Asians."
Whites, as well as Asians, were reshuffled. The 
aggressive offense by Black activists produced tension among 
liberal Whites. White complaints appeared all over the 
mainstream newspapers in New York City. This process 
produced a vivid image that Blacks were not only victims of 
racism but also that some Blacks were racists. Sonny 
Carson's famous "anti-White" comments during the mayoral 
election campaign in 1989 and his previous "anti-Semitic" 
comments, sensationalized by news media, provided a context 
for Whites in understanding "reverse racism." This 
contextualization was further strengthened by the comments 
of the police, some federal agents, and Mayor Dinkins over 
the boycotts. Because of "reverse racism," the ties between 
Blacks and liberal Whites were further strained. Mark 
Naison said, given the influx of immigrants from Asia and 
Latin America, "the politics of black rage and white guilt 
no longer serves the cause of justice in a multiethnic New 
York" (New York Times. Jan. 21, 1991).
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However, the discontent over White domination is 
widespread among the Black population. Even Mayor Dinkins 
mentioned that "there was a time when we had been so 
brainwashed, as it were, by whites in the United States that 
we did not fully appreciate the grand and glorious heritage 
that is ours" (New York Times. Feb. 21, 1990). The boycotts 
against Korean shopkeepers were another opportunity for some 
Blacks to explore how Whites react. As many Blacks 
expected, Whites again came out against Black causes.
Thus, the mistrust, injustice, immorality, and racism 
of each other are reconfirmed. Korean shopkeepers became 
more conservative and demanded stronger discipline of 
"criminals" (including boycotters) by the police and other 
law enforcement institutions. The law enforcement 
institutions reconfirmed their suspicions over Black 
activists as disrupter of social order. The Black activists 
again reconfirmed the racism of the police, FBI, offices of 
district and federal attorneys, and the court. Some liberal 
Whites were shocked by Black "reverse racism" toward 
Koreans. Other Whites again confirmed their distrust toward 
Blacks. Still other Whites saw two "barbaric" minorities 
engaged in a dog-fight. The image of Koreans and Blacks 
during the L.A. riots is a good example. The Koreans were 
described as overreacting to the riot, with guns and rifles, 
while Blacks were described as hoodlums and gang members.
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Persuasion or Coercion?
Through its multivocality, ambiguity, and fluidity of 
meanings, not only the dominant groups but also the 
resisting groups provide their own moral and political 
alibi. Because the subaltern groups also have their own 
alibi, it is very difficult to say that the dominant groups 
excercise moral leadership over all dominated groups. Some 
dominated groups can create multivocal and autonomous spaces 
where the moral leadership of the dominant group only 
partially penetrates. Korean shopkeepers and Black 
boycotters are good examples. While Korean shopkeepers 
accept and internalize racism and capitalism, they also 
express their resentment about White demands for deference. 
Black boycotters reject racism and White deference while 
they partially accept the capitalist social relationships.
The partial rejection of the leadership of the dominant 
group by the dominated groups means that there should be 
continuous negotiation and struggle in order to temporarily 
stabilize the fluid and ambiguous boundary between autonomy 
and penetration. In other words, the unequal social 
relationships are not fixed. They are challenged, 
reinstituted, and reconstituted through interactive talks, 
symbols, forces, and economic constraints. Dominant groups 
in stratified societies have the tantalizing requirement to 
reproduce the "biased" balance of power in reproducing their 
unequal social relationships.
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Persuasion
The dominant groups may want to create and reproduce 
social environment where their superiority is not 
challenged. If the unequal social relationships can be 
accepted as common sense by the dominated, the reproduction 
of the unequal social relationships would be easier for the 
dominant. However, common sense is a series of stratified 
deposits, multiplicity of distinct and often contradictory 
ideas; thus, common sense always has a possibility of change 
(Gramsci 1987). Common sense is also a locus of struggles 
to input "biased accents" in the "common sense" vision of 
the world. Classification, the words, the names (Bourdieu 
1989) which construct common sense of the social reality are 
also at stake in the struggles. The construction of 
negative images over Blacks is also a way to cause negative 
images to be perceived as common sense. For many Whites and 
Koreans, the negative images of Blacks are common sense. 
However, this is not common sense for many Blacks, because 
this make no sense to them.
Korean shopkeepers do not have a patrimonial bond with 
the Black population. Korean shopkeepers have no cultural 
repertoires which can be claimed as communal with poor 
Blacks.25 Thus, they cannot counter the boycotters' claims
25 Any Black shopkeeper, having problem with a Black 
consumer, can mobilize a variety of communal repertoires, 
persuasive to Blacks, to counter the possible "collective"
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of Koreans as "outsiders" or "exploiters." In the movie,
"Do the Right Thing," a Korean shopkeeper avoids the 
destruction of his store by shouting, "Me black, Me black." 
In reality, that does not work. Many Korean intellectuals 
insist that Blacks and Koreans are part of the same oppresed 
minority. This makes only partial sense to many Blacks and 
Koreans. Some Blacks think Koreans are not the proper 
target of Black rage because they are both minorities. 
However, because of the attitudes of Koreans, their 
residence in White areas, and their economic position, the 
claims of Koreans as outsiders make more sense to Black 
residents.
Korean shopkeepers have to create cultural repertoires 
in order to use them. By participating in several local, 
Black festivals, donating to several Black organizations, 
joining in local ceremonies, campaigning for Black 
politicians, and advertising in Black newspapers, Korean 
shopkeepers try to create a common sense that Korean 
shopkeepers are also a part of Black communities. That is, 
the cultural participation of Korean shopkeepers in Black 
neighborhoods is an effort by Korean shopkeepers to blur the 
boundary between Black residents and Korean shopkeepers and 
to make Korean shopkeepers partial insiders of Black
claims against him/her. However, there may also be some 
distance between Black shopkeepers and poor Blacks (Loewen 
1971).
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communities.26 For example, Korean traditional dances in 
Harlem provide a context where Korean shopkeepers 
"coordinate and coadjust a multiplicity of emotions and 
interests" (Sider 1986:94) between Korean shopkeepers and 
Black residents. Because of the multiplicity and ambiguity 
of meanings in Korean dances, the intentions and reactions 
are fluid and vague. However, the Korean shopkeeper who 
organizes the Korean dance performance felt much more 
clearly about the implication of Korean dance toward the 
conflict between Korean shopkeepers and poor Blacks.
While Korean shopkeepers try to persuade Black 
residents not to feel angry toward Koreans, the boycotters 
try to both persuade Black residents to join the boycott and 
to persuade Korean shopkeepers to stop discrimination. The 
Black boycotters and relavant Korean shopkeepers try to 
discuss the issues. This partial negotiation and persuasion 
is not effective, because both groups project a very 
different agenda. In fact, they give up the attempt to 
persuade each other. Because dialogue does not work, they 
try other methods of persuasion: displays of power and 
determination. It is very difficult to call these acts
26 This does not mean that Korean shopkeepers want to 
eliminate the boundary. They do not want to become the same 
as Blacks who are degraded in America. They just want to 
blur the boundary to some degree in order to make the 
centralization and organization of scattered discontent and 
anger against Korean shopkeepers difficult.
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persuasion or coercion.27 In fact, persuasion often 
presupposes political coercion and economic constraints.
Both are interconnected but with some disjunctures.
One of the examples is the barrage of negative images 
of the Black boycotters in mainstream newspapers. In a 
sense that the newspapers produce only images, this is a 
method of persuasion. But in another sense, the barrage of 
negative images, which will certainly produce a negative 
response among Whites, politicians, and possibly some 
Blacks, can also create a great political pressure or an 
excitement of exposures for the boycotters. However, 
negative images of the boycott may isolate the boycotters, 
fostering detrimental pressure from various social groups 
including some Black organizations.
The mainstream news media provided sensationalized 
images of the conflict between Blacks and Koreans during May 
and June 1990. These sensationalized negative images of the 
Black boycotters (particularly Sonny Carson) created an 
uproar over "reverse racism" not only from White viewers but 
also from some Black viewers. These viewers believed that 
the demand of the boycotters to expel Korean shopkeepers was 
"racist" and the boycotters preached "racial hatred" in 
Black neighborhoods. This uproar directly influenced the 
position of Mayor Dinkins about the boycott. By May 1990, 
he criticized the boycott as "based on race." This
27 It could be called a "persuasive threat."
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expression of opposition was a powerful persuasion for many 
Blacks because the Black mayor had received 91% of the Black 
vote just six months earlier and also maintained a claim to 
a strong communal bond with the Black population and their 
aspirations. This situation made many Blacks cross the 
picket line. Even though the Black boycotters were not 
persuaded by Mayor Dinkins at all (rather the opposite 
happened), they then had to deal with the consequence of his 
speech to other Blacks.
Coercion and Constraints
According to Wolf(1990), power is composed of a series 
of stratified power relationships. These power 
relationships are also the locations of pressure and 
coercion in the conflict between Korean shopkeepers and 
black boycotters. These relationships presuppose each other 
during the conflict between poor Blacks and Korean 
shopkeepers.
On the level of individual daily interactions, the 
physical confrontations or threats of confrontation and 
symbolic violence through name-calling or humiliation 
provide the context of temporal coercions. However, as I 
have explained, Korean shopkeepers have more power in 
everyday interactions through the support of state power and 
the nature of the interactions. Individual coercion, that 
is, physical confrontation by a consumer will not produce
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effective results for what he/she wants. According to some 
Blacks, Korean stores are the only stores in their immediate 
area. Because of these economic constraints, they must shop 
at Korean stores in many Black neighborhoods.
Individual physical threats or coercion of Korean 
shopkeepers against shoplifting suspects may reduce 
shoplifting. But this type of physical confrontation often 
produces innocent victims. Above all, physical discipline 
by Korean shopkeepers of innocent victims or shoplifting 
suspects, whoever they are, is illegal. Physical discipline 
is monopolized by the state system. However, violations of 
law does not guarantee the imprisonment of the violator 
because of various problems in legal system, legal agents, 
or social relations.
Collectivization of power is an important step in 
fighting a more powerful person because of the strength of 
numbers, the possibility of attention from friendly forces 
(although the opposite is also possible), and the 
possibility of overpowering a "higher" individual by a 
group. However, collectivization will make an issue a 
collective matter, thus the other side may try to 
collectivize their power, and furthermore intervention from 
third parties such as state agents or other forces may also 
occur. Collective boycotts against Korean shopkeepers 
inspire Korean shopkeepers to form Korean merchant 
associations all over New York City and the surrounding
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area. That is, in order to counter the collectivization of 
Black power against Korean shopkeepers, Korean shopkeepers 
have also collectivized their power through the formal 
organization of dispersed individual shopkeepers or 
"potatoes in a sack." Collective boycotts also brought the 
police into the matter and inspired members of Korean 
shopkeeper organizations to busily contact state agents and 
private local leaders.
A  boycott itself is economic coercion. The Black 
boycott was an economic coercion forcing several Korean 
shopkeepers to lose money and close their stores. The 
boycott may also be considered political persuasion and
pressure because it demonstrates that other Korean
shopkeepers or any non-Black shopkeepers who mistreat Blacks 
may become a target of a later economic coercion. The 
boycotters successfully apply force to the boycotted Korean 
stores. During the boycotts, sales at the boycotted Korean 
stores dove down to tens of dollars from thousands of
dollars. If the boycott is part-time as in Harlem in 1988,
a store could manage to produce enough profit to sustain 
their store. However, this economic constraint of the 
boycotts is countered by the police who try to open and 
maintain free business interaction or by Korean shopkeepers 
who donate money to the boycotted stores.
The presence of dozens or hundreds of police officers 
created an image of physical confrontation in the conflict.
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However, only a few boycotters were actually arrested for 
violating minor laws, and other boycotters and Korean 
shopkeepers were ticketed because of their physical 
confrontations. Because the police maintained a balance of 
power through the appearance of physical force and because 
more law enforcement agents could be mobilized, there was no 
direct confrontation with the police or between Korean 
shopkeepers and Black boycotters.28
Since state agencies have to follow the laws which 
protect not only individual property rights but also the 
individual rights of free speech, they allow the boycott to 
continue while protecting the property rights of Korean 
shopkeepers. However, the boycotts are restricted to 
prevent the violation of the property rights of the target 
store-owners. Thus, the imposition of communal 
responsibility on the Korean shopkeepers by the protesters 
is not possible. The capitalist law and state systems 
protect individual property rights over communal 
responsibility. The determination of the Black boycotters 
to boycott and the determination of the Korean shopkeepers 
to stay open, and the rights of free speech and property 
which are to be protected by state agents, create a 
stalemate.
28 The direct confrontation with the police or even with the 
army is possible as the L.A. riot in 1992 showed. In the 
L.A. riots, there was also a direct confrontation involving 
guns and rifles between Korean shopkeepers and rioters.
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When the front was stabilized among Korean shopkeepers, 
police agents, and Black boycotters, there was a fierce 
struggle to win the influence of Mayor Dinkins, other 
politicians and other state agents. When the President of 
the Association of New York met President Bush in June 1990, 
he requested the intervention of the federal government in 
the 1990 Church Avenue boycott. The intervention from the 
federal government agents was very limited. However, the 
FBI which had previously destroyed the Black Panther Party 
and other Black activist groups investigated the boycott and 
members of the December 12th Movement.
Mayor Dinkins and his subordinates applied pressur 
hard to stop the boycott. There was also pressure on Mayor 
Dinkins to take the side of the boycotters because Black 
activists in the boycott had considerable influence over the 
Black population in Brooklyn. These interactional pressures 
between Black activists and Black politicians created 
tension among the Black population in New York City. Even 
though the boycotts are over at this moment, the tension 
between Black activists and Black politicians remains.
Conjunction of Persuasion and Coercion
Political force, economic constraints, and physical 
confrontations are interpenetrated and intermingled in the 
case of the Black boycotts against Korean shopkeepers. The 
enforcement of certain coercive tactics also presupposed a
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certain degree of cultural consensus because the 
participants followed specific rules. For example, the 
boycotters and Korean shopkeepers avoided individual 
beatings not only because of the state agents or the fear of 
notoriety but because they also shared, to some degree, the 
idea that private beatings of individuals were improper. On 
the public stage, they also shared the idea that each side 
should follow specific aspects of law (e.g. civil rights for 
all).
Because the both groups also wanted to gain moral 
superiority in order to appeal to Black residents and the 
general public, their confrontations were constrained to a 
moral struggle. The desire for moral superiority limited 
not only physical confrontations but also the presentations 
of meanings. Because of the desire for moral superiority 
and the presence of police force, the expression of certain 
ideas were restricted or stimulated. Thus, it can be said 
that expressions or censure of certain ideas presuppose the 
existence of coercion and constraints.
Minor everyday coercion (disciplinar strategies using 
oney, power, physical forces, and symbolic violence) is 
intermingled with the manipulation of claims, symbols, and 
customs. Possibility of coercion and cultural forms are 
often inseparable. Harassment and humiliation are partially 
coercion and partially persuasion. Because the nuance of 
cultural activity reflects a background of coercion and
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ambiguity, many victims knowingly ignore racist attitudes, 
insults, provocation, and irritation. Everyday racist jabs 
and insults injure the minds of victims and often remind 
them of the threat of physical force.
Persuasion and coercion are not under the exclusive 
possession of the ruling bloc. Resisting groups such as 
Black boycotters also use both of them. The social fields 
might be full of multivocal, vague, clear, series of dis- or 
conjointed, episodic or relatively stable ideas, customs, 
symbols, constraints, and coercions. Thus, partial 
accommodation of opposed ideas and partial coercion (not 
only physical, but also economic and political) are common 
not only among the dominated but also possibly among the 
dominant. Because the dominant groups need not only to 
discipline the dominated groups but also to incorporate them 
into a shared or "imagined" boundary, it is difficult for 
the dominant to exclude all of the ideas and customs of the 
dominated. That is, "[t]he process of domination imposes a 
dialogue between dominators and dominated"(Sider 1987:22).
Orderings in Meaning, Power, and Economic Relationships
The relationship between Korean shopkeepers and poor 
Black residents is not only economic but also a relationship 
of power and meanings. Each relationship interpenetrates 
the other. By using their economically higher position, 
Korean shopkeepers try to insert themselves above Blacks in
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the American racial order. Through humiliation and insults, 
they may drive down the claims and assertions of Black 
consumers during the economic interactions. This continuous 
humiliation is only possible through the unequal power 
relationship which is again based on the unequal economic 
relationship between Korean shopkeepers and poor Black 
residents. This does not mean that the economic 
relationship determines other relationships. There are some 
disjunctions among the relationships on different levels.
Each relationship is also fully embedded in wider 
social relationships. The meanings projected to each other 
cannot be fully understood if the social context of American 
racism, the history of the experience of oppression of 
Blacks, and the newness of Koreans in America are ignored. 
The power relationship between the two can be understood 
only in the context of state power and the American 
electoral system. The economic relationship between the two 
already presupposes American capitalism. Not because 
Koreans have a greater access to the government, news media, 
and the White public, but because all of the above have, or 
believe to have, an interest in maintaining the present 
American capitalist and racial order, Korean shopkeepers 
could obtain supports from state agent and Whites. However, 
this is contingent upon specific conditons because a 
temporary alliance of some Whites and some Blacks is also 
possible.
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Because of the lack of social power and the lack of 
social support from Whites, state agents, and news media, 
poor Blacks cannot depend on the existing or legitimate 
channels which are biased against poor Blacks. Legitimate 
channels (the police and the courts) are more supportive of 
higher classes and prosecute only the conspicuous wrongdoing 
of superior classes. Minor mistreatment and cultural 
humiliation do not become issues. Thus, Blacks feel 
frustrated with legitimate channels and depend more on 
disruptive tactics, demonstrations, and street 
confrontation.
Economically and politically higher classes or groups 
often describe lower groups as pathological, barbaric, 
dirty, or lazy. By describing them so, the higher groups 
may claim their innocence and blame the victims. Through 
their power, they may try to silence discontent and 
criticism directed against the higher groups. This creates 
better conditions for the reproduction of unequal social 
relationships. However, this process is full of tensions, 
due to the changing balance of power and negotiation.
The continuous actions and negotiations make the 
reproduction of concrete unequal social relations relatively 
uncertain, the various dimensions of assorted practices or 
actions influence the process of the reproduction of social 
relations. Social orders in different dimensions of social 
practices are interpenetrated and interconnected. There are
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"the unbreakable links among language, power relations, and 
the materiality of everyday life"(Pred and Watts 1992:xvi, 
emphasis original). Thus, it can be said that "[s]ocial 
relations presuppose the legal system, state system, and 
culture"(Hoffman 1975:114).
While different racial experiences and rhetoric are 
the principal framework for understanding the conflict 
between Korean shopkeepers and poor Black residents, the 
state and capitalist social relationships are the principal 
ordering forces in everyday power-relations between them. 
However, the Black boycotts against Korean shopkeepers also 
simultaneouslu aim at different dimensions of social orders. 
The boycotters could project alternative images of racial, 
cultural, political, and economic orders in the limited 
spaces during a limited time. The partial disruption of the 
reproduction of the social relationships by the December 
12th Movement and the boycotters provided some sense of 
claiming the future —  a future of challenging, yet not 
replacing, power.
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AFTERWORD
The Korean Seafood Association of New York1 —  
which protects the rights of its 800 KSA member—  
has declared an immediate boycott of Slavin and 
Sons, 106 South Street. Picketing and protest 
will begin July 28, 1988 at 7 AM in front of 
Slavin and Sons.2
Slavin and Sons has consistently demonstrated 
unfair business practices when dealing with KSA 
buyers. These include: the monopolization of 
certain goods, poor quality of merchandise sold, 
unprofessional conduct with KSA buyers, and 
inconsistent refund policies.
• • •
In many cases, the fish market is the sight 
for quick-tempers, competitive attitudes that 
force sellers and buyers to engage in 
unprofessional business activity. Some of these 
aspects have been entrenched in the fish market as 
part of the game. Slavin and Sons, however, go 
beyond the limitations of the game. Consistently, 
repeatedly, deliberately, time-in and time-out, 
they have shown complete disrespect and dishonesty 
towards Koreans. And this is exceptional. And it 
cannot be tolerated...(from a leaflet for a 
boycott by Korean fish retailers against a White 
fish wholesaler)
Conflicts between Korean Shopkeepers and White Wholesalers 
When new Korean green grocers first came to Hunts 
Point, Bronx, the wholesale market for vegetables and fruits 
in New York City, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, some
1 The association is for the Korean fish retailers in the 
greater New York City area. They organized several boycotts 
against individual White wholesalers in the Fulton Fish 
Market which supplies about one to two hundred million 
dollars of fish and marine products for New York City and 
vicinity e v e r y  day.
2 At the time of the boycott, Korean fish retailers 
considered Slavin and Sons to be the worst wholesalers for 
the Koreans.
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wholesalers who were openly anti-Asian refused to deal with 
those Korean immigrants. Others overcharged. One of the 
first Korean grocers, recalled that Korean green grocers 
were not allowed to open crates to inspect the produce they 
were buying. Another Korean green grocer, who has a Ph.D. 
degree in Nuclear Physics and entered the green grocery 
business in the late 1960s, said that the wholesalers always 
yelled, "Chinks, go away. We don't want Chinks around 
here." One day he challenged a wholesaler. He blew up and 
threw some punches at a wholesaler. But the wholesaler 
soundly beat him. He sighed, "I was too ashamed to tell my 
wife, too ashamed to tell my family"(Harris 1983).
Korean fish retailers experienced similar things. A 
Korean fish market owner in Harlem remembered that whenever 
he bought a box of 125 pounds of whiting, the real weight of 
the box was always about 100 pounds. The price depended on 
the mercy of the wholesalers (the price always fluctuates in 
the wholesale market because of the whims of the weather, 
supply and demand, and the wholesalers). If he demanded an 
explanation, the wholesalers and his employees would insult 
him with foul language and threats. If he checked inside 
the box to find out whether the fish were good or not, the 
wholesalers and his employees would insult him again. In an 
incident that occurred in 1984, one Korean fish retailer 
demanded an explanation. The argument began between the 
Korean fish retailer and one of the employees of the
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wholesale stores, and the employee eventually killed the 
Korean fish retailer.
As in the case of the conflict between Black residents 
and Korean shopkeepers, the two groups involved have 
different understandings about the origin of conflict. 
Accordingly, the wholesalers expressed an opposite view.
One wholesaler stated that the conflicts began because the 
Koreans would pick out the best of the contents and leave 
the rest scattered on the floor. He also added, "The fact 
that they didn't speak English well didn't help either" 
(quoted in Harris 1983).
Whatever the cause of the conflict., the frustration of 
Korean green grocers and fish retailers runs deep. Whenever 
they reported this injustice to the police, nothing 
happened. They suspected a connection between the police 
and the wholesalers. When the number of Korean fish 
retailers increased quickly during the mid-1980s, many 
Koreans hoped to direct some activism against the worst 
wholesaler in the market in order to show all wholesalers 
that Korean fish retailers had punitive power.
When Korean shopkeepers organized their boycott against 
White wholesalers, the Koreans ironically mentioned almost 
the same things which Black boycotters mentioned about 
Korean shopkeepers: disrespect, high price, humiliation,
and abuse. Because the frustration was deep, the solidarity 
was strong. The boycott target, Slavin and Sons, was
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notorious among Korean fish retailers for mistreatment and 
price manipulation. The Korean Seafood Association (KSA) 
demanded that the owner respect Korean -fish retailers and 
practice fair business. After four months, the wholesaler 
surrendered. The business could not manage to produce a 
profit, primarily because the Korean fish retailers were the 
majority of the retailers, and they had stopped patronizing 
the wholesale store. After this victory, the KSA taught 
several "bad" wholesalers some lessons with the threat of 
boycotts or through actual boycotts.
During the boycott, the Koreans tried to reach various 
government officials and politicians for a beneficial 
intervention. Since the Korean fish retailers targeted only 
one store and demanded only the change of specific "unfair" 
practices* they were not considered a threat to social order 
by the state agents. However, the state agents also did not 
consider the practices of the wholesaler to be criminal. As 
usual, small humiliations and unfair practices did not draw 
the attention from state agents. The Korean fish retailers 
also tried to "play" fish wholesalers against each other 
competitively. The wholesalers in the market frequently 
donated money for KSA events to attract Koreans to their 
stores. One wholesaler rented a space to the KSA for 100 
years at no charge.
After the boycotts, there was a visible change in the 
attitudes of the wholesalers. Aside from the boycotted
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wholesalers the other wholesalers compromised their 
attitudes and their business practices. Nevertheless, some 
months after the boycotts, a few wholesalers again expressed 
their contempt of Koreans openly. Korean fish retailers and 
green grocers also wanted to take further action to change 
more fundamental discriminatory practices which were 
hitherto considered "acceptable." Thus, there have been 
periodic boycotts by Korean shopkeepers against subtle and 
open discrimination, mistreatment, and humiliation by White 
wholesalers. This fluidity and dynamics of tension between 
them has often erupted into a violent confrontation between 
individuals in the two groups.
While some of the demands from the Black boycotters 
went beyond the limit of capitalism (e.g., community control 
over its economy) and American racial order (e.g., Black 
Power), the demands from Korean fish retailers were within 
capitalism's boundary (e.g., do fair business), and the 
Koreans did not challenge the racial order. That is, they 
did not demand "Korean Power," or "Buy Korean Movement." 
Thus, the Koreans were not considered a threat to social 
order by the state agents. In the case of the Black boycott 
against Korean shopkeepers, they were considered a threat. 
Thus, the opposition from the public and the negative 
intervention of state agents such as the NYPD, FBI, 
politicians, and courts made the demands of Black boycotters 
for the radical change of an existing social relationship
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unsuccessful. The Korean fish retailers demanded only a 
minor change in the practices of one fish wholesaler at a 
time. However, the results of the two different boycotts 
were similar: improved and fairer treatment from those who 
are in a better position.
The Social Dilemma of Korean Shopkeepers 
In this dissertation, I focused on the relationship 
between the Korean shopkeeper and poor Black customers. 
Through the use of their economic position, Korean 
shopkeepers tried to establish a racial hierarchy. In the 
case of the conflict between White wholesalers and Korean 
shopkeepers, the White wholesalers used their class and 
racial power to create and stabilize hierarchical 
differences by victimizing Korean shopkeepers. Thus, Korean 
shopkeepers organized boycotts against White wholesalers.
In fact, the racism of intermediary Whites or Koreans 
should be contextualized in the whole American social 
structure. Intermediaries face great status anxiety and 
pressure from the pervasive racism in America. Although 
Korean racism conforms to the existing racism of the 
dominant, their actions are partially efforts to avoid 
further victimization or degradation by stepping on the 
shoulder of Blacks, thus creating their social distance from 
Blacks. Often, those in direct contact with the most 
degraded groups are the most violent racists.
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I do not want to excuse the racism of intermediate 
groups here. I merely want to point out that the racism of 
the intermediate and lower status groups is well-connected 
to the racism of the dominant groups. In this sense, 
whether they accept or reject the moral leadership of the 
dominant groups or not, they reproduce the racism in their 
own way and act within the boundaries of cultural norms 
supported by the dominant groups. While the intermediate 
status groups resent and often envy the privileges of the 
dominant and their discrimination against the intermediate 
groups, these intermediate groups also try to expand their 
own privileges and discriminate against easily degraded 
people.
White wholesalers abused and taken advantage of Korean 
shopkeepers; Korean shopkeepers abused and taken advantage 
of Black consumers. As an intermediate class between 
capital and labor, as well as between White wholesalers and 
Black consumers, Korean shopkeepers are the victims of 
racism and simultaneously racist victimizers.
Final Words
By describing Blacks, Koreans, or Whites as a unit of 
ethnicity or race, I have falsely created bounded ethnic and 
racial units. Even though I qualified their class positions 
by using terms such as "poor," "shopkeeper," and 
"wholesaler," the complexity of the fluid and contradictory
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phenomena cannot be fully described in this presentation.
In reality, ethnic or racial boundaries are based on 
"imagined communities" (Anderson 1983) rather than real 
communities. Imagined communities are often more apparent 
-than real communities, for through the imagination of human 
beings, imagined communities are considered tangible and 
people act accordingly.
The creation of an identity based on an imagined 
community is also an effort by people to understand their 
ethnic and racial reality within their political-economic 
and cultural environment. Thus, the simplified hierarchy of 
imagined communities is also a conceptual effort to find 
order in reality. This attempt often falls into the false 
image of separate and distinct boundaries for racial and 
ethnic units. Blacks, Koreans, or Whites are so diverse 
that it is almost impossible to understand the diversity 
with simple racial or ethnic terms.
I used Blacks, Koreans, or Whites as conceptual tools 
which allow to approach reality. Conceptual tools are not 
precise reflection of reality. Conceptual tools usually 
simplify and put reality in order. They are useful in 
analyzing reality. If the conceptual tools cannot 
efficiently explain and analyze reality, the tools can be 
discarded or modified. However, I hope I conveyed some of 
the complexity of social reality by using conceptual tools 
of race and class. Because conceptual tools are in tension
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(as all words are in social tension [Volosinov 1986]) and 
also limit and structure our possibility of understanding 
reality, my understanding of reality is also limited and 
structured by the continuous tension of my conceptual tools.
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